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THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF TRUST IN SCIENCE 
Karen Frost-Arnold Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2008
 
 
I argue that trust is epistemically important because it is the foundation of social practices 
that confer significant epistemic benefits on scientific communities.   
I begin by showing the limitations of the dominant rational choice account of trust, which 
maintains that trust is rational when the truster has good reason to believe that it is in the 
trusted’s self-interest to act trustworthily.  These limitations motivate my alternative account of 
trust, which recognizes non-self-interested motivations for acting trustworthily, such as having a 
sense of duty.  The first part of the account captures the cognitive aspect of trust.  When we trust, 
we take a particular cognitive attitude towards the claim that the trusted will do what we expect 
her to do; I argue that this cognitive attitude can be either belief or acceptance, in the sense 
outlined by Michael Bratman.  The second part of my account captures the emotional and moral 
aspects of trust by providing a framework to understand the connection between trust and 
betrayal—the feeling that usually results from being let down by a person one trusts.  I provide 
an account of betrayal as a reactive emotion that connects it to beliefs about relational 
obligations.  Thus when we trust, we depend on the trusted because we believe that our 
relationship with the trusted morally obliges her to act as expected.   
Using this account of trust, I argue that scientific communities can garner significant 
epistemic benefits when scientists are trustworthy and when they trust each other.  Applying a 
framework adapted from Alvin Goldman’s work on social epistemology, I argue that trust fosters 
 iv 
epistemically beneficial sharing between scientists.  These arguments are supported by a case 
study of the role that trust played in the achievements made by the community of early 20th 
Century Drosophilists.  Finally, using recent examples of scientific fraud in cloning research and 
public policy responses to much-publicized ‘crises in trust’, I argue that the epistemic success of 
science results, in part, from science’s ability to balance competition and cooperation, trust and 
distrust, self-interest and other-interest.   
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0.0  INTRODUCTION 
But it is impossible to go through life without trust: 
that is to be imprisoned in the worst cell of all, oneself. 
—Graham Greene The Ministry of Fear 
 
 
As social beings, we are dependent on others.  Most of the goods in life (e.g. food, health, 
security, intimacy, and education) cannot be brought about by one individual acting alone.  In 
addition, once one has attained some of these goods, one cannot sustain or keep them secure 
without the help or, at the very least, non-interference of others (Baier 1994, p.95).  This means 
that we are constantly making plans based on the assumption that others will play their part in 
providing, sustaining, or leaving alone something on which we depend.  In particular, we 
constantly trust others to perform or refrain from performing particular actions.   
Scientists are no different from the rest of humanity in this regard.  The most forceful 
arguments for a role for trust in scientific knowledge have come from philosophers who focus on 
the importance of collaboration for science (Hardwig 1991 and Webb 1993).  They note that 
modern science is increasingly a social institution in which individuals work together to produce 
scientific knowledge.1  One indicator of the degree of dependence in science is the number of 
                                                 
1 Of course, science has always been a social practice if only in the fact that individuals respond to and 
attempt to build on the results of predecessors.   
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scientists who work together on a project.  In many fields it is common for published papers to 
include several authors.  Laboratories are often complex groups of scientists working together on 
a project at a variety of different levels.  Senior scientists frequently depend on graduate students 
and junior scientists to produce much of the data.  Scientists also collaborate with colleagues 
from different labs at different institutions around the world.  Another piece of evidence for 
dependence in science is the extensive role of testimony in scientific knowledge.  Much of what 
scientists claim to know is based on testimony from others.  Testimony obviously plays a central 
role in the education of scientists.  It is also present in the ways scientists learn about new 
developments in their fields, through reading journals and attending conferences.  Therefore, 
scientists are dependent on each other, and so need to trust each other. Thus, at the broadest level 
of analysis, trust is a response to dependence, and this connection between trust and dependence 
makes trust a particularly useful concept for investigating the social character of science.   
In the past few decades, philosophers of science have become increasingly interested in 
understanding the social character of science.  Even though a significant amount of work has 
been done in the sociology of science and in social epistemology, relatively little has been said 
about the relationship between the morality of science and its epistemology.  The present project 
attempts to fill this gap by asking what ethics can contribute to the epistemology of science.  The 
ethical concept I focus on is trust.  The guiding questions of my project are: Is trust epistemically 
important?  Does trust between scientists help the community meet the epistemic aims of 
science?2  The inclusion of the phrase ‘the community’ indicates that this is an exercise in social 
epistemology.  As such, this project takes social practices as the focal unit of epistemic analysis 
and investigates the cognitive attitudes of individuals insofar as they motivate individuals to 
                                                 
2 The nature of these epistemic aims will be specified in chapter three. 
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engage in epistemically significant social practices.  I argue that the cognitive attitude of trust is 
epistemically important because it is the foundation of social practices that confer significant 
epistemic benefits on scientific communities.   
This analysis of the role of trust in science brings us closer to a more complete social 
epistemology of science.  Interestingly, many current social epistemologies share fundamental 
assumptions with the dominant accounts of trust.  Both approaches ground their analyses in a 
particular view of human nature: that the agents under study are self-interested rational beings.  
While there are good theoretical reasons for making this assumption, it nonetheless blinds us to a 
certain range of the phenomena under study.  In accounts of trust, assuming that humans are self-
interested blinds us to the ways in which we depend upon others to act out of a sense of moral 
obligation.3  In social epistemology, the assumption of self-interest prevents us from 
investigating the epistemic significance of the non-self-interested motivations that scientists do 
in fact have.  In particular, it ignores the role that trust in dutiful scientists, who are motivated by 
their interest in others, has in producing better science.  To show why a social epistemology of 
trust is needed to complete the picture, a discussion of the aims and current state of social 
epistemology is required. 
0.1 THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CHALLENGE AND SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
The past few decades of socio-historical study of science have challenged the traditional 
view of the field.  The notion that science owes its privileged status as the paradigm of objective, 
                                                 
3 The limits of this approach to trust are presented in detail in chapter one. 
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rational inquiry to scientists’ disinterested dedication to the pursuit of truth has been perceived to 
be undermined by sociological and historical research showing that scientists are influenced by 
non-epistemic values.  Sociologists, philosophers and historians have argued that scientific 
practice is not driven primarily by desire for the truth and responsiveness to the evidence, but is 
instead directed by such factors as: (a) individual desire for reputation, (b) competition between 
laboratories for grant funding, (c) personal loyalties and relationships, (d) political, social and 
moral beliefs, (e) gender, race and economic status, (f) power relations, (g) and cultural 
paradigms—among others.  In response, some sociologists, historians and philosophers have 
claimed that the traditional view is a myth, on the grounds that these factors were traditionally 
thought of as biasing and science ought to be viewed as no less susceptible to these biasing 
factors than other areas of human activity.4  This response has been perceived to undermine the 
objectivity and rationality of science.  However, others have argued that since science is a 
paradigm of objective, rational inquiry, it is the traditional conceptions of objectivity and 
rationality that must be questioned.5  Philosophers of science of this latter persuasion have taken 
up the challenge of providing an explanation of the objectivity and rationality of science that 
takes the sociological and historical claims into account.   
                                                 
4 The Edinburgh School’s Strong Programme is the most influential version of this response to the socio-historical 
challenge (e.g. Barnes and Bloor 1982).  In addition, Feyerabend argues against the privileged status of science 
(Feyerabend 1975).  
5 For detailed discussions of this move, see (Kitcher 1993 and 2001), as well as (Longino 1990 and 2002).  The 
social epistemologists described below provide one example of this response to the socio-historical challenge.  
Standpoint epistemologists (e.g. Haraway (1991), Harding (1991)) also respond to the challenge by proposing a new 
vision of objectivity.  Kuhn’s essay “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” (1977) is another frequently 
cited attempt to respond to the socio-historical challenge by reformulating our notion of objectivity. 
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One response to this socio-historical challenge has been to move towards a social 
epistemology of science according to which the objectivity6 of science appears at the community 
level.  Such social epistemologists attempt to specify the conditions under which groups of 
individuals interact in ways that are communally objective.7  This is not to say that individual 
scientists are always completely biased, but rather that if we are to demonstrate the objectivity of 
science, we need to show that the structures and institutions that govern the interactions between 
scientists produce objectivity.  This type of social epistemology rejects the notion that science’s 
objectivity results from its being composed of individual scientists who each eschew their 
subjective viewpoint and are unmoved by biasing factors like self-interest, personal 
relationships, socioeconomic status, race and gender, etc.  Thus, these social epistemologists 
accommodate the observations of sociologists by providing an alternative to the traditional view 
of individual scientists as disinterested truth-seekers.  They acknowledge both that scientists are 
motivated by interests other than an impersonal desire for true belief and that their scientific 
decisions are made on the basis of more than just the weight of the evidence.  Thus, social 
epistemology requires that we move away from a conception of objectivity as, “some special 
relation (of detachment, hardheadedness) they [individual scientists] may bear to their 
observations” (Longino 1990, p.79). 
Social epistemologists argue that interested, idiosyncratic parties can still create objective 
science, as long as they are organized in what Kitcher calls ‘epistemically well-designed social 
systems’ (Kitcher 1993, p.303).  In epistemically well-designed social systems, biased, 
                                                 
6 Henceforth, I will frame the discussion in terms of objectivity instead of rationality.  However, there is clearly a 
close connection between objectivity and one type of rationality since subjective, biasing factors are often 
considered to be irrational influences. 
7 Philosophers who make this move to social epistemology include: Goldman (1992), Hull (1988), Kitcher (1993), 
Longino (1990 and 2002), and Railton (1994). 
 5 
subjective assumptions are washed out, so that the products of the systems do not reflect the 
limited, subjective concerns of self-interest, personal loyalties, social and political agendas, race, 
gender and socioeconomic status, etc.  Instead of being a relation that individuals bear to the 
world, objectivity is the result of surviving the social processes that wash out these biasing 
factors.  Science can be objective, in the sense of not being biased, tainted or inappropriately 
partial, if the scientific community is well-organized.  For example, Longino argues that 
“criticism from alternative points of view is required for objectivity and that the subjection of 
hypotheses and evidential reasoning to critical scrutiny is what limits the intrusion of individual 
subjective preference into scientific knowledge” (Longino 1990, p.76).  For Longino, an 
epistemically well-designed scientific community is one with effective methods for hypotheses 
to be subjected to extensive and varied critical scrutiny.  On her account, science is objective to 
the extent that the scientific community is organized in ways that produce this critical scrutiny.  
Her account of objectivity illustrates the social epistemologists’ strategy of acknowledging the 
existence of biasing factors identified by the sociologists and historians, while maintaining that 
science produced by well-designed communities can still be objective.  Social epistemologies 
differ in their accounts of the processes and structures that best wash out biasing factors, but they 
share the conception of objectivity as a property of a well-designed community. 
0.1.1 Social epistemologies of self-interest 
One common form of this move to social epistemology investigates how self-interested 
scientists can interact in ways that are communally objective (e.g. Goldman 1992, Hull 1988, 
Kitcher 1993, and Railton 1994).  This approach takes to heart the observations of the role that 
desire for reputation, credit and funding play in science (see Latour and Woolgar 1979).  Peter 
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Railton argues that “objectivity arises not so much at the level of the individual investigator as at 
the social level, a perhaps unintended consequence of competition for funds, glory, and other 
scarce resources in a circumstance in which innovation that enhances prediction and control is 
rewarded” (Railton 1994, p.83).  Thus objectivity is a result of an “invisible mind” that acts 
much like the “invisible hand” of economics (Railton 1994, p.84).  A competitive community in 
which there are rewards for new, subsequently replicable results is one in which self-interested 
scientists are strongly motivated to stake out their own lines of research.  Thus the community 
benefits from a greater range of hypotheses investigated and tested.  The claims produced by 
such a community will be more objective than those in a community in which only a small range 
of hypotheses are tested. 
Philip Kitcher also argues that “the very factors that are frequently thought of as 
interfering with the (epistemically well-designed) pursuit of science—the thirst for fame and 
fortune, for example—might actually play a constructive role in our community epistemic 
projects, enabling us, as a group, to do far better than we would have done had we behaved as 
independent epistemically pure individuals” (Kitcher 1993, p.351).  Kitcher models many 
aspects of scientific practice formally.  He uses this formal analysis to show that, under certain 
conditions, a community of pure epistemic agents, those whose primary goal is to attain an 
epistemically valuable state (e.g. true belief), will do worse than a community of epistemically 
sullied agents, those who are motivated both by a desire for priority and a desire to solve 
problems (Kitcher 1993, p.351).  This is because pure agents will tend towards uniformity, 
whereas the community of sullied agents will be more diverse in their research strategies.  Why?  
Since pure agents are all motivated by a desire to attain an epistemically desirable state, they will 
all pursue the line of research that appears most promising (perhaps by being better developed or 
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more successful) (Kitcher 1994, p.344).  In contrast, epistemically sullied agents have more 
reason to take risks because they want to be the first to solve a problem.  Therefore, like Railton, 
Kitcher thinks that we need not be dismayed when sociologists tell us that scientists are driven 
by self-interest (in this case, desire for credit).  If science is well-organized to provide the right 
incentives to such agents, it can still be a rational, objective enterprise.  
0.1.2 A social epistemology of trust 
These social epistemologies of self-interest are interesting and useful analyses of the 
social aspect of the epistemology of science, especially since, as a matter of fact, scientists can 
be motivated by considerations of self-interest.  However, they are not the only possible form 
that social epistemology can take to respond to the socio-historical challenge to provide an 
account of the objectivity of science that takes seriously the power of biasing factors to influence 
scientists.  Consider the following quotation from Railton: 
what forms of interaction with the world might selectively reward reliability in 
belief-formation, and thereby tend over time to enhance it?  Strikingly, a 
disinterested, contemplative, appreciative mode of inquiry would not appear a 
promising candidate to fill this bill….  Equally strikingly, an interested, 
instrumental, manipulative, ambitious, competitive mode of inquiry might better 
fill the bill of producing novel forms of feedback that can frustrate subjective 
projection—at least, up to a point. (Railton 1994, pp.81-2) 
 
In this passage, Railton moves from an appreciation of the limits of disinterested inquiry to the 
suggestion that we investigate whether self-interested inquiry might better provide objectivity.  
Suppose one agrees with his assessment of the failings of disinterested inquiry; is the only 
solution to substitute self-interested inquiry for disinterested inquiry?  The answer is no, because 
dis-interested and self-interested are not exhaustive categories.  One might suggest other-
interested inquiry as an alternative.  People often have other-interested motivations; in other 
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words, they are often motivated to act for the good of others even when it is not in their self-
interest to do so.  Often we do something because we believe we have an obligation to do it, and 
that sense of obligation is motivating for us.  In chapter two, I present an account of trust which 
shows that other-interested individuals are trustworthy individuals.  Thus there is conceptual 
space for a social epistemology that examines how communities of other-interested scientists can 
be well-organized to act in rational ways that produce objective knowledge.  This conceptual 
possibility, which provides the tools for analyzing the role of trust in science, has been largely 
ignored by philosophers of science.8, 9  
What is the relationship between other-interest and trust?  There are many types of 
motivations for acting for the good of others that are not self-interested reasons, including caring, 
a sense of honor and a sense of duty.  It is this last type of other-interest, being motivated by a 
sense of duty or obligation, that is connected to trust.  In chapter two I present an account of trust 
on which one adopts the cognitive attitude of trust because one believes that one’s relationship 
with the trusted morally obliges her to do that which one trusts her to do.  Trustworthy 
individuals are those who are motivated to live up to the obligations inherent in their 
relationships with others.  I call these moral obligations ‘relational obligations’.  Thus, other-
interested individuals who are motivated by a sense of duty to live up to their relational 
obligations are trustworthy.  Therefore, a social epistemology of trust investigates the role that 
dependence on the other-interestedness of scientists plays in producing objective science. 
                                                 
8 The notable exception is Steven Shapin’s work, especially (1994).  However, his work centers on the 
science of the 17th Century.  There has, to my knowledge, been little exploration of this approach in 
relation to modern science.  Thagard (1997) also analyzes the epistemology of collaboration, but he does 
not specifically address other-directed motivations for collaboration. 
9 Not only has philosophy of science ignored this possibility; but, as I argue in chapter four, by focusing 
on self-interested motivations, philosophy of science justifies institutional structures that may actually 
undermine other-interestedness in science. 
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Like other social epistemologies, a social epistemology of trust shows that what appear to 
be biasing factors can, when scientists interact in a well-ordered community, provide epistemic 
benefits to the community.  Just as it is natural for individuals to be motivated, to some degree, 
by self-interest, it is natural for people to form personal ties and become involved in a variety of 
different social relationships (Rachels 1975, p. 326).  Any particular scientist will have different 
personal relationships with different members of the scientific community.  Some will be her 
friends, some her students, others her collaborators, and some will be members of her clique or 
‘social circle’ of scientists who informally exchange information about her research area.10 
Initially, it appears that the personal relationships and personal loyalties of scientists might bias 
their work.  A sense of duty to one’s friends, colleagues or students could cause scientists to give 
special, unwarranted credence to the work of scientists with whom they have personal, trusting 
relationships.  In addition, the existence of cliques and social circles might harm the objectivity 
of science.  If scientists share, collaborate, and discuss their work only or primarily with trusted 
members of their social circle, the kind of transformative criticism that Longino argues increases 
objectivity may not take place.  Assumptions may remain unquestioned as information is not 
shared evenly throughout the community. 
In general, it appears that scientists’ trust in the other-interestedness of their colleagues 
threatens objectivity by undermining two of the norms that Robert K. Merton identified in the 
1940’s as constituting the ‘ethos of science’ (Merton 1942/1996).  Merton’s norms are usually 
taken to provide the classic statement of the traditional view of science, which has since come 
under attack by sociologists and historians.  Merton’s first norm is universalism, which means 
that  
                                                 
10 Diana Crane (1972) and Karin Knorr Cetina (1999) provide detailed analyses of social circles and 
informal communication in science. 
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…truth claims, whatever their source, are to be subjected to preestablished 
impersonal criteria; consonant with observation and with previously confirmed 
knowledge.  The acceptance or rejection of claims entering the lists of science is 
not to depend on the personal or social attributes of their protagonists; their race, 
nationality, religion, class, and personal qualities are as such irrelevant.  
Objectivity precludes particularism. (Merton 1942/1996, p.269)   
 
As I have suggested, personal relationships can promote particularism, and trusting relationships 
may lead scientists to subject scientific claims to personal, rather than impersonal, criteria.  
Another one of Merton’s norms is communism, by which he means that the findings of scientific 
work are to be shared communally rather than hoarded as the private property of the discoverer: 
“The institutional conception of science as part of the public domain is linked with the 
imperative for communication of findings.  Secrecy is the antithesis of this norm; full and open 
communication its enactment” (Merton 1942/1996, p.272).  Sharing information only with 
trusted members of one’s clique seems to fly in the face of full and open communication.  
Therefore, trusting relationships might initially seem to bias scientists, and thereby undermine 
the objectivity of science.  One of the aims of social epistemology is to show how science can be 
objective at the community level despite the existence of factors that bias scientists at the 
individual level.  In sum, there is room for a social epistemology that investigates how to design 
an epistemically well-functioning community of scientists who are often motivated by concern 
for others and who often trust their colleagues to be similarly motivated.  Such an epistemology 
would both fill a conceptual gap and move the discussion toward a more complete understanding 
of the actual impact of social relations on the epistemology of science.   
A social epistemology of trust needs to draw on a particular account of trust.  
Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the dominant accounts of trust are unsuitable for 
providing a social epistemology of trust in other-interested scientists.  This is because the 
dominant accounts take what I call the ‘rational choice approach’ by analyzing trust as 
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reasonable belief in the self-interested actions of the trusted.  As I argue in chapter one, this 
approach has several limitations in its own right.  In addition, such an account of trust will not 
furnish the theoretical tools needed for an alternative to the social epistemologies of self-interest.  
For this reason, in chapter two, I provide my own account of trust, which is better suited to the 
purposes of the epistemological project at hand.  Trust is a broad concept.  Therefore, some 
preliminary remarks about the kind of trust at issue and the types of questions that are relevant to 
this project are required. 
0.2 TRUST: PRELIMINARY DISTINCTIONS 
Trust, in the sense discussed here, is a three-part relation in which A trusts B to do C.  
This type of trust always involves a truster, A, a trusted, B, and an action, C, that the truster trusts 
the trusted to perform.  This means that I will not be concerned with questions about how 
trusting scientists are in general (this would be to analyze trust as a one-part relation), nor will I 
be considering questions about what it means for A to have generalized trust, or faith, in B (trust 
as a two-part relation).  Instead, it will be necessary to investigate the nature of the cognitive 
attitude that A takes when she trusts B to do C.  I will be asking questions about what trust of this 
sort is.  In answering this question it is also helpful to examine the nature of our reasons for 
trusting, since an account of the rationality of trust presupposes some notion of what kind of a 
phenomenon trust is.  Similarly, an account of what trust is can naturally suggest a particular set 
of standards for evaluating trust.  While there are many other important questions one could ask 
about the morality of trust (e.g. When is trust blameworthy?), answering these questions is not 
directly relevant to showing that trust has epistemic significance in science.  Hopefully, 
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demonstrating the importance of trust in science will encourage others to take up these 
worthwhile questions.  
If trust is a three-part relation between the truster, the trusted and an action the trusted is 
expected to perform, it is important to determine what kinds of things one can put one’s trust in.  
Even a cursory survey of common usage of ‘trust’ shows that a wide variety of things are 
referred to as being trusted to perform some action.  The paradigmatic cases of trust are when we 
trust people to perform actions, e.g. trust in one’s spouse to be faithful, trust in the babysitter to 
care for one’s child, trust in one’s colleague to turn in the report on time, and trust in one’s 
doctor to prescribe the right medication.  Thus, discussions of trust center typically around 
questions of the nature of, and reasons for, adopting a cognitive attitude of trust towards the 
proposition that someone will do something.  While people are the paradigmatic objects of trust, 
animals, natural objects, artificial objects and machines, and institutions are all also commonly 
referred to as objects of trust, e.g. trust in one’s cat not to eat the fish, trust in the wetlands to 
prevent flooding, trust in one’s car to start in the morning and trust in the medical system11.  In 
one sense, it is reasonable to say that we trust these objects as well as people because we can be 
dependent on all of these things.  We make plans based on the assumption that our alarm clock 
will wake us up, and we make plans based on the assumption that our partner will not unplug the 
alarm clock.  However, there is another sense in which our use of ‘trust’ to refer to our attitude 
                                                 
11 Trust in institutions is an interesting mixed case.  On the one hand, trust in the medical system involves 
‘trust in abstract objects’ (to use Anthony Giddens’ term) (Giddens 1990, p.114).  We trust the procedures 
and social structures that govern the interaction of members of the medical profession and the public.  On 
the other hand, trust in the medical system involves trusting those individual people who play specified 
roles in the system.  While a comprehensive analysis of what it means to trust people who play 
institutionalized roles is outside the scope of this project, the account of trust developed in chapter two 
relies heavily on a notion of relational obligations that makes a step towards recognizing that our trust in 
people is tied up with our beliefs about the kinds of actions they are obligated to perform as a result of 
their norm-governed relationships with us. 
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towards non-persons is usually figurative.  As I argue in chapter one, a central feature of trust is 
that trusting someone to do something makes the truster vulnerable to feeling betrayed if the 
trusted does not act as expected.  Thus, one difference between our trust in people and our 
attitude towards non-persons is that we tend to feel merely disappointed rather than betrayed 
when non-persons fail to live up to our expectations. 
The social epistemology of trust in science provides an analysis of the epistemic 
significance of scientists’ trust in their colleagues to perform particular actions.  The 
paradigmatic examples of trust in science include the following: the head of a laboratory trusts 
her postdoc to perform the experiments as directed and not fabricate results, the postdoc trusts 
the senior advisor not to steal her ideas, and one partner in an interdisciplinary collaboration 
trusts her partner to conduct her part of the project with due diligence.  In chapter three, I argue 
that these kinds of trust, and more, create epistemic benefits to the scientific community as a 
whole.   
Finally, in my analysis of the role of trust in science, I do not address any of the 
important and complex questions about trust and competence.  In most situations, it makes no 
sense for A to trust B to do C if A has overwhelming evidence that B is incapable of doing C.  For 
this reason, questions of competence are an important part of the investigation of the nature of 
trustworthiness and the rationality of trust.  However, in this analysis, I follow Russell Hardin in 
focusing on the question of motivation for acting trustworthily (Hardin 2002, p.8).  Thus, I will 
not address any of the questions about how scientists can determine whether their colleagues are 
competent to carry out the actions they are trusted to perform or how they determine whether 
their colleagues are sloppy or careless.  The reason for sidestepping the issue of competence is 
that it is not directly relevant to the concerns of social epistemology.  The relevant aim of social 
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epistemology is to show how factors that appear to provide biased motivations to scientists can 
actually contribute to objectivity at the community level.  Thus it is questions of motivation and 
not competence that are central to this analysis of trust in science.  Having introduced the 
necessary preliminary distinctions to focus the concept of trust under discussion, I conclude this 
introduction with a brief outline of the structure of the argument to be presented. 
0.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT 
Trust and trustworthiness have received attention from numerous scholars representing a 
variety of fields.  At present, it is possible to identify one dominant approach to the analysis of 
trusting relationships, which I call the rational choice approach.  Chapter one outlines the 
rational choice approach and elucidates why it is of limited use in analyzing trusting 
relationships in general, and trusting relationships between scientists in particular.  In short, 
rational choice theorists argue that trust is rational when the truster has good reason to believe 
that it is in the trusted’s self-interest to act trustworthily.  The rational choice approach provides 
useful analytical tools; however, it is limited because it fails to recognize the role of other 
motivations for acting trustworthily such as having a sense of duty.  By ignoring these 
motivations, the rational choice approach provides only a partial explanation of why people trust 
and why they act trustworthily. Of particular importance is how these limitations prevent the 
rational choice approach from accounting for cases of trust on the part of powerless individuals. 
This analysis of the lacunae in the dominant approach to trust and trustworthiness 
motivates an alternative account of trust offered in chapter two.  My account is as follows:   
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(T) A trusts B to do C iff (1) A takes the proposition that B will do C as part of A’s 
adjusted cognitive background, (2) in part, because A believes that their relationship 
morally obliges B to do C.   
 
The first part of (T) captures the cognitive aspect of trust.  When we trust, we take a particular 
cognitive attitude towards the claim that the trusted will do what we expect her to do.  There is 
serious debate in the trust literature about the nature of this cognitive attitude—is it belief or 
some other cognitive attitude?  Drawing on the work of Michael Bratman (1992), I argue that the 
cognitive attitude we take when we trust can be either belief or acceptance.  The second part of 
(T) captures the emotional and moral aspects of trust by providing a framework to understand 
the connection between trust and betrayal, which is the feeling that usually results from being let 
down by a person one trusts.  Following Annette Baier (1994), many authors identify 
vulnerability to betrayal as the essential difference between trust and mere reliance.  
Unfortunately, little has been said about what kind of an emotion betrayal is.  I provide an 
account of betrayal as a reactive emotion that connects it to beliefs about relational obligations.  
Thus when we trust, we depend on the trusted because we believe that our relationship with the 
trusted obliges her to act as expected.  This belief makes us vulnerable to feelings of betrayal if 
the trusted fails to fulfill these obligations. 
In chapter three, I use this account of trust to analyze the role of trust in science.  I argue 
that scientific communities can garner several significant epistemic benefits when scientists are 
trustworthy and when they trust each other to act trustworthily.  Using a framework adapted from 
Alvin Goldman’s work on social epistemology (1992), I show how the epistemic benefits of 
trusting relationships between scientists can be evaluated in terms of increased reliability, power, 
speed, efficiency and fertility.  In particular, I argue that trust fosters epistemically beneficial 
sharing between scientists.  Communities in which scientists share materials and technology, 
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technical gossip and shop talk have increased reliability, power, speed, efficiency and fertility.  
These arguments are supported, in part, by a case study of the role that trust played in the 
achievements made by the community of Drosophilists that grew out of Thomas Hunt Morgan’s 
laboratory. 
Finally, in chapter four, I argue that the epistemic success of science results, in part, from 
science’s ability to balance competition and cooperation, trust and distrust, self-interest and 
other-interest.  Having followed the arguments of chapter three, one might object that while trust 
does have some epistemic benefits, those benefits are overshadowed by the harms that trust does 
to the epistemic projects of science.  In particular, one might worry that a scientific community 
that values trust may increase conformism, bias and epistemic laziness.  I respond to these 
objections by showing that not only are the epistemic benefits of trust not overshadowed by its 
epistemic harms, but that competition between self-interested scientists also has negative 
epistemic consequences and that these negative effects can be mitigated by trusting relationships.  
I use recent examples of scientific fraud in cloning research and public policy responses to 
much-publicized “crises in trust” to illustrate the need for balancing trust with competition while 
valuing diversity in science.  I conclude with an outline of some positive proposals for how to 
design scientific communities that maximize the epistemic benefits of trust while minimizing its 
drawbacks. 
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1.0  LIMITATIONS OF THE RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH TO TRUST 
In recent decades, trust and trustworthiness have received attention from numerous 
scholars representing a variety of fields.  Since the philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and 
political theorists who have studied trust and trustworthiness ask different questions and use 
diverse theoretical tools, it is difficult to classify the existing literature into a neat and tidy 
taxonomy.  However, it is possible to identify one dominant approach, which I call the ‘rational 
choice approach’.  This chapter outlines the rational choice approach and elucidates why it is of 
limited use in analyzing trusting relationships in general, and trusting relationships between 
scientists in particular.  This analysis of the lacunae in the dominant approach to trust and 
trustworthiness motivates an alternative account of trust, offered in chapter two. 
There are a number of questions that a theory of trust could be intended to answer.  First, 
‘What is trust?’  One might want an account of what trust is that distinguishes it from other 
social phenomena.  Second, ‘Why do people trust each other (when they do)?’  A theory of trust 
could attempt to elucidate the psychology of trust.  Third, ‘When is it rational to trust, and what 
makes it rational?’  An evaluation of the legitimacy of the reasons people have for trusting could 
also be part of a theory of trust.  Fourth, ‘What are the standards for moral evaluation of trust?’  
One might want to know when trust is ethically suspect or praiseworthy.   
The existing philosophical, political and sociological literature on trust contains attempts 
to answer all four of these questions.  Often the questions are not clearly distinguished in an 
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author’s attempt to tackle the subject of trust.  This is understandable, since the four questions 
are connected.  An account of what trust is can make it natural to suggest a particular set of 
standards for evaluating trust.  Similarly, an account of the rationality of trust presupposes some 
notion of what kind of a phenomenon trust is.  Answering one question about trust leads one to 
take positions on other central questions about it.  In addition, as Russell Hardin has noted, much 
of the literature on trust is actually primarily about trustworthiness (Hardin 2002, p. 29).  Hence, 
these four questions about trust can also be asked about trustworthiness.  What is 
trustworthiness?  Why do people act trustworthily?  When is trustworthiness rational?  How 
should we morally evaluate trustworthiness?  For these reasons, the trust literature is somewhat 
complicated, and identifying established positions and persistent points of disagreement requires 
a significant degree of abstraction and reconstruction.  In identifying the rational choice approach 
to trust, I am not referring to a position with which authors have already self-identified.  Instead, 
I provide a clear explanation of the most prominent line of argument that I find in the trust 
literature.  While the authors I will discuss are tackling different questions about trust and 
trustworthiness, I find among their arguments a distinctive set of assumptions and methods.   
1.1 THE RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH TO TRUST 
Rational choice theorists share some philosophical motivations.  They all have 1) an 
interest in the question ‘What makes trust rational?’, and 2) a preference for a minimalist 
approach, which leads them to provide answers to the question that center around self-interested 
rationality.  In short, rational choice theorists argue that trust is rational when the truster has good 
reason to believe that it is in the trusted’s self-interest to act trustworthily.  The writings of four 
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proponents of the rational choice approach— Adler (1994), Blais (1987 and 1990), Hardin 
(2002), and Rescher (1989)—share these two features.  
First, as attempts to answer the question, ‘What makes trust rational?’, rational choice 
accounts of trust are particularly concerned to show why it makes sense to trust, given the risks 
involved and the temptations of uncooperative behavior.  When one trusts (or acts on trust)12 one 
puts oneself, to some degree, in the hands of the trusted.  Hardin puts it this way: “As virtually 
all writers on trust agree, acting on trust involves giving discretion to another to affect one’s 
interests.  This move is inherently subject to the risk that the other will abuse the power of 
discretion” (Hardin 2002, p.11).  In his discussion of trusting testimony, Jonathan Adler defines 
trust in terms of risk: “It seems sufficient for a seeker to be extending trust that the seeker is at 
risk, if the testimony is false” (Adler 1994, p.266).  It is recognition of this risk, coupled with 
attention to the temptations for abuse of power by the trusted, that makes the question of the 
rationality of trust pressing for rational choice theorists.  Nicholas Rescher talks of the 
temptations for abuse of power in connection with the need for sharing of information in science: 
“Since information is power, there is a constant temptation to monopolize it.  But information 
monopolies, however advantageous for some few favorably circumstanced beneficiaries, exact 
an awful price from the community as a whole” (Rescher 1989, p.34).  The temptation to abuse 
the power entrusted to oneself is familiar from a host of everyday trusting situations.  A 
                                                 
12 I add this qualification because Russell Hardin is one rational choice theorist who insists that trusting 
and acting on trust are distinct (Hardin 2002, pp.58-60).  Hardin is careful to note that on his account, 
trust is an involuntary cognitive attitude.  For him, acting on trust involves risk-taking, but “trust is not 
itself a matter of deliberately taking a risk because it is not a matter of making a choice” (Hardin 2002, 
p.12).  Other rational choice theorists are not so careful in observing the trusting/acting on trust 
distinction.  Michel Blais, for example, often talks of trust as the act of cooperation where Hardin would 
prefer him to talk of the act of cooperation as an act based on trust (Blais 1987 and 1990).  I will attempt 
to describe the rational choice approach in a way that presupposes neither adherence to nor rejection of 
this distinction. 
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babysitter may be tempted to steal the loose change lying on the kitchen counter of her 
employer’s house, a friend may be tempted to gain popularity by spreading her friend’s secret, 
and a teacher may be tempted to pass off a student’s idea as her own.  Rational choice theorists 
want to know how it could be rational to trust given all the risks involved in making oneself 
vulnerable to abuse of power. 
Second, rational choice theorists adopt a sparse set of theoretical tools to answer this 
question.  With a minimalist spirit, they make as few assumptions as possible about the 
individuals involved in trusting relationships.  All they assume about these individuals is that 
they are self-interested and possess instrumental rationality.  This is not to say that the 
individuals are exclusively self-interested but merely that no altruistic motives are taken for 
granted.  Their challenge is, therefore, to show how it could be rational for such people to trust 
each other.  This is obviously very much a Hobbesian project, and as such it is fitting that 
rational choice theorists often use the simple models of game theory, such as the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, that have figured prominently in interpretations of Hobbes.  I find it useful to compare 
the rational choice accounts of trust to two solutions to the problem of cooperation between 
Hobbesian agents.  First, as Hobbes notes in his response to the fool, Hobbesian agents can find 
it in their self-interest to cooperate in the state of nature when cooperation will maintain a useful 
friendship (Hobbes 1650/1994, xv.4).  Second, cooperative behavior is rational for Hobbesian 
agents when external constraints imposed by the sovereign make cooperation in one’s self-
interest.  Rational choice theorists provide similar solutions to the problem of trust. 
Hardin provides a schema for the first type of solution by giving a rational choice account 
of trust in general rather than focusing specifically on trust in science, as do Rescher, Blais and 
Adler.  Hardin calls his account the “encapsulated-interest view.”  Like the other rational choice 
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theorists, Hardin assumes little about the individuals involved in a trust relationship; all we 
assume about them is that they are self-interested and instrumentally rational: “[trust is] 
essentially rational expectations about the self-interested behavior of the trusted” (Hardin 2002, 
p.6).   For Hardin, trust is simply belief that the trusted will be trustworthy.  The question that 
interests him is: What are the reasons a truster has for believing that the other party will be 
trustworthy?  In other words, what makes it rational for trusters to trust?  His answer is as 
follows:  
On this account, I trust you because I think it is in your interest to take my 
interests in the relevant matter seriously in the following sense: You value the 
continuation of our relationship, and you therefore have your own interests in 
taking my interests into account.  That is, you encapsulate my interests in your 
own interests. (Hardin 2002, p.1) 
 
So, for example, if I have a profitable business relationship with Mary, it is in my self-interest to 
take Mary’s interests into account.  I want my relationship with Mary to continue, so I have a 
purely self-interested reason to be trustworthy to her given the risk of her detecting 
untrustworthiness and cutting off our relationship.  If Mary has reason to believe that I value our 
relationship, then it is rational for her to trust me.13  As with other rational choice theorists, 
Hardin grounds the rationality of trust in evidence that it is in the trusted’s self-interest to be 
trustworthy.  His innovation is to identify the way in which valuing ongoing relationships can 
make it in the trusted’s self-interest to take the interests of the truster into consideration.14 
                                                 
13 In fact, the situation is more complex than Hardin’s initial presentation of trust as encapsulated interest 
suggests.  In order for it to be rational for Mary to trust me, Mary ought to also have reason to believe that 
I know what her interests are.  Even if Mary believes that it is in my self-interest to take her interests into 
account, it may not be wise of her to trust me if I am significantly mistaken about what her interests are.   
14 Hardin appears to allow for instances of trust as encapsulated interest that do not focus on ongoing 
relationships when he says that to say that I trust you “…is to say that you have an interest in attending to 
my interests because, typically, you want our relationship to continue” (Hardin 2002, p.4; my emphasis in 
bold).  This would appear to leave room for trust in one-off interactions when individuals encapsulate 
each other’s interests.  However, when Hardin argues that incentive compatibility is not the same as trust 
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One way to flesh out Hardin’s trust as encapsulated interest schema is to use the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma to explain why it is rational for scientists to trust each other.  Both Rescher 
and Blais take this approach.  Rescher models trust situations as instances of an iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.  He argues that “[a]s long as interagents react to cooperation with some 
tendency to reciprocation in future situations, cooperative behavior will yield long-run benefits” 
(Rescher 1989, p.37).  The long-run benefit for scientists in trusting each other enough to share 
their information is a decreased chance of “coming up empty-handed” (Rescher 1989, p.38).  
Rescher thus argues that, despite the risks involved, trust can be rational in the long-run for self-
interested scientists, as long as they reciprocate whenever they are trusted.  In fact, the economic 
incentives make cooperation practically inevitable: 
If its cognitive needs and wants are strong enough, any group of mutually 
communicating, rational, dedicated inquirers is fated in the end to become a 
community of sorts, bound together by a shared practice of trust and cooperation, 
simply under the pressure of its economic advantage in the quest for knowledge. 
(Rescher 1989, p.43) 
 
Blais also makes use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  He wants to show that “only cooperation, as 
defined … in game theory and as illustrated in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, is necessary for the 
justification of vicarious knowledge” (Blais 1987, p.370).  Relying on Axelrod’s (1984) study of 
strategies in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma situations, Blais argues that “faith in the future behavior 
of another player is less necessary than durability of the relationship:  as long as the ‘shadow of 
the future’ is sufficiently long, each player has less incentive to defect in order to maximize 
                                                                                                                                                             
he makes it clear that his account does not apply to one-off interactions: “Note that our merely having the 
same interests with respect to some matter does not meet the condition of trust as encapsulated interest, 
although it can often give me reason to expect you to do what I would want you to do or what would 
serve my interests (because it simultaneously serves yours).  The encapsulated-interest account does entail 
that the truster and the trusted have compatible interest over at least some matters, but incentive 
compatibility, while necessary, is not sufficient for that account, which further requires that the trusted 
values the continuation of the relationship with the truster and has compatible interests at least in part for 
this reason” (Hardin 2002, pp.4-5). 
 23 
payoffs in the short run; for repeated encounters favor cooperative behavior simply from an 
egoistic viewpoint” (Blais 1987, p.370).  Blais’ main point is that players in the knowledge game 
will find it in their interests to not defect by cheating, “by fudging, fabricating, or otherwise 
publishing unreliable results” (Blais 1987, p.370).  What ensures that it will be in their interests 
to cooperate by not cheating?  Here is a sketch of Blais’ answer.  First, scientists are engaged in 
long-term relationships with other members of the scientific community or with the community 
itself.  Second, while there may be tempting immediate gains to be garnered from defecting (e.g. 
an enhanced reputation through publications), the scientific community can effectively retaliate 
in future interactions.  Forms of retaliation include the destruction of a dishonest scientist’s 
reputation, withdrawal of funding, censure and even exile from professional organizations.  
Finally, it is possible to detect defectors.  As Blais puts it, “everyone serves as potential 
watchdog for everyone else” (Blais 1987, p.372).  When these three conditions (long-term 
relationships, effective retaliation, and relatively easy detection of defectors) are in place, 
defection will not be an effective strategy for a self-interested scientist to pursue.  Cooperation—
trust in Blais’ sense—is therefore rational. 
Adler follows Hobbes’ second solution to the problem of cooperation to show that 
cooperation is rational in science.  On Hobbes’ account of the sovereign’s power, the constraints 
the sovereign places upon self-interested subjects make it rational for them to cooperate with 
each other.  Similarly, Adler’s account of the power of constraints in scientific practice argues 
that community-level constraints can make it in the best interest of a scientist to cooperate with 
her colleagues.  According to Adler, “there are powerful constraints on informants to be truthful 
and reliable” (Adler 1994, p.267).  These constraints include the peer review and replication 
process in which scientists’ results are subjected to scrutiny from a variety of sources.  As Adler 
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notes, “the force of these constraints varies according to such factors as the institution or 
community’s sensitivity to the detection of deception or error, the costs to the informant once an 
error is detected, and the rapidity and extent of communication about these findings” (Adler 
1994, p.267).  An individual working in a community with rigorous methods of detecting 
defection, which it punishes with severe penalties, is more likely to find it in her own best 
interest to cooperate (rather than defect) than an individual whose community places weak 
constraints on her behavior.   
These four rational choice theorists apply a sparse set of theoretical tools to the analysis 
of trust and trustworthiness.  Their minimalist methodology leads them to understand trust in 
terms of self-interested rationality.  This methodology makes three fundamental assumptions.  
These are assumptions about what is going on when person A trusts person B to do action C, and 
when B does do C as A trusts B to do.   
(RC1):  A trusts B to do C on the basis of evidence that B will do C.   
(RC2):  The evidence A relies upon is evidence that it is in B’s self-interest to do C.   
(RC3): B acts trustworthily (by doing C) for self-interested reasons.   
(RC1) claims that people’s reasons for trusting are evidential.  (RC2) specifies what the evidence 
for trust is: it is evidence that the trusted has self-interested reasons for being trustworthy.  
According to (RC3), it is such self-interested reasons that account for trustworthy behavior.  
These are not presented as necessary conditions for trusting or trustworthy behavior.  Instead, 
(RC1) and (RC2) are jointly sufficient conditions for trust to be rational; and (RC3) is a 
sufficient condition for an actor’s trustworthy act to be rational.  A’s possession of good evidence 
that it is in B’s self-interest to do C is sufficient to make it rational for A to trust B to do C.  
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Similarly, B’s possession of self-interested reasons for acting trustworthily (by doing C) makes it 
rational for B to do C.   
All four authors provide interesting accounts of trust that rest on these three assumptions.  
By focusing on the economics of cooperation, Rescher helps us understand how the need to share 
information binds a scientific community together.  Hardin’s explanation of how partners in a 
relationship can encapsulate each other’s interests usefully explains why trust thrives in enduring 
relationships.  In addition, Blais and Adler’s emphasis on community level constraints that 
encourage trustworthy behavior by scientists usefully highlights the communal aspects of 
scientific trust.  The rational choice approach certainly provides an important tool for 
understanding trust in science.  However, it cannot explain all of the interesting features of trust 
between scientists or trust in general.  Having described the rational choice approach, I will now 
explain what is missing in it and why I adopt an alternative approach to understanding trust and 
trustworthiness. 
1.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH 
Rational choice assumptions about trust, (RC1-RC3), provide useful insights into trust 
and trustworthiness, but they also overlook many other important aspects of trusting behavior.  In 
particular, the rational choice approach is limited in four ways.  First, it only recognizes one type 
of evidence used by trusters to determine whether the trusted will be trustworthy.  Second, this 
approach only accounts for self-interested reasons for being trustworthy.  Third, it does not leave 
room for non-evidential reasons for trusting.  Fourth, it fails to mark the distinction between trust 
and mere reliance.  It may be possible for the rational choice approach to deal with the first three 
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limitations by adding to its account of both the evidence available to trusters and the reasons for 
trusting and being trustworthy.  However, a simple extension of the rational choice approach will 
not enable it to mark the trust/mere reliance distinction that I shall outline.  In what follows, I 
will explain the first three limitations in turn.  Then I shall illustrate how these limitations 
combine to prevent the rational choice approach from accounting for cases of trust on the part of 
relatively powerless individuals.  Finally, I shall address the fourth limitation, which would 
require more revision of the rational choice account to handle. 
1.2.1 Other reasons for trust 
One limitation of the rational choice approach is that (RC2) omits reasons for trust based 
on evidence about the trusted other than evidence that it is in the trusted’s self-interest to act 
trustworthily.  While the rational choice approach is certainly right that we often trust because 
we have evidence that it is in the trusted’s self-interest to be trustworthy, it is also certain that we 
trust based on other types of evidence. For example, I may trust my colleague because I have 
evidence that she is strongly motivated by a sense of professional ethics.  I may have heard her 
speak disparagingly of other colleagues who act only to further their self-interest, and I may have 
seen her sacrifice her own interests for the sake of adhering to professional codes of conduct.  
Such evidence need not be limited to trusting someone’s professional ethics; one may trust based 
on evidence that someone is strongly motivated by a general sense of duty or honor.15  Such 
                                                 
15 One might wonder how one can distinguish evidence that someone is motivated by a sense of duty or 
honor from evidence that someone is motivated by a desire to be regarded as dutiful or honorable.  In fact, 
a cynic might even ask whether a sense of duty can be distinguished from a desire to be regarded as 
dutiful or honorable.  I am not such a cynic.  I think people are in many ways motivated by a general 
sense of duty or honor or a particular sense of duty or honor in a certain sphere of their lives.  This sense 
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evidence is not accounted for in the rational choice approach, which, as part of its minimalist 
strategy, takes only evidence of self-interested reasons to act trustworthily into account.  
Similarly, this approach cannot account for my trust based on evidence that the trusted cares for 
me.  In a developing romantic relationship, people often look for cues that their partner cares 
deeply for them.  That one’s partner loves one is generally acknowledged to be a good reason to 
trust him or her.  The only one of the rational choice approaches that perhaps has a chance of 
giving a plausible account of this type of trust is Hardin’s view of trust as encapsulated interest.  
Hardin would argue that when I learn that my partner loves me, I take this as evidence that it is 
in his self-interest to maintain our relationship by acting trustworthily.  This may account for 
many cases of trusting someone with whom one has a relationship, but it is an implausible 
account of all of them.  It is not unheard of for people to trust their ex-boyfriends, ex-girlfriends, 
ex-spouses, or ex-friends even though the relationship has ended.  Love or even just affection 
and caring can persist even though the relationship does not.  Thus, I may trust my ex-boyfriend 
to return my books to me simply because I know he still cares about me and would not want to 
hurt me even though we may never speak again.  Again, I am not arguing that the rational choice 
approach is wrong because it cannot deal with all types of trust.  I merely wish to point out that 
(RC2) quite significantly restricts the type of evidence that leads people to trust.   
                                                                                                                                                             
of duty can be distinguished from a desire to appear dutiful or honorable because it leads people to act 
dutifully or honorably even when the desired audience is absent.  I also think that we are fairly good at 
assessing whether someone is genuinely dutiful or honorable rather than merely acting so to enhance their 
reputation.   
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1.2.2 Other reasons for trustworthiness 
Not only does (RC2) limit the rational choice approach’s account of the range of reasons 
for trusting, but (RC3) limits its account of reasons for being trustworthy.  This causes a second 
limitation of the approach: there are more reasons for being trustworthy other than merely 
finding it in one’s self-interest to be trustworthy.  I may act to live up to someone’s trust in me 
out of a sense of honor or duty, or because I care about the person and have their interests at 
heart.16  An account of trust and trustworthiness that ignores these reasons leaves out something 
significant about the rationality of trust.   
It is a fact that one often trusts someone because one believes that she is a dutiful person 
or because she cares for one.  We will have trouble accounting for the rationality of such trust if 
we do not acknowledge that love for someone or a sense of duty are reasons for trustworthy 
behavior.  Acknowledging that these are reasons for trustworthiness forces us to ask important 
questions that are critical to assessing the rationality of trusting someone who one believes 
possesses such reasons.  For example, suppose I trust my colleague to work diligently because I 
have good evidence to believe that she is motivated by a sense of professional honor.  In judging 
whether it is rational for me to trust her to perform a particular part of her job, we would want to 
have answers to some of the following questions:  Do I know whether she considers herself 
obliged to perform this part of her job diligently, or might she think that a dutiful professional 
could do sloppy work in this area?  Do I know whether she has self-interested reasons for not 
performing that part of the job?  If so, do I know how she tends to weigh self-interested reasons 
                                                 
16 In general, the rational choice theorists’ preference for a sparse set of theoretical tools leads them to adopt a 
limited notion of self-interested rationality according to which individuals are not motivated by altruistic motives.  
In addition, their desire to account for trust without needing to use moral concepts like a sense of duty means that 
one cannot interpret the self-interested individuals they discuss as having an interest in acting out of a sense of duty. 
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against reasons of duty?  In other words, does she only posses a weak sense of duty, or are 
considerations of duty highly motivating for her?  Taking reasons for trustworthiness other than 
mere self-interest seriously requires us to ask certain questions in assessing the rationality of 
trust.17  Given that people do in fact trust based on evidence of these other reasons for 
trustworthiness, those who want to know what makes trust rational ought to ask these questions.  
Unfortunately, the rational choice view of why people act trustworthily does not provide the 
resources to do so. 
1.2.3 Non-evidential reasons for trust 
Third, as a result of (RC1), the rational choice approach is limited to explaining reasons 
for trust that are evidential; however, reasons for trust can also be non-evidential.  I may trust 
someone on pragmatic grounds, e.g., I trust in order to achieve some goal.  Richard Holton gives 
an example of trust for pragmatic reasons: 
Suppose you run a small shop.  And suppose you discover that the person you 
have recently employed has just been convicted of petty theft.  Should you trust 
him with the till?  It appears that you can really decide whether or not to do so.  
And again it appears that you can do so without believing that he is trustworthy.  
Perhaps you think trust is the best way to draw him back into the moral 
                                                 
17 To give another example, in assessing the rationality of trusting one’s romantic partner, important 
questions are raised if we acknowledge that loving someone is a reason for being trustworthy to her.  
Take the issue of assurances of love; does the fact that one’s partner says she loves you provide good 
reason for trusting her?  Well, it depends.  As Nancy Nyquist Potter notes, part of being a trustworthy 
person is giving assurances of one’s trustworthiness (Potter 2002, p.26).  Since loving someone is a 
reason for being trustworthy, telling one’s partner that one loves them is a good means of assuring them 
of one’s trustworthiness.  Often, we consider the relationship to have taken on a new level of intimacy 
when verbal assurances of love have been made.  However, we also tend to consider it unreasonable to 
take seriously someone who says “I love you” too early in the relationship.  Verbal expressions of love 
can be used to try to manipulate one’s partner.  Therefore, a complete account of the rationality of trust 
would need to account for how reasonable people distinguish sincere expressions of love from insincere, 
potentially manipulative expressions. 
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community; perhaps you simply think it is the way you ought to treat one of your 
employees. (Holton 2002, p.63) 
 
In this case the shopkeeper decides to trust not because there is evidence of the employee’s 
trustworthiness, but in order to achieve the goal of bringing the employee back into the moral 
community.18  Trust can also be a leap of faith in which I trust even though I lack evidence that 
the trusted will act as I expect.  The rational choice approach cannot explain cases of non-
evidential trust.  At best, the rational choice approach can explain cases of non-evidential trust as 
irrational trust.  However, for reasons that will be discussed in detail in chapter two, I prefer to 
adopt an account of trust that does not preclude the rationality of some cases of non-evidential 
trust.  Therefore, I will argue for an account of reasons for trust that is not limited to evidential 
reasons.   
1.2.4 Powerlessness and trust 
As a result of these three limitations, the rational choice approach has trouble accounting 
for trust on the part of someone in a position of relative powerlessness.  The rational choice 
approach can nicely explain why I would trust someone when I have the ability to detect 
untrustworthy behavior and prevent it by placing retaliatory constraints on the trusted to make it 
in her interest to be trustworthy.  Game theoretic models, like iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas, can 
also provide insights into continued cooperation between equals who are equally able to detect 
and punish defection.  However, not everyone who trusts is in a position to detect potential 
defection and punish it with effective retaliation.  There are two forms of powerlessness which 
                                                 
18 Holton’s example raises several pressing questions about whether we can choose to trust and whether 
trust requires belief.  These questions will be dealt with in chapter two. 
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can make it difficult for someone to conform to the model of trust proposed by the rational 
choice approach: lack of power to influence and epistemic powerlessness. 
Some people lack the power to influence the behavior of the trusted by making it in the 
trusted’s self-interest to be trustworthy. All four rational choice theorists explain why it is 
rational to trust by pointing to ways in which the truster can attempt to constrain the behavior of 
the trusted.19  For example, according to the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma accounts, there are two 
ways that the truster can make it in the trusted’s self-interest to cooperate.  Either the truster is 
able to punish uncooperative behavior on a future interaction, or the truster has something that 
the trusted hopes to gain from future cooperative interactions.  Trusters who are unable to punish 
defection effectively or who have nothing to offer as future reciprocation lack the power to make 
it worthwhile to the trusted to act trustworthily.  Similarly, according to Hardin’s trust as 
encapsulated interest account, the truster can influence the trusted’s behavior through the threat 
of cutting off the relationship if the trusted acts untrustworthily.  Individuals who are caught in a 
relationship and have no viable opportunity to end it are unable to exercise this type of power.   
The trust that graduate students, post-doctoral trainees and other scientists in 
apprenticeship positions place in their superiors illustrates this type of trust by relatively 
powerless individuals.  Let us consider two examples of ways that graduate students trust despite 
having no viable opportunity to cut off their relationship with their advisors.  Consider Lauri, a 
graduate student working in developmental genetics in a department with only one member of 
the faculty specializing in this subfield.  Suppose that Lauri has slim chances of being able to 
                                                 
19 In some cases it will not be the truster herself who enforces the constraints, but she will still have a role 
in constraining the trusted’s behavior by setting up constraining mechanisms or by alerting the 
community to untrustworthy behavior so that the community can enforce its own constraining 
mechanisms.  For example, individual scientists can alert the community to forgery so that the community 
can punish fraudulent scientists. 
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transfer to another program or change her specialization without prohibitive costs.  If Lauri 
wants to pursue a scientific career, she has no viable opportunity to cut off her relationship with 
her advisor if the advisor acts untrustworthily.  Nonetheless, Lauri assumes that her advisor will 
treat her well.  She takes the risk that her advisor will turn out to be untrustworthy because it is 
the only viable way to achieve her goal of attaining her Ph.D., and she has no evidence that her 
advisor is an untrustworthy person.  Further, Lauri trusts her advisor even though she has 
evidence that her department and university administration exercise poor oversight over the work 
of its professors.  She has seen other graduate students severely sanctioned for blowing the 
whistle on fraudulent professors.  She trusts even though she is in a position where neither she 
nor the surrounding scientific community exercise constraints that make it in the professor’s self-
interest to be a trustworthy mentor for her.  Like the shopkeeper in Holton’s example, Lauri 
trusts for pragmatic, non-evidential reasons. 
Now consider Monica, who is in the same position as Lauri; she has no viable 
opportunity to cut off her advisor if the advisor proves untrustworthy, and neither Monica nor the 
surrounding scientific community exercise constraints that make it in the advisor’s self-interest 
to be trustworthy.  Monica, like Lauri, trusts her advisor.  However, she does not do so for 
pragmatic reasons.  Instead Monica trusts because she believes her advisor to be a morally 
upstanding professional.  She trusts because she has evidence of her advisor’s moral character.  
Both Lauri and Monica illustrate trust that is beyond the limits of the rational choice theory’s 
explanatory power.  Trust on the part of individuals who lack the power to influence the trusted’s 
actions is an anomaly if we accept the rational choice model, because it provides no tools for 
explaining why it is rational for them to trust.   
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The second type of powerlessness is inability to detect untrustworthy behavior.  This is a 
form of epistemic powerlessness that would undermine one’s ability to influence the trusted’s 
behavior.  One cannot take one’s ability to sanction untrustworthy behavior as a reason to expect 
trustworthiness if one is not even in a position to detect untrustworthiness that requires sanction.  
Scientists who collaborate with colleagues from a different field are in this position because they 
lack the expertise to understand their colleagues’ work.  As Paul Thagard notes, “Peer-different 
collaborators are exceptionally epistemically dependent on their coworkers, since they typically 
lack the skill to validate work done in a different field” (Thagard 1997, p.254).  Scientists 
engaged in cross-disciplinary work are, therefore, epistemically powerless in this sense because 
they would not be able to detect fraud or sloppy work by their colleagues.  Thus, any case in 
which one trusts someone but lacks the ability to detect untrustworthy behavior will present an 
anomaly for those rational choice theorists who argue that it is rational to trust when one has 
evidence that constraints like retaliation make it in the trusted’s self-interest to be trustworthy.  
This kind of powerless has an epistemic dimension because it involves a lack of knowledge on 
the part of the truster.   
There are also cases of what we might call epistemic powerlessness in which the truster 
lacks access to certain information about the trusted’s interests and circumstances.  Since rational 
choice theorists, who adhere to (RC1), explain rational trust in terms of the truster’s having 
evidence that the trusted will be trustworthy, anyone who lacks information about the trusted’s 
interests and circumstances will present a case of trust that the rational choice theorist cannot 
easily justify.  If the rational choice approach is the only explanation of trust we have, then it is a 
mystery why people trust without this kind of information.  Again, graduate students can 
experience this type of relative powerlessness.  Graduate students need to be able to work in a 
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particular laboratory or experimental environment for an extended period of time in order to 
complete the research for their dissertations.  This environment is provided to them by their 
advisors in whose laboratories they do their research and on whose experiments they work.  By 
beginning her work in a particular laboratory, a student runs the risk that her advisor will cut her 
off from the laboratory prematurely by firing her or moving to another institution.  Being cut off 
from the lab of one’s advisor disrupts and potentially halts altogether a student’s research.  
However, graduate students are not usually privy to relevant information about their advisors’ 
circumstances that could result in their being cut off from their advisors’ laboratory.  Advisors’ 
decisions are often influenced by funding restrictions and opportunities as old grants are 
cancelled or new ones offered.  Funding considerations may cause an advisor to shift the focus of 
her work or even move to another institution.  Thus, any graduate student who is not privy to all 
the details of her advisor’s funding situation is in a position of epistemic powerlessness.  She 
lacks information that would aid her in assessing whether it is in her advisor’s self-interest to 
remain her advisor.  Nonetheless, one could still argue that a student in such a position may still 
reasonably trust her advisor not to abandon her prematurely.  If the advisor has promised the 
student that she will not leave the institution, if at all possible, before the student finishes, and the 
student knows that her advisor refused to abandon a previous student when under funding 
pressures, then it seems reasonable for the student to trust her advisor not to leave.  However one 
might make this argument, one would not be able to make it along the lines suggested by the 
rational choice account, which requires the truster to have enough information about the trusted’s 
circumstances to be able to judge whether trustworthiness is in the trusted’s self-interest.  
Therefore, the rational choice account is limited in its ability to account for trust on the part of 
the epistemically powerless. 
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At this point, a rational choice theorist might argue that these examples of powerlessness 
do not present cases of reasonable trust that fall outside the scope of rational choice explanations.  
There are two arguments such a theorist might make.  First, she might argue that the powerless 
simply do not engage in trust.  This is Hardin’s approach.  He addresses issues of powerlessness 
as follows: 
There are inherent problems in trusting another who has great power over one’s 
prospects.  In an iterated exchange between two relatively equal partners, both 
stand to lose more or less equally from the default of the other.  If a much more 
powerful partner defaults, however, she might be able to exact benefits without 
reciprocating.  Moreover, she might be able to dump partners willy-nilly and 
replace them with others, while they cannot dump her with such blissful 
unconcern because there may be few or no others who can play her role.  Hence 
as in the discussion of endgame effects, the weaker party to an unequal 
relationship is at threat of seeing the interaction terminated at any time but is most 
likely not in a position actually to terminate it. (Hardin 2002, p.101) 
 
Hardin does not take these problems facing the powerless as evidence that his approach cannot 
account for their trusting behavior.  Instead, he raises these issues to explain why “[i]n general, 
therefore, the weaker party cannot trust the more powerful much at all.  Inequalities of power 
therefore commonly block the possibility of trust” (Hardin 2002, p.101).  While Hardin is quite 
right that the powerless do often distrust the powerful, this is only half the story.  The important 
fact Hardin misses is that the powerless do often trust the powerful.  Graduate students do trust 
their advisors and collaborators do trust their partners from different disciplines.  Wherever we 
find cases of those who lack the power to detect and sanction the untrustworthy behavior of those 
they depend on, we have found a domain of trusting relationships which cannot be accounted for 
in the rational choice model.   
That said, a rational choice theorist might have a second argument against this claim: she 
might concede that there are cases of trust by the powerless but argue that these are cases of 
irrational trust.  She might argue that perhaps many individuals do trust when they lack evidence 
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that it is in the trusted’s self-interest to be trustworthy, but these individuals are pursuing an 
irrationally risky strategy.  Similarly, it is simply not wise to place one’s trust in someone who 
may find it in her best interest to be untrustworthy.  However, while there may be many cases of 
powerless individuals unwisely placing their trust in untrustworthy people, this argument cannot 
explain away all cases of trust by the powerless.  The fact that many cases of interdisciplinary 
collaboration in science, cases in which each partner lacks the expertise to detect untrustworthy 
behavior, are successful makes it implausible to discount such trust as irrational.  Similarly, I do 
not think it is irrational of Lauri and Monica, the trusting graduate students, to trust even though 
they lack the power to make it in their advisors’ self-interest to be trustworthy.  The rational 
choice approach is limited because it provides no theoretical tools to understand such perfectly 
reasonable, and not unusual, instances of trust by the relatively powerless.   
Note that Lauri and Monica’s cases illustrate different limitations of the rational choice 
approach.  Lauri, who has non-evidential reasons for trusting her advisor, illustrates the third 
limitation of the rational choice account that is preventing it from justifying trust by the 
powerless.  Since it does not account for pragmatic reasons for trust, the rational choice approach 
cannot explain why it is rational for Lauri to trust when she has no other viable advisor with 
whom to work.  Monica, who trusts because she has evidence of her advisor’s moral character, 
trusts based on evidence not acknowledged by the rational choice account.  This is a type of 
evidence that frequently gives people in powerless positions reason to trust.  Such trusters cannot 
easily be dismissed as trusting irrationally.  If we are to follow the rational choice approach, we 
will have to take the unpalatable position of labeling many common and pervasive interactions 
irrational, including many employer/employee, parent/child, doctor/patient, professional/client, 
and cross-disciplinary relationships.  In fact, many relationships between people who trust each 
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other despite differences and difficult epistemic locations will have to be dismissed as irrational.  
Taking this position simply to avoid having to formulate an account of trust to supplement the 
rational choice approach is an extreme move.   
Issues of powerlessness also illustrate the limitations of (RC3)—the assumption that the 
trusted acts trustworthily for self-interested reasons.  This assumption about the reasons for 
trustworthy behavior limits our ability to account for trustworthiness rooted in recognition of 
one’s moral responsibility to be trustworthy, especially when one is in a position of power.  In 
general, rational choice theorists avoid delving into issues of moral responsibility.  This is partly 
because their primary interest is in questions about the rationality of trust rather than questions 
about the morality of trust.  However, this silence on questions of moral responsibility is also 
caused by their minimalist desire to provide the simple explanations of rational trust behavior.  
Blais, Hardin and Rescher all express the hope that their accounts of trust can succeed without 
needing to bring in moral terms that they consider vague or overly complex.  Blais’ attempt to 
explain the collective knowledge acquired by cooperation between scientists illustrates this 
evasion of moral language.  He states one of his goals as “to suggest that the kind of trust that is 
needed in any such collective system of beliefs can be illuminated by these results stemming 
from the Prisoner’s Dilemma, provided that the concept of trust be taken not in the moral, but in 
a strategic sense” (Blais 1987, p. 363 my emphasis).  Later, he explains what he means by taking 
trust in a strategic rather than moral sense: 
In science, cooperation is of the essence.  This type of cooperation does not 
require trust in the moral sense.  It is not necessary to assume that trustworthiness 
is a moral virtue of the trustee, or that trust be construed as a “confident 
expectation of something; hope” (Oxford English Dictionary)….  I should like to 
model trust as a strategy, rather than as some state of the truster perhaps related to 
some other state of the trustee….  The idea is to see how far we can go in 
assuming that cooperation in the knowledge game is justified, even if the players 
of the game have no such moral virtues. (Blais 1987, p.370)   
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Blais does not deny the existence of moral virtues, but he is trying to see how much of scientific 
cooperation he can explain without referring to them.  Other rational choice writers agree that 
there may be more to trust and trustworthiness than just self-interested rational behavior, but, like 
Blais, they see themselves as providing a useful, if not essential, initial explanation of the central 
cases of trust.  If, after an acceptable rational choice account of trust behavior has been provided, 
more needs to be said about some peripheral instances of trusting and trustworthiness, then 
perhaps the language of virtues, character and moral responsibilities can be brought in to fill the 
gaps.  This is Hardin's approach: 
Many writings on trust convey a vague sense that trust always requires more than 
rational expectations grounded in the likely interests of the trusted.  If this sense is 
correct, then we are at a very early stage in the development of any theory to 
account for trust or even to characterize it in many contexts.  If an account from 
interests is largely correct for a large and important fraction of our trusting 
relationships, however, we already have the elements of a theory of trust that 
merely wants careful articulation and application. (Hardin 2002, p.6) 
 
Rescher also argues that cooperation “need not ensue from a moral dedication to the good of 
others and care for their interests” (Rescher 1989, p.43).  The rational choice approach, therefore, 
attempts to explain why individuals trust and act trustworthily in different contexts by showing 
why it would be in the self-interest of a rational agent to do so.  Explicitly moral language is 
avoided in these explanations, and the test of a successful rational choice theory of trusting 
behavior is its ability to provide this type of explanation for a wide range of trusting 
relationships.   
Unfortunately for the rational choice theorists, we do need to bring in moral concepts like 
responsibility to account for some important aspects of people’s reasons for being trustworthy.  
While Blais claims that “it is not necessary to assume that trustworthiness is a moral virtue of the 
trustee…,” Nancy Nyquist Potter argues persuasively that it is necessary to assume that 
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trustworthiness is a moral virtue in order to account for the responsibility that the powerful bear 
towards the relatively powerless.  Citing Annette Baier’s work on power and trust, Potter 
maintains:  
Trust itself alters power positions (Baier 1986, 240): trusting others involves 
depending on them, being vulnerable to the possibility of disappointment or 
betrayal, and risking harm to self.  This further feature of trust, in turn, indicates a 
moral requirement of the one being trusted: being worthy of another’s trust 
requires that one takes care to ensure that one does not exploit the potential power 
that one has to do harm to the trusting person. (Potter 2002, pp. 9-10)  
 
Potter is arguing that the power that the trusted has over the truster implies a moral responsibility 
on the part of the trusted.  Throughout her book, she argues that the powerful have a moral 
obligation to cultivate a trustworthy character, one that recognizes “the importance of being 
trustworthy to the disenfranchised and oppressed” (Potter 2002, p.29).  Thus, her interest in 
power relations spurs her to adopt a virtue theory of trust and trustworthiness.  She justifies this 
focus on character as follows:  
The locus of trust is on character because, when differences in privilege and 
power exist between us, we may be uneasy about what each other cares about: 
each sees that the other values some things which she or he sees as either 
incompatible with or hostile to the things she or he values.  Hence, the emphasis 
is on how willing and able one is to care for the goods others value even when 
those are not, or do not appear to be, entirely harmonious with the goods one 
values oneself.  However, differences in power and privilege make it more 
difficult to assess the trustworthiness of others, so it is important to give and 
receive assurances of our trustworthiness. (Potter 2002, p.12 my emphasis in 
bold) 
 
Those who are trusted have the power to hurt the interests of trusters, and in cases of differences 
in privilege, the trusters may fear that the trusted will use that power to pursue goods that are 
incompatible with those things they themselves value.  This is easily illustrated in 
employer/employee relationships as seen in debates about the labor practices of large retail 
chains.  The employees of a large retail chain trust the company to provide safe and healthy 
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conditions for their work; they place their valued safety and health in the hands of their 
employer.  The employer thus has the power to hurt the interests of its employees by failing to 
provide adequate working conditions.  Additionally, there is a huge difference in power between 
the employer and its non-union employees.  Critics of certain large retail chains worry that the 
company’s interest in its profit margins is in tension with the employees’ interest in good 
working conditions.  Of course, this tension is present in most employer/employee relations.  
However, some corporations are motivated by a sense of corporate ethics.  These companies 
believe that they have a moral responsibility to care for their employees’ health even when doing 
so is not entirely harmonious with their own interest in profits.  When critics argue that certain 
employers are lacking something important that these other companies possess, Potter’s analysis 
suggests that they are arguing that some employers are not as trustworthy as others.  In this case, 
using the language of moral responsibility allows us to say something important about the 
trustworthiness of corporations; and the rational choice approach does not provide us with these 
kinds of conceptual tools.  
1.2.5 The trust/mere reliance distinction 
Lastly, the rational choice approach fails to mark the conceptual distinction between trust 
and reliance (and correlatively between trustworthiness and reliability).  Baier makes this 
distinction when she says “We can still rely where we no longer trust” (Baier 1994, p.98).  Baier 
illustrates the distinction with the following example: 
Once we have ceased to trust our fellows, we may rely on their fear of the newly 
appointed security guards in shops to deter them from injecting poison into the 
food on the shelves.  We may rely on the shopkeeper’s concern for his profits to 
motivate him to take effective precautions against poisoners and also trust him to 
want his customers not to be harmed by his products, at least as long as this want 
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can be satisfied without frustrating his wish to increase his profits. (Baier 1994, 
p.99) 
 
This example suggests that there may be a difference between relying on someone and trusting 
them, but what marks the difference in these two ways of depending on someone?  Baier 
continues: 
We all depend on one another’s psychology in countless ways, but this is not yet 
to trust them.  The trusting can be betrayed, or at least let down, and not just 
disappointed.  Kant’s neighbors who counted on his regular habits as a clock for 
their own less automatically regular ones might be disappointed with him if he 
slept in one day, but not let down by him, let alone had their trust betrayed. (Baier 
1994, p.99) 
 
When one merely relies on a person, one takes a similar attitude towards him or her as one takes 
towards a clock.  A good clock can be counted on to tell the time accurately, and one may 
reasonably alter one’s behavior based on its behavior.  But one does not feel that the clock has 
betrayed one or failed to meet a responsibility when it is inaccurate.  In short, one’s relationship 
with the clock’s activities does not carry moral weight.  This is because clocks are not part of our 
moral community, so norms do not apply to our interactions with them.  One cannot make a 
contract with a clock or enter into a norm-governed relationship with it.  One element of our 
education is to learn which norms apply to different kinds of interactions, and we learn that 
inanimate objects are not subject to the same norms as those governing interactions with other 
people.  In learning this, we learn when certain emotional responses are appropriate (for 
example, we learn that it is inappropriate to feel betrayed by a clock).  Thus, part of what it 
means to be a mature moral being is to have the emotional responses that are appropriate to the 
situation at hand.  This is why we generally do not feel betrayed by our clocks (or if we do feel 
betrayed we are likely to acknowledge the feeling as silly).  I will say that the kind of 
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relationship we have with a clock is one of ‘mere reliance’, as opposed to one of trust.  In 
general, our relationships with inanimate objects are relationships of mere reliance. 
Our relationships with people are more complex.  Sometimes our interactions with people 
resemble our relationships to inanimate objects.  People can merely rely on other people.  Baier’s 
example of Kant and his neighbors illustrates this nicely.  The neighbors who used Kant’s 
regular walks about town as an indicator of the time merely relied on him.  They were not 
betrayed by his failure to act as a good indicator of the time on the day he slept in.  Their 
relationship with him (if it can even be called a relationship) did not carry that kind of moral 
weight.20  However, most of our interactions with people are governed by norms.  When one 
counts on someone in a context governed by norms, one has a different relationship with that 
person than one has with an inanimate object.  These types of relationships are the kind of 
relationships that Baier called trusting relationships.   In contrast to relationships of mere 
reliance, trusting relationships do possess the possibility of betrayal.21  When a child’s trust is 
broken, the child can be said to have been betrayed.  Infidelity on the part of a trusted spouse is a 
betrayal, and the disloyal spouse is subject to moral blame.   
Even though Baier’s main interest is in answering a different question than the one of 
interest to the rational choice theorists, her distinction between reliance and trust suggests one 
line of argument against their approach.  Baier is trying to determine what distinguishes trust 
                                                 
20 It is worth noting that whether one is inclined to grant moral weight to Kant’s relationship with his 
neighbors depends on how one imagines several details of the story.  If we imagine that Kant entered into 
an agreement with them to try to stick to a timely walk so that they could keep the time, then I think we 
no longer want to say that Kant cannot betray his neighbors.  In fact, I think intuitions could change if we 
just imagine that Kant is aware that his neighbors rely upon him.  When I say that the relationship does 
not carry this kind of moral weight, I am taking Baier’s example to be that the neighbors have decided to 
rely upon him without his consent or knowledge. 
21 Baier relies heavily on the concept of betrayal to mark the trust/reliance distinction.  Unfortunately, she 
says little about what exactly betrayal is.  In chapter two, I will provide an account of betrayal that will fill 
this gap in her account. 
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from other social phenomena; the rational choice theorists instead focus on what makes trust 
rational.  However, notice how Baier’s argument that trust involves vulnerability to betrayal has 
implications for the question of when trust is rational.  If trust involves vulnerability to betrayal, 
then rational trust will involve appropriate22 vulnerability to betrayal.  In assessing the 
rationality of someone’s trust, one must therefore ask questions like whether it is appropriate to 
feel betrayed by the trusted when the trusted fails to fulfill one’s expectations.  Thus, an answer 
to the question What makes trust rational? that is based on a recognition of the trust/reliance 
distinction would include something like the following claim: If A is trusting rationally, then it is 
appropriate for A to feel betrayal when the trusted fails to fulfill the truster’s expectations.  This 
is not part of the rational choice account of trust.  Thus, the rational choice approach presupposes 
an account of trust that does not mark the trust/reliance distinction.  Once one appreciates the 
distinction, one might be tempted to dismiss rational choice accounts on the grounds that they are 
accounts of the rationality of reliance that do not cast much light on trusting behavior.   
To elaborate, Baier’s distinction suggests the following argument against the rational 
choice approach.  If trust is “essentially rational expectations about the self-interested behavior 
of the trusted” as Hardin and the rational choice theorists claim, then when one trusts one is 
vulnerable to being disappointed by one’s expectations (because one has miscalculated the 
effects of external circumstances on what is in the trusted’s self-interest to do), but one is not 
vulnerable to betrayal.  However, when one trusts one is vulnerable to betrayal.  So, trust must 
not be what the rational choice account tells us it is.  That is, if I rationally expect that someone 
will do something because I think it is in her self-interest to do so, then I am justified in feeling 
                                                 
22 As will be shown in chapter two, it is possible for one’s trust to be problematic not only because one 
trusts without good reason to do so, but also because the nature of one’s relationship with the trusted 
makes feelings of betrayal inappropriate. 
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disappointed when she acts contrary to my expectations.  However, I would not be justified in 
feeling betrayed, because I simply did not see the external circumstances clearly enough.  Were I 
to have recognized the situation for what it was, I would have predicted that the self-interested 
person would not act as expected. The failure here is largely my own.  I am the one who 
expected the other to do whatever was in her self-interest.  I was disappointed by my own 
evaluation of what was in the self-interest of the other.  The proper response to such a 
disappointment is to think “Oh, I should have known better.”  So if Baier is correct that if one 
reasonably trusts someone, one is entitled to feel betrayed by her untrustworthy behavior, then 
we are led to the conclusion that the rational choice approach does not deliver an account of 
trust.23 
The following thought experiment adds to the attractiveness of this criticism of the 
rational choice account.  Consider two scientists from different fields.  Alice needs Betty to 
conduct an experiment that Alice lacks the expertise to perform or supervise.  Alice is concerned 
because Alice knows that Betty is a self-serving individual who has no moral compunction about 
giving her colleagues sloppy data if she can get away with it.  But luckily for Alice, there is 
another scientist, Claire, who works in Betty’s lab.  Alice and Claire are good friends, and Claire 
offers to check over Betty’s data for Alice because Claire knows, and cares about, how important 
this experiment is for Alice.  Betty knows that Claire will be checking the data.  Alice now 
expects that Betty will not give her sloppy data because she thinks Betty knows that Claire will 
expose Betty’s carelessness and damage her professional reputation if Betty does so.  
Unfortunately for Alice, when the time comes, Claire is overwhelmed with work.  Betty notices 
this and takes the opportunity to slip by some sloppy work.  Claire gives Betty’s data only a 
                                                 
23 Potter provides a similar argument (Potter 2005, p.5). 
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passing glance before falsely telling Alice that everything is fine with it.  As a result, Alice’s 
own project grinds to a halt because of flaws in Betty’s data.  Now, how is Alice to respond 
when both Betty’s and Claire’s carelessness is uncovered?  The key question for our purposes is 
whether Alice would justifiably feel betrayed by either Betty or Claire.  Intuitively, I think we 
want to say that Alice would be entitled to feel betrayed by Claire but not by Betty.  We might 
explain this intuition by saying that it was Claire on whom Alice was really counting.  Alice fully 
expected that Betty would disappoint her if Betty could get away with it.  So, Alice’s attitude 
towards Betty will not likely change as a result of this disappointment.  The same is not true of 
Alice’s attitude towards Claire.  Alice probably believed that Claire cared enough about Alice to 
look out for her even when it was inconvenient.  Alice now sees that this is not the case, and 
Alice’s attitude will change.  Alice will feel betrayed by someone she thought was a trustworthy 
friend.  If Baier is right that we justifiably feel betrayed when those we trust let us down, then it 
is clear that Alice did not trust Betty.  Alice did rely on Betty for the data, but theirs was not a 
trusting relationship.  This is problematic for the rational choice theorists because Alice’s 
expectation that Betty would produce good data would be a paradigmatic case of trust for them.  
Alice had reason to expect that Betty’s self-interest would, under these circumstances, lead Betty 
to act in a certain manner.  One might, therefore, conclude that Baier’s distinction between 
reliance and trust suggests that the rational choice approach gives us interesting accounts of 
reliance and reliability but not trust and trustworthiness. 
But is this the right conclusion to draw?  Is this enough of an argument to support 
abandoning the rational choice approach to trust and trustworthiness?  While this argument and 
thought experiment reveal something important about the group of behaviors and dispositions we 
call trust and trustworthiness, I do not think we should dispense with the rational choice 
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approach so quickly.  The main reason for this is that I find it unproductive to argue about what 
we really mean by the English verb ‘to trust’.  Even a cursory survey of common usage of ‘trust’ 
shows that we use the term to refer to both what Baier calls reliance and what she calls trust.  We 
say that we trust objects of which we do not make moral judgments.  Witness the perfectly 
everyday assertion: “I trust my car to get me to work each day,” and these more cultured 
examples from the Oxford English Dictionary’s entry on trust:  “He trusts much more to the Sun, 
for his Guide, than to the Creator of it” and “The mushrooms, that grow in meadows, are of the 
best kind: all others are dangerously trusted.”  We can, and do, use ‘trust’ to mean ‘reliance’ in 
Baier’s sense.  Therefore, we should not take her account of the difference between trust and 
reliance as arguing that vulnerability to betrayal is a necessary condition for the competent 
application of the English word ‘trust’.  The actual situation is that our use of ‘trust’ covers two 
very different ways in which we count on objects and people (including, in the case of self-trust, 
oneself).  Her distinction, when applied to interpersonal interactions, helps us see that sometimes 
we count on people in ways that make us vulnerable to betrayal and sometimes we count on 
them in the way we count on a clock or a car.  Depending on the social context and the norms 
governing the interactions, sometimes our counting on them means we hold them to a particular 
kind of moral standard and sometimes our counting on them has no such moral weight attached 
to it.  We should not, therefore, argue that the rational choice theorists have no right to describe 
their project as an account of trust and trustworthiness.   
Indeed, there are lessons to be learned from the earlier argument and its attendant thought 
experiment.  First, we learn that we can recognize the distinction Baier makes in concrete cases.  
In thinking about Alice’s differing attitudes towards Betty and Claire, we can see that Alice 
counts on Claire in a different way than Alice counts on Betty.  This example suggests that there 
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is something important about Alice and Claire’s relationship that is not accounted for by the 
rational choice account.  As we have seen, some rational choice theorists claim that we can 
reduce trust to reliance on self-interested behavior without losing sight of the interesting 
phenomena.  But we should not be so hasty to rush to this conclusion.  There are clearly ways of 
depending on people that do not fit the rational choice model, and my slightly contrived thought 
experiment suggests that some of these may be found in interactions between scientists.  
Therefore, my analysis of trust between scientists departs from the rational choice approach and 
instead provides an account of trust and trustworthiness, in Baier’s sense.  The fact that trust 
involves vulnerability to betrayal is an essential part of my account of trust.   
In conclusion, the rational choice approach to trust and trustworthiness has much to offer.  
It provides a useful starting point to understand some of the dynamics of trusting relationships, 
both between individuals and within a community as a whole.  However, like most theoretical 
tools, the rational choice approach has limited scope.  It fails to recognize that we often act 
trustworthily for reasons other than self-interest, and it also overlooks that we frequently trust 
people because we see those other motivations in them.  In addition, the rational choice approach 
fails to address non-evidential reasons for trust.  By providing such a limited view of reasons that 
motivate people’s actions in trusting relationships, the rational choice approach cannot 
adequately explain trusting relationships where the parties have unequal power.  Finally, the 
rational choice approach cannot mark the distinction between trust and reliance.  Having outlined 
some of the limitations of the dominant approach to trust, the next chapter provides an alternative 
account that lacks these limitations. 
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2.0  AN ACCOUNT OF TRUST 
Before I introduce and defend my account of trust, it will be helpful to have on the table a 
set of criteria of adequacy by which to judge it.  Some of these goals must be met by all 
legitimate accounts of trust, while others need only be met by accounts aimed at capturing a 
certain range of trust phenomena.  The criteria of adequacy are as follows.  1)  An account must 
show how trust involves vulnerability and risk.  Reliance and trust are similar in that by trusting 
or relying on someone we are vulnerable to being let down.  In showing where the vulnerability 
lies in trusting, my account will clarify the close relationship between trust and reliance.  2) An 
account must mark the distinction between reliance and trust by showing how trust involves 
vulnerability to betrayal.  As we saw in chapter one, one can, following Baier, make a distinction 
between reliance and trust by pointing to the particular kind of vulnerability to which the trusting 
are susceptible; while those who merely rely can be vulnerable to being disappointed, they are 
not, unlike the trusting, vulnerable to betrayal.  An account of trust phenomena needs to explain 
what betrayal is and how it can be used to delineate the trust/reliance boundary.  3)  Any account 
of trust must apply to, and unify, many different cases of what common usage would call trust.  
An account which is overly narrow and covers only an idiosyncratic group of cases of trust 
cannot be legitimately called an account of trust.  A successful account of trust also needs to 
show what cases of the relevant type of trust have in common; it should unify the phenomena 
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under study without falling prey to familiar counterexamples.  After explaining my account of 
trust, I return to these criteria and argue that the account meets all three of them. 
My account of trust is as follows: 
(T)  A trusts B to do C iff (1) A takes the proposition that B will do C as part of A’s adjusted 
cognitive background, (2) in part, because A believes that their relationship morally obliges B to 
do C.24 
 
Clearly, both the nature of the cognitive attitude found in (1) and the kind of relationship and 
obligations at issue in (2) need explication and justification.  I address each in turn. 
2.1 THE COGNITIVE ATTITUDE OF TRUST 
2.1.1 Does trust require belief? 
There is debate in the trust literature about whether trust requires belief that the trusted 
will act as expected.  When I sincerely say, “I trust my friend to keep my secret,” do I have the 
belief that she will keep my secret to herself?  If I trust my spouse to remain faithful, do I believe 
that my spouse will not cheat on me?  Several commonly shared, and potentially contradictory, 
intuitions about trust make it difficult to answer these questions.  First, many authors share 
Baier’s intuition that we do not ordinarily choose to trust (e.g. Baier 1994, Hieronymi 2008).25  
At first glance, it seems that trust is not under voluntary control.  If we do not trust someone, we 
cannot decide to change our position and trust her.  This intuition potentially explains why the 
                                                 
24 This account shares many features in common with Holton’s account of trust as reliance from the participant 
stance (Holton 1994).   
25 As Holton notes, Baier’s views on this issue appear to evolve.  In “Trust and its Vulnerabilities” she changes her 
statement to “trusting is rarely something we decide to do” (Baier 1994, p.141) from the stronger claim in “Trust and 
Antitrust” that “[t]he child, of course, cannot trust at will any more than experienced adults can” (Baier 1994, 
p.110). 
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demand “Trust me!” is so impotent (Baier 1994, p.110).  The parents of a teenager may fervently 
want to trust their child but feel that the child’s past irresponsible behavior makes it impossible 
for them to choose to trust, even though the child asks the parents to “just trust me.”  This 
intuition that trust is involuntary is taken as evidence for the view that trust requires belief that 
the trusted will act as expected, because it is commonly argued that belief is involuntary 
(Williams 1973).  Thus some conclude that since we cannot will ourselves to believe whatever 
we like, we cannot choose to trust whomever we like.   
This view is undermined when we reflect on some of the reasons we cite for our trust in 
others.  Some of these reasons do not appear to be reasons one could cite to support a belief that 
someone will do something.  One can trust because one thinks one ought to trust people with 
whom one has a certain kind of relationship, or because one thinks that one’s interactions with 
someone will go more smoothly or simply if one trusts.  For example, recall Holton’s example of 
the shopkeeper who decides to trust the convicted thief with the till.  The shopkeeper, who 
chooses to trust because that is how she feels she ought to treat her employees or because she 
hopes to draw the thief back into the moral community, is not trusting for reasons that constitute 
evidence for the belief that the thief will not steal.  Similarly, Lauri, the graduate student who 
trusts her advisor because she has no other alternative, may be choosing to trust because she 
thinks the relationship will be simpler and smoother if she takes a trustful rather than distrustful 
attitude.  So here, as in the shopkeeper example, we have a case where one has reasons for 
trusting which could not be reasons for belief that the trusted will act as expected.  Non-
evidential reasons for trusting create problems for the view that trust requires belief that the 
trusted will act as expected.  If one can have reasons adequate to justify trust but not adequate to 
justify belief, then it seems that trust does not require belief that the trusted will act as expected. 
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On my account, trust does not require belief that the trusted will act as expected.  Often, 
one does trust on the basis of one’s belief that the trusted will live up to one’s expectations, but 
this is not always the case.  There are cases of trust when the truster cannot sensibly be said to 
have the belief that the trusted will act as expected.  Even though this account denies that trust 
requires belief, it does not claim that trust has no cognitive element.  Trusters do have some 
cognitive attitude towards the proposition that the trusted will come through for them.  On my 
account, A either believes or accepts that B will do C and this belief or acceptance is the basis of 
A’s practical reasoning.  This is what it means to say that the proposition that B will do C is part 
of A’s adjusted cognitive background.  Having situated this account of trust in the context of the 
debate about the role of belief in trust, I now explicate the key notions of belief, acceptance and 
adjusted cognitive background. 
2.1.2 The distinction between trust and acceptance 
In “Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context,” Michael Bratman usefully 
outlines a distinction between belief and acceptance.  In general, reasonable belief has four 
features that acceptance lacks (Bratman 1992, pp.3-4).  First, reasonable belief is context-
independent.  My beliefs do not change as I move from one intellectual or practical context to 
another.  Second, reasonable belief is “shaped primarily by evidence for what is believed and 
concern for the truth of what is believed” (Bratman 1992, p.3).  In other words, belief aims at 
truth.  Third, we do not normally have direct voluntary control over our beliefs.  Fourth, an 
agent’s beliefs are subject to demands for consistency and coherence.  We aim at having a 
coherent belief system.  In contrast, acceptance is context-dependent, shaped by factors other 
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than evidence, voluntary, and exempt from demands for overall consistency across contexts.  
These four features distinguish belief from acceptance.   
Bratman’s argument for the belief/acceptance distinction proceeds by presentation of 
several examples of context-dependent acceptance.  For instance: 
The three of us need jointly to decide whether to build a house together.  We 
agree to base our deliberations on the assumption that the total cost of the project 
will include the top of the estimated range offered by each of the sub-contractors.  
We facilitate our group deliberations and decisions by agreeing on a common 
framework of assumptions.  We each accept these assumptions in this context, the 
context of our group’s deliberations, even though it may well be that none of us 
believes these assumptions or accepts them in other, more individualistic contexts. 
(Bratman 1992, p.7) 
 
In this case, our building group has decided to use the highest estimated prices for materials and 
labor in our practical reasoning about the cost because it will make our work smoother.  This is a 
case where I can legitimately accept a set of assumptions in this one context that I would not 
accept in another context; were I asked to place a bet on the cost of the house, I would not take 
the highest sub-contractor estimates for granted in my calculations.  This example also illustrates 
how reasonable acceptance, unlike belief, does not necessarily aim at truth.  One can have 
pragmatic reasons for accepting a proposition in a given context; in this case, we have a 
pragmatic interest in simplifying our group deliberations.  The building group’s acceptance of 
the cost framework is voluntary.  Thus, it does not have the third feature of belief.  Finally, we 
would find it strange were someone to criticize the group for accepting the high cost estimate on 
the grounds that it is inconsistent with the set of propositions the group accepted when they were 
trying to figure out what the cheapest price for the house might be.  Thus, sometimes we adopt a 
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cognitive attitude of acceptance which is not subject to the ideals of consistency and coherence 
across contexts.26   
Bratman argues for a model of practical planning and deliberation, in which an agent’s 
beliefs create a “default cognitive background” that can be adjusted to suit practical reasoning 
about what to do in a specific context (Bratman 1992, p.10).  We bring to all contexts a set of 
involuntary beliefs that are subject to demands for evidence and consistency.  However, 
depending on the nature of the particular context at hand, we can bracket a belief that p, which is 
part of our cognitive background, or we can posit that p despite not maintaining a belief that p in 
the default background.  We thus engage in practical reasoning in a specific context based on our 
“context-relative adjusted cognitive background” (Bratman 1992, p.11).  This adjusted cognitive 
background includes all the un-bracketed propositions that we believe as well as all the 
propositions we have accepted for this particular context.   
There are a number of types of practical pressures that can cause us to adjust our 
cognitive background by accepting that p when we do not believe that p, or by bracketing our 
belief that p.  These pressures include the need to simplify one’s reasoning, to take into account 
asymmetries in the costs of errors, to facilitate social cooperation, and to satisfy the pre-
conditions for any practical reasoning at all.  The building example illustrates how both the 
demands of social cooperation and need to simplify our reasoning can lead us to choose to posit 
a cost for the building that we would not accept in individualistic contexts.  A cautious driver 
who operates on the assumption that all the drivers around her are driving drunk when she drives 
at night on New Year’s Eve is someone who accepts a proposition (that the other drivers are 
                                                 
26 Acceptance is, however, subject to a demand for consistency within a given context.  The premises one uses in 
one’s practical reasoning about a particular course of action ought to be consistent.  In fact, as Holton notes, in 
observing someone’s plans, we take evidence that their plans are based on a particular premise as evidence that the 
person does not accept premises inconsistent with that premise (Holton 1994, p.72).   
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drunk) in a particular context (on New Year’s Eve) because of the asymmetries in the costs of 
errors (it will cost her little to make this assumption and could cost her a lot not to make it and 
drive less cautiously).  Finally, a soldier who doubts that she will survive the day of battle ahead 
illustrates the need to accept certain propositions as a precondition for practical reasoning 
(Bratman 1992, p.8).  Even though the soldier doubts that she will survive the day, she 
nonetheless needs to accept that she will so that she can engage in necessary practical reasoning 
about tomorrow’s schedule.  In all these examples, individuals are led by pragmatic 
considerations to accept certain propositions as the basis of their practical reasoning. 
To accept that p is to choose to take p as a premise in one’s practical reasoning.  It is to 
make p part of one’s adjusted cognitive background for practical reasoning in the particular 
context at issue.  Accepting that p is not the same as believing that p with a low degree of 
confidence.  Bratman uses the following example to illustrate this point: 
I have a chair and a two-story ladder.  In each case I think it equally and highly 
likely that it is in good condition.  Indeed, if you offered me a monetary bet about 
whether the chair/ladder was in good condition I would accept exactly the same 
odds for each object.  But when I think about using the chair/ladder things change.  
When I consider using the chair I simply take it for granted that it is in working 
order; but when I am about to use the ladder I do not take this for granted. 
(Bratman 1992, p.7) 
 
In this case, the asymmetries in the costs of errors provide reason to accept one proposition and 
not the other, even though one has the same degree of confidence in each.  Accepting that p is 
also different from supposing that p and pretending that p.  In short, “Context-relative acceptance 
is tied more directly to action than is mere supposition; and it is tied more directly to practical 
reasoning than is mere pretence” (Bratman 1992, p.9).  These distinctions are particularly 
important to understanding trust, so I discuss supposition and pretence further after having 
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explained how trust involves taking the proposition that the trusted will act as expected as part of 
one’s adjusted cognitive background.   
2.1.3 A takes the proposition that B will do C as part of A’s adjusted cognitive 
background 
When A trusts B to do C, A has the proposition that B will do C as part of her adjusted 
cognitive background.  When we trust someone to do something, we make plans based on the 
assumption that she will come through for us.  This assumption is part of the background of our 
deliberation.  Sometimes we may make plans based on the assumption that she will come 
through for us even when we do not have good evidence to support the belief that she will do so.  
So sometimes our trust is based on acceptance, rather than belief, that the trusted will act as 
expected.  In the example of Lauri the graduate student, she may not have enough evidence to 
support a belief that her advisor will treat her well, but she may still choose to make plans for her 
graduate program based on that assumption.  Therefore, one way that the proposition that B will 
do C can be part of A’s adjusted cognitive background is by A accepting the proposition for 
pragmatic, non-evidential reasons. 
Another way that the proposition that B will do C can be part of A’s adjusted cognitive 
background is by A believing it.  If A has a context-independent belief that B will do C, A may 
find herself in a specific context in which there is no reason to bracket this belief.  In this case, 
A’s trust in B to do C is based on the belief that B will do C.  In this situation, A uses the premise 
that B will do C in her practical reasoning—A makes plans based on the assumption that B will 
do C.  Thus, this account is broader than accounts of trust which require that trust involves belief 
(e.g. Hieronymi 2008).  Trust may involve belief that someone will do something, but it may 
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instead just involve acceptance that someone will do something.  In either case, trust involves 
taking the premise that someone will do something as the basis of one’s practical reasoning 
about what to do in a particular context, which is to say that trust involves having the proposition 
that someone will do something as part of one’s adjusted cognitive background.   
One of the primary virtues of this account is that it recognizes that trust is context-
dependent.  Whether or not we trust someone depends crucially on the details of the context of 
trust.  I may trust my friend Leslie not to tell my secret when exposure would do me little harm, 
but I may also not trust Leslie with same secret in an environment where it would seriously 
damage my reputation.  Situations like this are easily accounted for on my account.  As Bratman 
points out, the difference between what we reasonably accept in one context and do not accept in 
another can be strongly influenced by asymmetries in the costs of errors (Bratman 1992, p.7).  
Thus, I have one of two attitudes towards Leslie.  Either I believe that she will keep my secret 
and I choose to bracket this belief when the costs of error are high, or I doubt that she will keep 
my secret but I nonetheless choose to accept that she will keep it because the costs of errors are 
low, and I think trusting her will have pragmatic benefits (for example, the benefit of cementing 
my relationship with her).  Thus my trust in Leslie to keep my secret in the less risky context 
may be based on either acceptance or belief.  Our ability to adjust our cognitive background for 
practical reasoning in light of the details of the particular context of deliberation nicely explains 
why trust is context-dependent.  Having explicated and justified part (1) of my account of trust, I 
turn to objections.   
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2.1.4 Objections and replies 
What about the initial intuition that trusting is not subject to voluntary control?  If some 
cases of trust involve acceptance, rather than belief, that someone will do something, then some 
cases of trust are under voluntary control.  While my account denies that trusting can never be 
done at will, it can nonetheless accommodate some of the considerations that I take to be behind 
this intuition that trusting is not voluntary. The key is to recognize that acceptance is not 
supposition.  Bratman makes a few brief remarks about this distinction, and elaboration of it can 
allay concerns about the voluntariness of trusting.  According to Bratman, “Context-relative 
acceptance is tied more directly to action than is mere supposition” (Bratman 1992, p.9).  He 
uses the following example to illustrate supposition: 
“Suppose I had a million dollars”, I ask myself.  “What should I do with it?”  
Such a question may trigger contingency planning based on the mere supposition 
that I have such wealth.  But this planning will not directly shape my action.  If I 
conclude, for example, that with such wealth I should invest in General Motors 
my conclusion will not lead directly to my calling up my broker. (Bratman 1992, 
p.9) 
 
So, according to Bratman, supposition does not lead directly to action, but acceptance can 
directly shape action.  While it would be preferable to have a more precise account of how a 
cognitive attitude leads directly or indirectly to action, it is relatively clear what Bratman has in 
mind here.  Supposition can be used in hypothetical reasoning about what one would do were 
one to have good reason to act on the supposition.  In contrast, reasoning on the basis of what 
one accepts is not hypothetical in this way.   
If one accepts that p in a context, one takes oneself to have good reason ceteris paribus to 
act on p in that context.  The reasons one has for accepting that p can, as Bratman points out, be 
non-evidential, but that does not mean that evidence has no place to play in acceptance.  There 
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are some epistemic constraints on acceptance.  One might wonder why there should be epistemic 
constraints on the premises we can use in our practical reasoning.  It seems that we should be 
able to use any premise as part of our planning process.  However, we need to remember that 
practical reasoning is reasoning about what to do.  As such, it is distinct from daydreaming or 
hypothetical reasoning about what one would do in another faraway possible world.  In our 
practical reasoning we make plans about what to do in this world, and, therefore, our planning 
must be guided by premises that have at least some relevant semblance to the actual world.  
Otherwise our plans become daydreams or hypotheses about very distant possible worlds.  Thus, 
massive amounts of evidence that p is not true (or not even approximately true) can make it 
unreasonable to accept p in virtually all contexts.  The abundant evidence that I do not have a 
million dollars makes it unreasonable to accept that I do and call my broker.  A reasonable 
person could very well make hypothetical plans based on the supposition that she is a 
millionaire, but only an irrational person would plan her life around that attitude in the face of 
glaring evidence to the contrary.  A reasonable person would find herself incapable of accepting 
that proposition.  Were we to ask her to try to plan her life around it, she might tell us that she 
just cannot, no matter how hard she tries.  I submit that the same can be true for trust.   
In the vast majority of contexts, given a substantial amount of evidence against the 
trustworthiness of a person, we cannot trust her no matter how hard we try.  Suppose I have seen 
my friend to be a terrible keeper of secrets.  If I have an important secret, I may find that no 
matter how much I want to show confidence in my friend, I cannot accept that she will keep my 
secret.  I cannot choose to trust her.  Trust is, therefore, inconsistent with holding that one has 
overwhelming evidence that the trusted will not come through for one.  This sketch of the 
epistemic constraints on acceptance nicely accounts for this intuition; just as one cannot accept 
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that p if one takes oneself to have massive evidence that p is not even approximately true, one 
cannot trust that B will do C if one takes oneself to have massive evidence that B will not do C.  I 
cannot trust my friend to keep my secret if I take myself to have good evidence to believe that 
she will divulge it.  However, this epistemic constraint on trust only rules out trusting someone to 
do something one has overwhelming evidence to believe they will not do; it does not rule out 
trusting someone when one is agnostic about the likelihood that they will act as expected.  
Holton makes this same point about reliance: “I do not need to have the belief that you will do 
what I rely [on] you to do, but I do need to lack the belief that you will fail” (Holton 1994, p.71).  
In summary, unlike belief, acceptance can be voluntary, but that does not mean that we are 
always free to choose to accept whatever we wish.  Since acceptance, unlike supposition, is 
subject to some epistemic constraints, we find that we are not entirely free when it comes to 
trusting.  Even though this account of trust as sometimes involving acceptance can, as I have 
shown, accommodate intuitions which initially seem to support the view that trust requires 
belief, there are other objections to this account, which now need to be tackled. 
One objection, proposed by Pamela Hieronymi, argues that trust without belief is merely 
a poor cousin of the type of trust of which we should want to give an account.  She thinks that 
trusting without believing that the trusted will come through for you shows a lack of confidence 
in the trusted: “your lack of confidence betrays a lack of trust” (Hieronymi 2008, p.6).  
Hieronymi uses the following example to support this claim: 
Suppose that, in the morning, you and I agree to meet for dinner at a certain time 
at a certain restaurant to plan an upcoming event.  Later in the day you learn that 
all my friends have decided to go to my favourite restaurant to celebrate a surprise 
promotion bestowed on one of them.  You now doubt whether I will keep my 
engagement with you. You are not certain I will not, but then you are not certain I 
will either.  You are in a state of doubt.  In the face of your doubt, you decide to 
go to the restaurant and wait for me. (Hieronymi 2008, p.6) 
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Hieronymi imagines that when I arrive at the restaurant, you tell me about your doubts that I 
would show up and explain that you decided to go to the restaurant in spite of the doubts.  She 
thinks that in this scenario, I will be concerned that your doubts express a lack of trust in me that 
I will keep my agreement (Hieronymi 2008, p.6).  The idea here is that I will be concerned that 
you did not believe that I would keep our dinner date.  I will think that this means that your trust 
in me is less than could be desired.  Hieronymi calls trust accompanied by belief “full-fledged” 
trust.  Full-fledged trust is a sort of ideal trust: “…even if one thinks the full-fledged sort of trust 
would be positively inappropriate in the circumstances, one can still imagine what it would be to 
have it, and its inappropriateness is typically explained by features of the situation seen as 
regrettable” (Hieronymi 2008, pp.6-7).  On this objection, insofar as my account of trust allows 
room for trust based on acceptance rather than belief, it is an account of a less trusting sort of 
trust.  What we really want is an account of the full-fledged, fully trusting, sort of trust that 
requires belief.  
I not only fail to share Hieronymi’s intuitions about the restaurant example, but I also fail 
to see why an account of trust need be an account of ideal or perfect trust.  First, it seems to me 
that when you tell me about your doubts that I would arrive for dinner it would be just as natural 
for me to respond, “I’m sorry I gave you reason to doubt me, but thanks for trusting me 
anyway.”  I do not think that we always take doubt and the absence of complete confidence to 
suggest a lack of trust.  Second, even if we agree with Hieronymi that trust with belief is a more 
trusting sort of trust, I do not see why an account of trust need only focus on this narrow class of 
trust phenomena.  Hieronymi acknowledges this response when she notes that some may dismiss 
her account of full-fledged trust as a mere ‘purist’s’ notion of trust.  She argues that given the 
problems with the alternative accounts of trust, we ought to adopt the purist’s notion of trust as 
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“a natural refinement of our ordinary notion” (Hieronymi 2008, p.2).  Therefore, in order to fully 
respond to her objection, I must show that the problems she sees with the alternatives do not 
arise with my account. 
One such objection to the view that trust does not require belief rests on the sensible 
demand that trust be distinguished from mere pretence of trust.  Many authors worry that trusting 
without belief is too similar to acting as if one trusts without actually trusting (Baker 1987, 
Hardin 2002, Hieronymi 2008, Holton 1994).  This worry is thought to be particularly pressing 
when it comes to trusting what one is told.  Suppose that my friend tells me that she is innocent 
of the crime of which she has been accused.  It might seem right to say that what my friend 
wants of me is to believe that she is innocent, and she might charge me with failing to trust her if 
I do not believe in her innocence.  Judith Baker uses this scenario to make the following 
argument that trust must require belief: 
Someone might try to distinguish trust from genuine or full belief.  Trust, on such 
a view, would be a watered down variant of belief, something more like pretence 
or acting-as-if something were true.  But this is to view trust as a non-serious form 
of belief.  Whereas what one demands from one’s friends is belief, not pretence, 
that one is innocent.  And what some outsiders find amazing is just the fact that 
serious belief continues in the face of rising evidence against it.  As a strategy 
then, this response amounts to an arbitrary denial of the phenomena which raise 
the problem in the first place. (Baker 1987, p.6) 
 
Richard Holton, who agrees with my view that trust does not require belief, takes this objection 
to be problematic for his view.  He says, “It is surely right that when we trust a friend, we do not 
simply act as if we believe what they say; we really believe them” (Holton 1994, p.73).   
Now I agree that when we trust a friend we do not merely act as if we believe her, but I 
do not think this means that trusting others when they speak to us necessarily involves belief in 
what they assert.  Bratman’s account of acceptance allows us to identify a cognitive attitude that 
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is neither belief nor pretence.  Bratman focuses on the link to action to draw the 
acceptance/pretence distinction:  
Is such context-relative acceptance mere pretence?  I do not think it is.  In 
accepting that p I do not simply behave as if I think that p:  I also reason on the 
assumption that p.  So there is not the kind of indirect, circuitous connection 
between reasoning and action that is characteristic of pretence. (Bratman 1992, 
p.9) 
 
Suppose that I say I trust my friend when she tells me that she is innocent, but I am unwilling to 
say that I believe she is innocent.  On my account of trust, it is unfair to charge me with merely 
pretending to trust my friend.  If I accept what she says in this context, I decide to work her 
innocence into my plans.  Were I to be merely pretending to believe that she is innocent, then I 
would make plans with the goal of leading her (and perhaps others) to think that I believe she is 
innocent.  My practical reasoning about how to keep up this pretence would be more convoluted 
and indirect than would be my reasoning based on the acceptance that she is innocent.  Consider 
an example Bratman attributes to Michael Dummett: 
My close friend has been accused of a terrible crime, the evidence of his guilt is 
strong, but my friend insists on his innocence.  Despite the evidence of guilt, my 
close friendship may argue for assuming, in my ordinary practical reasoning and 
action, that he is innocent of the charge.  In making plans for a dinner party, for 
example, such considerations of loyalty might make it reasonable for me to take 
his innocence for granted and so not use this issue to preclude inviting him.  Yet if 
I find myself on the jury I may well think that I should not take his innocence for 
granted in that context for reasons of friendship. (Bratman 1992, p.8) 
 
The reasoning involved in the decision to invite the friend to dinner is relatively simple.  By 
accepting the friend’s innocence, one decides to base one’s reasoning on the premise that he is 
innocent, and thus, as Bratman says, there is no reason not to invite the friend as one normally 
would.  In contrast, the reasoning involved in merely pretending to trust the friend’s profession 
of innocence must involve considerations about how to keep up the appearance of trust.  
Therefore, instead of just deciding to do as one normally would and inviting the friend, one 
 63 
decides to act as usual because otherwise the friend might detect the pretence.  This example 
illustrates how acceptance of testimony need not be merely pretence.27  In this way, the worry 
that my account of trust is incapable of marking the distinction between trusting and pretending 
to trust is alleviated.28 
It is on this question of the distinction between trusting and acting as if one trusts, that my 
account differs most strongly from its closest relative—Holton’s account of trust as reliance from 
the participant stance.  As I have noted, Holton agrees with my view that trust does not require 
belief.  He also agrees that we can sometimes choose to trust.  His account of trust also has two 
parts which closely mirror my own.  The first part of his account is, like mine, meant to capture 
what trust and reliance have in common.29  When I trust or rely on someone to do something, “I 
plan on the supposition that they will do it” (Holton 1994, p.72).30  This is very similar to saying 
that I make the assumption that they will do it part of my adjusted cognitive background.   
Despite these similarities, Holton does not clearly mark the distinction between trusting 
and acting as if one trusts.  Holton characterizes trust as “a kind of acting-as-if” (Holton 1994, 
p.73).  He gives the following example of trust circle games to illustrate his account of trust.  In 
these games, the participant stands in a circle of people who are supposed to catch her.  The 
participant closes her eyes and lets herself fall backwards, and the people in the circle catch her.  
Holton says that at the moment before one falls, one can choose to fall despite having some 
                                                 
27 Bratman’s example also provides a nice counterexample to the assumption shared by Holton and Hieronymi that 
trusting the testimony of others is one type of trust that requires belief in what is said (Hieronymi 2008, p. 8; Holton 
1994, p. 73).  I find it plausible to say that one does trust what the friend says about her innocence even though one 
does not thereby acquire a context-independent belief in her innocence. 
28 Holton also provides a nice example that illustrates the difference between pretending to believe that p and 
working p into one’s plans: “When I feign belief in God, I do not work my plans around the supposition of God’s 
existence:  I do not, for instance, plan with an eye to the Day of Judgement.  All that I work into my plans is my 
pretence itself, not the truth of that which I am pretending” (Holton 1994, p.72). 
29 I will discuss the second part of his account, which depends on the notion of the participant stance, in section 2. 
30 Holton occasionally also describes the truster as working it into her plans that someone will do something (Holton 
1994, p.72). 
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doubts about whether one will be caught.  This is his example of choosing to trust.  To explain 
what is going on when one makes that choice, Holton draws the following analogy: “Just as the 
non-believer in the [religiously] strict society can decide to act as a believer would, so I can 
decide to act on the supposition that you will catch me.  That is to decide to rely on you” (Holton 
1994, p.69).  This analogy reveals that Holton’s account does not adequately distinguish between 
trusting and acting as if one trusts.  Deciding to trust the people in the trust circle is here being 
compared to acting as if one believes the religious doctrines of a strict religious society.  Thus, 
Holton maintains that trusting is a kind of acting-as-if. 
The problem with Holton’s account is that trusting and acting as if one trusts are clearly 
different.  One can act as if one takes p as a premise in one’s practical reasoning without actually 
doing so.  Any act of pretense will fit this description.  Both parts of Holton’s analogy illustrate 
this.  The non-believer who acts as a believer may do so simply to avoid shunning without taking 
any of the believer’s religious doctrines as premises in her practical reasoning.  Similarly, I can 
decide to fall into the arms of the catchers in the trust circle without in any way taking the 
premise that I will be caught as a premise in my practical reasoning.  I may fall, thus acting-as-if 
I trust, without believing or accepting that I will be caught.  For example, I may reason that I 
ought to fall backwards because I think that I will not be caught and that this will make the 
others feel guilty and treat me better in the future.  The problem with Holton’s account of trust is 
not that he says trusting involves acting on the supposition that the trusted will act as expected.31  
The problem is that Holton maintains that acting on such a supposition is a case of acting-as-if.  
My account does not confuse these two notions. 
                                                 
31 Although for the sake of clarity, I would replace his use of ‘supposition’ with ‘assumption’ to keep in line with 
Bratman’s distinction between supposition and acceptance. 
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Having defended this part of my account of trust from various objections, I should 
explain how it meets the first of the criteria of adequacy.  The first criterion demanded that an 
account of trust be able to show how trust, like reliance, involves vulnerability and risk.  Part (1) 
of (T) is able to do this because when one takes the premise that someone will do something as 
part of one’s adjusted cognitive background, one works it into one’s plans that she will do it—
one uses the assumption that she will do it in one’s practical reasoning.  Therefore, when one 
counts on someone in this way (by either trusting or relying), one is vulnerable to having one’s 
plans undermined.  If she fails to act as one expects, then the success of one’s practical reasoning 
is threatened.  One has made plans and reasoned about what to do based on a false premise.  This 
is the risk that one takes when one takes the premise that someone will do something as part of 
one’s adjusted cognitive background.  This risk is present both when one relies upon and when 
one trusts someone.  Therefore, this first part of (T) [A trusts B to do C iff (1) A has the 
proposition that B will do C as part of A’s adjusted cognitive background] explains what reliance 
and trust have in common.  Having explained what it means for an agent to take the premise that 
someone will do something as part of her adjusted cognitive background, I will now turn to the 
second part of my account of trust.   
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2.2 REASONS FOR TRUST AND VULNERABILITY TO BETRAYAL 
One of Baier’s insights into the usefulness of the ethical notion of trust is that it contains 
both cognitive and emotional aspects (Baier 1994, p.10).32  The first part of (T) covers the 
cognitive aspect of trust by defining trust in terms of one’s adjusted cognitive background.  The 
second part of (T) captures the emotional element by providing a framework through which to 
understand the connection between trust and betrayal, which is the emotion that one usually feels 
when one is let down by someone one trusts.  Before I explain this second part of (T), I should 
first make explicit some goals I hope to achieve with this second part of my account of trust.   
First, it needs to mark the distinction between trust and reliance.  The notion of taking the 
proposition that someone will do something as part of one’s adjusted cognitive background 
captures what trusting and relying have in common.  As explained in section 1, when one trusts 
or relies on someone to do something, one works it into one’s plans that the trusted/relied upon 
will do that thing.  However, trusting is, on my account, importantly different from relying.  By 
explaining A’s trust in B to do C in terms of particular reasons why A takes this cognitive 
attitude, I provide an account of trust which, unlike the rational choice accounts, does not reduce 
trust to mere reliance.  Some reasons for taking the proposition that someone will do something 
as part of one’s adjusted cognitive background make one susceptible to feeling betrayed instead 
of merely disappointed when one’s expectations are frustrated.  In particular, taking the cognitive 
attitude described in (1) because one believes that one has a relationship with someone which 
obliges that person to do something, makes one susceptible to feeling betrayed.  Thus, a 
                                                 
32 Baier says, “[T]o trust is neither quite to believe something about the trusted nor necessarily to feel any emotion 
toward them—but to have a belief-informed and action-influencing attitude” (1994, p.10).  This is a nice 
characterization of the account of trust I present. 
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discussion of the nature of betrayal and its connection to beliefs about relationships and reasons 
for adopting cognitive attitudes will reveal how this second part of (T) marks the distinction 
between trust and mere reliance.   
Second, this part of (T) needs to mark the trust/reliance distinction without falling prey to 
some counterexamples that plague other accounts of trust.  Holton’s critique of Baier’s account 
of trust provides a useful illustration of the type of pitfalls I hope to avoid.  Baier’s account of 
trust is similar to mine in that she thinks trusting is a particular way of relying on someone.  She 
thinks trusting is relying on the trusted’s goodwill towards one (Baier 1994, p.99).  This account 
of trust does mark a distinction between trust and reliance.  For example, it can explain why, to 
use Baier’s example, it does not make sense to say that Kant’s neighbors trusted him when they 
used his regular walks as a time keeping system.  They did rely upon him, but they were not 
relying on his goodwill.  Unfortunately, as Holton points out, Baier’s account still allows for 
some cases of mere reliance to count as cases of trust.  The confidence trickster is one 
counterexample that proves this point.  A con artist may befriend her victim and then rely on the 
goodwill of the victim as part of her plan to steal the money.  But clearly the con artist does not 
trust the victim to give her the money.  Thus, Baier’s view that trust requires reliance on the 
goodwill of the trusted is insufficient to mark the distinction between trust and reliance where we 
intuitively want it to be.  I provide an account of trust that distinguishes between cases of mere 
reliance, including the reliance of a confidence trickster, and instances of trust.  Having made 
clear what is to be achieved by this part of (T), I can now turn to the details of (T). 
Recall that my account of trust is as follows: 
(T)  A trusts B to do C iff (1) A takes the proposition that B will do C as part of A’s adjusted 
cognitive background, (2) in part, because A believes that their relationship morally obliges B to 
do C. 
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The first thing to notice about (2) is that it makes trusting a matter of taking a particular cognitive 
attitude partly on the basis of a particular type of reason.  The nature of one’s reasons for taking 
the cognitive attitude described in (1) determine whether one trusts or merely relies upon 
someone when one works it into one’s plans that she will do something.  To explain why this is 
the case, I must take a detour to discuss the nature of betrayal.   
2.2.1 An account of betrayal 
Suppose that I am counting on my friend to keep a secret that I have shared with her.  
Now if I come across some evidence that makes me think that she has told my secret to others, 
then I will feel betrayed because she did not live up to the obligations that I expect of my friends.  
That feeling of betrayal is the typical reaction to the violation of trust.  Following Baier, many 
authors correctly identify vulnerability to betrayal as the essential difference between trust and 
reliance (e.g. Baier 1994, Hieronymi 2008, Holton 1994).  Since betrayal is so central to 
understanding trust, it is necessary to have an account of this emotion.  In this section, I provide 
an account of betrayal as a reactive emotion that connects it to beliefs about moral relationships 
and the obligations involved in such relationships. 
The reactive attitudes (or ‘reactive emotions’) were outlined by Strawson in “Freedom 
and Resentment” (Strawson 1962).  While my conception of the reactive attitudes differs from 
Strawson’s, we agree on the following key observations.  The emotions of resentment, 
indignation and guilt are reactive attitudes.  They are “non-detached attitudes and reactions of 
people directly involved in transactions with each other” (Strawson 1962, p.4).  The reactive 
attitudes are antithetical to the objective attitude adopted by the scientist towards her objects of 
research, the psychiatrist towards her patient or the public policy maker towards the public.  The 
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objective attitude is the stance of treating the other person as a subject of treatment, “something 
certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or 
cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided” (Strawson 1962, p.9).  The therapist may have 
some emotions towards her patient, but a therapist who feels resentful towards a patient who fails 
to respond to treatment has formed an inappropriate relationship with her patient.  The reactive 
emotions are those emotions to which humans are naturally subject as a result of their inevitable 
involvement, or participation, in interpersonal relationships (Wallace 1994, pp.31-2).  Thus, 
normally we adopt a participant attitude (or, as Holton calls it, ‘participant stance’) towards 
people with whom we have relationships.  It is only when we are engaged in certain kinds of 
unusual relationships (e.g. patient/psychiatrist) or when we see someone as “warped or deranged 
or compulsive in behaviour or peculiarly unfortunate in his formative circumstances” that we 
tend to adopt the objective attitude towards that person (Strawson 1962, p.9).  In adopting the 
objective attitude towards someone, we “set him apart from normal participant reactive attitudes” 
(Strawson, p.9).  Strawson also seems to think that when we adopt the objective attitude towards 
someone, we fail to view her as someone with whom one has a moral relationship.  Speaking of 
someone whom we deem insane, Strawson says,  
We may say: to the extent to which the agent is seen [as insane], he is not seen as 
one on whom demands and expectations lie in that particular way in which we 
think of them as lying when we speak of moral obligation; he is not, to that extent, 
seen as a morally responsible agent, as a term of moral relationships, as a member 
of the moral community. (Strawson 1962, p.17) 
 
Thus, sometimes we adopt an attitude towards people that denies that we have a moral 
relationship with them.  When we do so, we are not subject to certain normal human emotions 
towards such people.  However, normally we view people as members of the moral community, 
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as individuals with whom we have moral relationships, and when we do so, we tend to 
experience the reactive emotions in the course of our interactions with them. 
There are three basic reactive emotions: resentment, indignation and guilt.33  These 
different emotions are distinguished by the types of explanations we give when we experience 
them.  As Rawls says, “In general, it is a necessary feature of moral feelings, and part of what 
distinguishes them from the natural attitudes, that the person’s explanation of his experience 
invokes a moral concept and its associated principles” (Rawls 1971/1999, §73).  The differences 
between resentment, indignation and guilt are marked by the concepts and principles which we 
invoke in our explanations.  In other words, it is an explanation’s invocation of the belief that a 
certain kind of obligation has been violated which specifies which reactive emotion is felt.  
When I explain my emotion by appealing to my belief that someone has wronged me, I am 
feeling resentment.  When my explanation invokes my belief that another person has wronged 
someone else, I am feeling indignation.  And when my emotion is explained in terms of my 
belief I have wronged someone, then the emotion I am explaining is guilt. 
One can be susceptible to both moral and nonmoral versions of each of these reactive 
emotions (Wallace 1994, p.34).  The moral reactive attitudes are responses to perceived 
violations of moral obligations.  Nonmoral reactive attitudes are responses to perceived 
violations of nonmoral obligations.  Thus, one can feel moral resentment when one believes that 
someone has breached a moral code, for example, by lying.  This resentment is moral resentment 
because the expectation that the person tell the truth is justifiable in terms of moral obligations.  
                                                 
33 Strawson’s original account of the reactive attitudes is much more inclusive.  His list includes “such things as 
gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings” (Strawson 1962, p.4).  Wallace argues that an inclusive 
account of the reactive attitudes undermines Strawson’s key claims that 1) the reactive attitudes are practically 
inevitable for us and 2) they are opposed to the objective stance (Wallace 1994, pp 29-32).  I will not rehearse the 
details of these arguments, but I do find them persuasive and use Wallace’s shorter list of the reactive attitudes in 
what follows. 
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In contrast, one could feel nonmoral resentment about another’s breach of etiquette (Wallace 
1994, pp.36-7).  If the code of etiquette is not justifiable on moral grounds, then one feels 
nonmoral resentment when it is breached.34  In sum, the key to classifying the type of reactive 
attitude a person is feeling is to identify the type of belief that explains why she is feeling the 
emotion in question.  To determine if it is resentment, indignation or guilt, one needs to know 
whether she believes herself or another to have violated an obligation towards her or others.  To 
determine whether she feels a moral or nonmoral reactive emotion, one should know whether she 
believes a moral or nonmoral obligation was violated.   
As Holton has observed, betrayal is a reactive attitude (Holton 1994, p.66).  My account 
of betrayal is as follows:  betrayal is a feeling of resentment explained by invoking the belief that 
someone has violated a moral, relational obligation to perform particular behavior towards 
oneself that one was counting on her to perform on the basis of one’s belief in the existence of 
the relational obligation to do so.35  The elements of this account of betrayal are as follows: 1) 
betrayal is one form of the reactive emotion of resentment, 2) it is a moral reactive emotion, 3) 
the explanation of the emotion invokes the belief that someone failed to perform some action that 
one had believed or accepted that she would perform, and 4) one believed or accepted that the 
trusted would perform this action partly because one believed that one had a relationship with 
the trusted that obliged her to perform that action.  I will argue for each of these elements in turn. 
First, betrayal is a species of resentment because it is an emotional response to a 
perceived wrong to oneself.  One might object here that just as I will feel betrayed if my friend 
                                                 
34 However, one might argue, following Sarah Buss, that matters of etiquette are matters of morality (Buss 1999).  
 
35 To simplify terminology, I describe betrayal in terms of a reaction to someone failing to perform an action, but we 
can also, and frequently do, feel betrayed when someone fails to adopt an attitude towards us that we think they are 
obliged to take. 
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reveals my secret that I expected her to keep to herself, I can feel betrayed if my mother’s friend 
divulges my mother’s secret.  However, cases of feelings of betrayal in response to someone else 
being wronged are best explained either as instances of sympathetic feelings of betrayal when 
one joins another in feeling the betrayal they feel, or as instances of feeling betrayed because of a 
wrong committed toward oneself, such as the wrong of acting as an untrustworthy family friend.  
Thus to feel betrayed is to feel a type of the reactive emotion of resentment. 
Second, betrayal is a moral reactive attitude because moral justifications are given for the 
obligations that we believe have been violated when we feel betrayed.  The particular kind of 
obligations that, when violated, make one susceptible to feeling betrayed are relational 
obligations.  Relational obligations are moral obligations to which one is subject when one 
participates in a relationship.36  For example, sometimes we explicitly agree to take on a certain 
type of relationship by agreeing to undertake certain obligations (e.g. wedding vows).  Other 
times we explicitly agree to do something in order to reassure someone that we are indeed in a 
particular kind of relationship (e.g. agreeing to keep a secret as a sign of friendship).  This 
explicit agreement creates a relational obligation.  However, explicit agreement is not the only 
                                                 
36 When one has a relational obligation to do something, one has a duty to the other party in that relationship to do 
that thing.  This is important to recognize because sometimes our relationships involve obligations to do things to or 
for third parties.  As H.L.A. Hart notes, it can be easy to get confused about the nature of the obligations and 
corresponding rights in these situations (Hart 1955).  Consider the relationship between an at-home nurse, X, and 
employer, Y, who has hired X to care for his ailing mother.  X has a relational obligation to care for Y’s mother.  
Now suppose that X is derelict in her duty.  X has not lived up to an obligation to someone, but to whom?  Hart 
explains, “Rights arise out of this transaction [between X and Y], but it is surely Y to whom the promise has been 
made and not his mother who has or possesses these rights. Certainly Y's mother is a person concerning whom X 
has an obligation and a person who will benefit by its performance, but the person to whom he has an obligation to 
look after her is Y. This is something due to or owed to Y, so it is Y, not his mother, whose right X will disregard 
and to whom X will have done wrong if he fails to keep his promise, though the mother may be physically injured. 
And it is Y who has a moral claim upon X, is entitled to have his mother looked after, and who can waive the claim 
and release Y from the obligation” (Hart 1955, p.180).  Thus, when one has a relational obligation to do something, 
one has an obligation to the person with whom one has that relationship.  It is this person who is liable to feel 
betrayed if one does not live up to the obligation.  Third parties who failed to benefit from one’s expected living up 
to that obligation are not individuals to whom this duty has been breached.  Thus, they are not liable to feeling 
betrayed. 
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way that one can become subject to a relational obligation to perform some action.  Moral 
justifications for obligations can also derive from the trusted’s implicit agreement to behave in a 
particular way given their participation in a certain kind of relationship with the truster.  One 
might say “My therapist ought to maintain confidentiality because it’s an essential part of the 
therapist-patient relationship” or “That’s what friends do—they keep each other’s secrets.”  By 
participating in a therapist-patient relationship, the therapist implicitly agrees to maintain 
confidentiality, and is thus subject to a relational obligation to do so.  We normally feel betrayed 
when someone breaches a relational obligation.  However, we do not feel betrayed when 
someone breaches a code of etiquette, even if that code of etiquette applies to a particular type of 
relationship.  Feelings of betrayal are normally associated with a sense that the betrayer failed to 
do something she ought, morally speaking, to have done.  Thus betrayal is a moral form of 
resentment because it is a response to a perceived violation of a moral obligation.   
Third, betrayal is felt only if one believed or accepted that the trusted would live up to her 
relational obligation.  One might feel some other type of resentment when someone has failed to 
live up to a moral obligation of behavior towards oneself, but one will not feel betrayal unless 
one adopted the assumption that the trusted would live up to the obligation as part of one’s 
adjusted cognitive background.  Suppose I have two roommates, Pam and Angela.  Pam 
regularly eats my food, while Angela never does.  If I buy some of my favorite cereal, I would 
likely feel resentful when Pam eats it, but I would not feel betrayed.  In contrast, I would feel 
betrayed if I bought the cereal while Pam was out of town and Angela ate it.  I would feel 
betrayed because I counted on Angela not to eat my food.  I assumed that Angela would not eat 
my food, but experience had long ago taught me not to assume that Pam would not eat my food.  
One does not feel betrayed when one neither believes nor accepts that someone will live up to 
 74 
her relational obligations to one.  Betrayal, then, is explained in terms of a certain kind of 
perceived wrong, the wrong of having one’s practical reasoning undermined.37  
Finally, in order to feel betrayed rather than just wronged by someone, one must also 
have counted on her because one believed her to be under a moral obligation to perform the 
action in question.  This move is intended to rule out feelings of betrayal as a response to 
someone failing to be merely reliable.  Suppose I have hired a house sitter to take care of my 
home while I am on vacation.  I am not sure that the house sitter will not steal my belongings, so 
I put a noticeable surveillance system in place to make it in her interest not to steal.  Now if the 
house sitter steals from me despite these precautions, I might feel disappointed, but I would not 
feel betrayed.  However, suppose that instead of trying to make it in her interest not to steal, I 
had believed her to be a morally upstanding person who would take her duties as my house sitter 
seriously.  In this situation, I would feel betrayed, and not merely disappointed, when I discover 
her theft.  My feeling in these two scenarios thus fits my account of betrayal as a type of moral 
resentment explained in terms of a belief that someone failed to live up to an obligation that I 
was counting on them to live up to because I believed that our relationship created a moral 
obligation to do so.  I feel resentful because someone wronged me, and it is moral resentment 
because the house sitter had a moral obligation not to steal from her employer.  I was counting 
on the house sitter in a way that I would not be counting on a random passerby not to jump in an 
open window and steal my belongings.  And my reason for counting on her was not that I 
                                                 
37 In this, I disagree with Hieronymi, who thinks that “one can be betrayed even in cases in which one does not trust 
at all (by, say, a dastardly politician)  and that one can risk betrayal without trusting” (Hieronymi 2008, p.17).  I 
classify cases like being let down by a dastardly politician as cases of being wronged, but not cases of being 
betrayed.  If one does not trustingly take the proposition that a dastardly politician will do something as part of one’s 
adjusted cognitive background, then one cannot be betrayed by when the dastardly politician fails to do it; instead 
one will have merely been wronged. 
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thought I had been clever enough to put effective deterrents in place.  My reason for counting on 
her was that I believed her to be motivated to live up to the obligation not to steal. 
This account also helps us explain our intuitions about the scientists, Alice, Betty and 
Claire, from chapter one.  Recall that Alice works it into her plans that Betty, her colleague from 
another discipline, will perform her part of their joint project carefully.  Alice’s reason for doing 
so is that she thinks she has made it in Betty’s self-interest to work carefully because Alice has 
asked Claire to check Betty’s work.  So Alice has also worked it into her plans that Claire will 
carefully check Betty’s work.  However, Alice does so for very different reasons than those 
which prompt her to count on Betty.  Alice counts on Claire because she thinks that Claire is her 
friend and will carefully check Betty’s work because her friend asked her to do so.  I argued that, 
intuitively, we want to say that Alice will feel betrayed when Claire lets her down; however, 
when Betty lets her down, Alice will not feel betrayed, but instead merely disappointed.  We can 
now explain why we have this intuition.  One feels betrayed in response to having one’s plans 
frustrated by someone who fails to do something one assumed she would do only when one’s 
reasons for making those plans include the belief that one was in a relationship with that person 
that obliged her to perform that action.  Alice believes that she has a friendship with Claire that 
obliges her to keep her promise to Alice, and that is part of the reason why Alice assumes Claire 
will do so.  In contrast, Alice’s reasons for basing her plans on the assumption that Betty would 
do her work carefully are completely different.  They are not reasons that take into account a 
moral relationship and relational obligations.  Thus, in adopting the assumption that Betty would 
do her work carefully, Alice did not take the participant stance towards Betty; she did not make 
herself susceptible to feeling betrayed.  These examples illustrate how betrayal is a response to 
being let down by someone towards whom one adopted the participant stance.  Therefore, 
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identifying the place betrayal occupies in the reactive attitudes can provide a detailed account of 
the emotional aspect of trust.   
2.2.2 A adopts the cognitive attitude of trust, in part, because A believes that their 
relationship obliges B to do C. 
Having provided an account of betrayal as a reactive attitude, I now use this account to 
explain part (2) of my account of trust.  Recall that my account is as follows: 
(T)  A trusts B to do C iff (1) A takes the proposition that B will do C as part of A’s adjusted 
cognitive background, (2) in part, because A believes that their relationship morally obliges B to 
do C. 
 
Trust is not simply a matter of taking a particular cognitive attitude towards the proposition that 
someone will do something.  In order for one to trust someone to do something, one must adopt 
that cognitive attitude in a way that makes one susceptible to the reactive attitude of betrayal.  As 
I have shown, betrayal is a feeling of resentment explained by invoking the belief that someone 
has violated a relational obligation to perform particular behavior towards oneself that one was 
counting on her to perform on the basis of one’s belief in the existence of the relational 
obligation to do so.  Thus, in order to adopt the relevant cognitive attitude in a way that makes 
one susceptible to betrayal, one’s reasons for adopting that cognitive attitude must include belief 
that one’s relationship with that person obliges her to do the thing one trusts her to do.  In other 
words, in order for A to count as trusting B to do C, it is not enough for A to take the proposition 
that B will do C as part of A’s adjusted cognitive background.  If A’s reasons for doing so do not 
include the belief that their relationship obliges B to do C, then A is not susceptible to feeling 
betrayed.  A would then be like Alice who does not trust Betty or like the employer with the 
surveillance equipment who does not trust her house sitter.  So if A takes the proposition that B 
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will do C as part of A’s adjusted cognitive background, in part, because A believes that their 
relationship obliges B to do C, A meets a necessary condition for trusting B to do C. 
Baier’s example of Kant’s daily walks helps to show that (1) and (2) provide jointly 
sufficient conditions for trust.  First consider the example as Baier originally presents it.  Kant 
takes regular daily walks, and unbeknownst to him, his neighbors use his walks as a reliable 
indicator of time.  They begin to make plans for their schedules on the assumption that he will 
take his walk at the same time every day.  This assumption has been adopted as part of their 
cognitive background.  Kant does not know that they make plans based on his walks, and they do 
not believe that he has any obligation to them to be punctual.  They have no relationship with 
him.  He is just a man with peculiarly punctual habits who happens to live in their neighborhood.  
Given this description of the situation, we do not want to say that they trust him to walk at the 
same time every day.  They are just using him like they would a clock, and we tend not to think 
of people as trusting their clocks.  Now suppose we change the scenario simply by creating a 
relationship between Kant and his neighbors.  As a sign of friendship, Kant agrees to keep his 
walks punctual so that his neighbors can tell the time.  In this scenario, his neighbors make plans 
on the basis of Kant’s assumed punctuality because they believe that, as a friend, Kant has an 
obligation to keep his promise to walk on time.  When we change the details of the situation in 
this way, our intuitions change, and we are now likely to say that the neighbors trust Kant to 
walk punctually.  Thus, adopting the premise that someone will do something as part of one’s 
cognitive background on the basis of one’s belief that there is a relationship that obliges that 
person to do that thing, is a sufficient condition for trusting that person to do that thing. 
Before addressing some objections to the second part of (T), I will show that it meets the 
two criteria for adequacy that were laid out at the beginning of section 2.2.  First, this account 
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marks the distinction between trust and reliance.  As I showed in section one, trust and reliance 
are similar in that they both involve vulnerability on the part of the truster.  What distinguishes 
them is that trust involves vulnerability to feeling betrayed, and reliance does not.  I have shown 
that meeting conditions (1) and (2) of (T) makes one vulnerable to feeling betrayed.  Any 
cognitive attitude that meets (1) but does not meet (2) will be an instance of reliance rather than 
trust.   
From this it follows that the rational choice approach provides an account of reliance 
instead of trust.  In chapter one, I outlined the rational choice account of trust as involving the 
following two assumptions about the reasons for trusting: 
(RC1):  A trusts B to do C on the basis of evidence that B will do C.   
(RC2):  The evidence A relies upon is evidence that it is in B’s self-interest to do C.   
According to the rational choice account of trust, A trusts on the basis of evidence that it is in B’s 
self-interest to do C.  On my view, the rational choice approach provides an account of reliance 
rather than trust because the reasons cited for believing that B will do C do not include A’s belief 
that A and B are in a relationship that obliges B to do C.  The rational choice account eschews 
reference to moral obligations.  In doing so it generates an account of reliance rather than trust 
because susceptibility to betrayal, the hallmark of trust, comes from working it into one’s plans 
that someone will do something because one believes that there is a relationship that obliges that 
person to act that way.  The graduate student/advisor relationship illustrates this.  Whether a 
graduate student trusts or merely relies on her advisor to give her appropriate credit for her work 
depends on the reasons why she works it into her plans that the advisor will do so.  If the 
graduate student makes plans on this assumption because she believes that it is in her advisor’s 
self-interest to give her appropriate credit (say because she thinks she has enough power to 
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damage the advisor’s reputation for plagiarism), then the student merely relies on the advisor.  
However, if the student makes plans on the assumption that the advisor will not steal her work 
partially because she believes that the student/advisor relationship carries with it a moral 
obligation for advisors to give their students appropriate credit, then the student trusts her 
advisor.  When the student adopts this cognitive attitude towards her advisor’s future actions on 
the basis of this kind of reason, she makes herself susceptible to feeling betrayed when the 
advisor plagiarizes her work.  This example shows that one can use my account of trust to 
distinguish between cases of reliance and cases of trust. 
The second criterion of adequacy for (2), outlined at the beginning of section two, is that 
it not make (T) susceptible to the confidence artist counterexample that plagues Baier’s account.  
One problem with Baier’s account of trust as reliance upon the goodwill of the trusted is that it 
implies that a confidence artist trusts her victim to pay her money.  My account does not have 
this counterintuitive result.  A confidence artist’s assumption that her victim will pay her the 
money may meet condition (1) of (T), but it will not meet (2).  The confidence artist’s reasons 
for making plans on the basis of the assumption that her victim will give her money do not 
include the belief that she has a relationship with the victim that obliges the victim to give her the 
money.  The confidence artist assumes that the victim will pay because the con artist believes 
that her confidence tricks will be successful.  She believes that she will be able to manipulate the 
victim into doing something that the victim has no obligation to do.  She relies on the victim to 
be easily manipulated.  It would be a strange confidence artist who believed that the victim had 
an obligation to be victimized.  Thus, this example does not cause problems for my account. 
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2.2.3 Objections and replies 
There are two types of objection that one might press against this second part of (T).  
First, one might want to object to my account of betrayal.  Second, one might want to raise 
various counterexamples to (T).  I present and reply to some instances of both types of objection.  
One might object that my account of betrayal provides no room for irrational feelings of 
betrayal.  R.J. Wallace has leveled a similar charge against Rawls and Butler’s accounts of the 
moral sentiments, which share relevant similarities with the account of the reactive attitudes on 
which my account of betrayal depends.  Wallace frames his discussion in terms of the irrational 
guilt that one feels when one does not believe that one has done anything wrong:   
Very often when one feels guilt inappropriately [Wallace uses ‘inappropriate’ 
where I use ‘irrational’], what makes the guilt seem inappropriate is precisely the 
fact that one does not believe oneself to have done anything morally wrong at all; 
there are no moral obligations one accepts that one believes oneself to have 
violated.  If this is correct, however, then genuine guilt cannot always be 
explained by distinctively moral beliefs, as Butler and Rawls propose. (Wallace 
1994, pp.46-7) 
 
Along these lines, one might argue that my account of betrayal does not allow for irrational 
feelings of betrayal, since on my account explanations of feelings of betrayal invoke the belief 
that the trusted has not lived up to her obligations as one assumed she would.  Irrational feelings 
of betrayal might not appear to fit this account because one cannot explain one’s feeling of 
betrayal in terms of a belief that the trusted has violated an obligation.  Thus one might, 
following Wallace, object that this account of trust provides no room for irrational feelings of 
betrayal. 
However, it is possible to explain how we can trust irrationally and experience irrational 
feelings of betrayal.  Irrational betrayal might result from a conflict amongst one’s beliefs.  
While it is outside the scope of this project to fully explore how conflicting beliefs could lead to 
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irrational emotions, there are two ways one might begin to flesh out this idea.  First, one might 
have a general moral belief that conflicts with one’s beliefs about what a particular person ought 
to do in a particular situation.  For example, the lapsed Catholic may believe that, in general, it is 
permissible to have sex outside of marriage; however, when it comes to herself, she cannot apply 
this principle to her actions because she believes that it is wrong for her to do so.  Similarly, 
irrational feelings of betrayal could be explained by a conflict between one’s belief that one has 
been betrayed by someone one was counting upon and one’s other belief that, in general, it 
would not be wrong of someone to let one down in this way.   
Wallace may object that this explanation sidesteps the real issue because it does not 
explain how one might feel guilt despite not believing oneself to have done something morally 
wrong.  In other words, Wallace may point out that the lapsed Catholic would say that she does 
believe herself to have done something wrong by having premarital sex.  In response, there may 
be another way to explain the irrational guilt (and betrayal) in terms of a conflict between beliefs.  
If it makes sense to talk of unconscious beliefs, then there could be a conflict between one’s 
conscious and unconscious beliefs.  For example, the lapsed Catholic’s guilt could be explained 
by the unconscious belief that it is wrong for her to have sex outside of marriage.  It is true that, 
if asked, she is likely to say that she does not believe that it is wrong to have sex outside of 
marriage; but nonetheless, at some level, she does still believe that it is wrong for her to do so.  
Again, the irrationality would be caused by the inconsistency of her beliefs.  In the same way, 
one might have irrational feelings of betrayal were one to consciously believe that, in general, it 
would not be wrong of someone to let one down in this way and also unconsciously believe that 
so-and-so betrayed one when she acted in that way.  Trust could, therefore, be irrational when 
one does not have consistent beliefs about the kinds of obligation to which the trusted is subject.     
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There are other objections to (T) that are based on proposed counterexamples.  One 
might worry that this account of trust is too inclusive.  While some authors (e.g. (Baier 1994) and 
(Holton 1994)) have attempted to provide a broad account of trust, one might question the need 
for an account of trust that covers phenomena as dissimilar as counting on one’s spouse to 
remain faithful and counting on a stranger to give good directions to the nearest library.  These 
are certainly very different types of interaction, and it would be a mark against an account of 
trust if it were unable to provide any conceptual machinery to differentiate between them.  
However, it is also true that there is something that connects trust in intimate relationships and 
trust in strangers.  Therefore, I think the best approach is to provide an account that both shows 
what these types of interaction have in common and also explains their key differences.  On my 
account, trust in one’s spouse and trust in a stranger are similar in that both can lead to feelings 
of betrayal when the trust is disappointed.  In most cases, our interactions with a stranger when 
we stop to ask for directions are brief, and when we find that they have led us astray, we feel 
only annoyance and would not deem it appropriate to feel betrayed.  However, humans are 
capable of rapidly forming bonds with other people, and in some cases one might feel that one 
has formed enough of a relationship with the helpful stranger to feel betrayed if one is let down.  
In those cases where one feels betrayed by the stranger, my account will acknowledge you as 
having trusted the stranger.  In cases where enough of a relationship has been established so that 
one becomes susceptible to feelings of betrayal, a similar phenomenon is at play as the trust 
between spouses.  However, the account can explain the difference between stranger-trust and 
spouse-trust by pointing to the strength of the relationship between the truster and the trusted.  In 
those rare cases when one forms a bond with a helpful stranger, one does develop a relationship 
with the stranger, but it is a very weak relationship, and as such it will normally only give rise to 
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very mild feelings of betrayal.  In contrast, the relationship between spouses is much more 
significant and carries with it the potential for strong feelings of betrayal.  Someone who thinks 
that my account of trust is too inclusive most likely takes the central cases of trust to be trust 
between spouses or friends or other close relationships.  While I agree that it is most natural to 
talk about trust between close relations, I do think some sense can be made of cases of very 
minimal trust such as that between strangers.   
The worry that this account of trust is too inclusive can also be allayed by recognizing 
that the account also allows for inappropriate trust.  Some of the cases that this account classifies 
as instances of trust will be cases of inappropriate trust.  So many apparent counterexamples will 
turn out to be instances of inappropriate trust.  Some of Baier’s examples of trust in strangers are, 
I think, better described as instances of reliance.  For example, she says “We trust those we 
encounter in lonely library stacks to be searching for books, not victims.  We sometimes let 
ourselves fall asleep on train or planes, trusting neighboring strangers not to take advantage of 
our defenselessness” (Baier 1994, p.98).  Suppose I am attacked in the library stacks or on a 
train.  I think the normal emotional reaction would be to feel egregiously wronged but not 
betrayed.  Betrayal seems out of place in this situation.  We can accommodate this intuition by 
noting that it is part of normal psychological development that we learn which types of emotions 
are socially appropriate in given situations.  Feelings of betrayal are usually inappropriate in our 
dealings with total strangers.38  Thus, when someone does feel betrayed by a stranger, we are 
tempted to say that their trust in that person was inappropriate.  My account of trust will count 
                                                 
38 Notice that inappropriate trust is not the same as the irrational trust I described in response to Wallace’s imagined 
objection.  These are two different ways that trust can go wrong.  In irrational trust, one’s trust is based on a belief 
that contradicts other beliefs held in one’s adjusted cognitive background.  The problem with inappropriate trust is 
not one of holding or failing to hold particular beliefs.  Inappropriate trust happens when our emotions misfire; the 
emotion of betrayal is triggered in the wrong situation.   
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any instance of feelings of betrayal as a response to violated trust, but this does not mean that 
every instance of trust will be a case of appropriate trust.  Therefore, in many cases where one 
worries that my account is counting too many phenomena as cases of trust, the worry can be 
somewhat alleviated by noting that the account does at least allow one to call many such 
phenomena instances of inappropriate trust. 
One might object that (T) cannot explain the natural phenomenon of a child’s trust in her 
parents.  According to this objection, my account requires the truster to have cognitive 
machinery and moral concepts that children do not have, since it requires the truster to have the 
belief that there is a relationship that obliges the trusted to perform some action.  One might 
claim that children do not have sophisticated beliefs about relationships and obligations, but they 
nonetheless trust.  Thus, my account inappropriately denies that children can trust.  My response 
to this objection is to bite the bullet to some extent and concede that very young children do not 
trust.  In fact, very young children cannot even rely on their parents.  A very young child, who 
lacks the cognitive ability to weigh the evidence and practical considerations that bear on her 
cognitive attitudes towards the future actions of her parents, cannot adopt the cognitive attitude 
described in (1) of (T).  At some point, a child develops these abilities, and it seems possible that 
this happens at a stage before she develops moral concepts like obligation.  If this is the case, 
then a child at this stage is able to rely on, but not trust her parents.  It is not until a child is able 
to form beliefs about the kinds of roles that people play and the kinds of things that people 
playing the role of parent should do, that we can say the child trusts her parents.  So to the extent 
that an infant lacks these cognitive abilities, that infant cannot be said to trust her parents.  
However, children may develop these cognitive abilities and moral concepts relatively early on, 
since one does not need to have a sophisticated theory of moral obligation to be able to form the 
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belief that a parent ought to take care of her child.  Therefore, biting the bullet on this objection 
does not require me to give up very much.  Throughout most of their childhood, children do have 
the ability to trust.  Having responded to several objections to this account, I finish by comparing 
my account of trust to the rational choice account criticized in chapter one. 
2.3 COMPARISON TO THE RATIONAL CHOICE ACCOUNT 
In chapter one, I argued that while the rational choice approach provides useful insights 
into trust, it also overlooks many other important aspects of trusting behavior.  In particular, I 
argued that the rational choice approach is limited in four ways.  First, it omits reasons for 
trusting based on evidence about the trusted other than evidence that it is in the trusted’s self-
interest to act trustworthily.  Second, its explanation of the reasons for acting trustworthily only 
accounts for self-interested reasons for being trustworthy.  Third, it does not leave room for non-
evidential reasons for trusting.  Fourth, it fails to mark the distinction between trust and mere 
reliance.  I have argued that (T) is able to mark the trust/reliance distinction, so it is clear that my 
account does not share the fourth limitation.  Thus, I will now argue that my account of trust 
does not share the first three limitations facing the rational choice account. 
In contrast to the first and second limitations of the rational choice approach, (T) can 
account for different types of evidence for trusting because it recognizes non-self-interested 
reasons for being trustworthy.  Recall that (T) allows for trust based on either belief or 
acceptance.  Trust may involve belief that someone will do something, or it may involve 
acceptance that someone will do something.  In cases when A’s trust that B will do C is grounded 
in belief that B will do C, A’s trust, if it is reasonable, is “shaped primarily by evidence for what 
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is believed and concern for the truth of what is believed” (Bratman 1992, p.3).  In these cases, A 
trusts on the basis of evidence that B will do C.  But what kind of evidence grounds such trust?  
In order for A’s attitude towards B to be one of trust rather than reliance, part of A’s set of 
reasons for trusting must include a belief that their relationship obliges B to do C.  Thus, 
evidence that B is motivated to live up to the obligation to do C will be good evidence for A’s 
trust in B.   
Like the rational choice approach, (T) takes evidence of B’s motivations as evidence that 
counts in favor of A trusting B to do C.  The difference is the kind of motivations that each 
emphasizes.  The rational choice approach highlights evidence that B has self-interested 
motivations for doing C.  (T) recognizes that people often have other-interested motivations; in 
other words, they are often motivated to act for the good of others even when it is not in their 
self-interest to do so.  There are many types of motivations for acting for the good of others that 
are not self-interested reasons, including caring39, a sense of honor40 and a sense of duty.  All of 
these can motivate B to do C, but a sense of duty is the motivation that most directly motivates 
trustworthy behavior.  Often we do something because we believe we have an obligation to do it, 
and that sense of obligation is motivating for us.  Thus, when B recognizes a relational obligation 
to do C for A, B may find the existence of that obligation a motivating reason to do C.  This can 
be the case even when doing C is not in B’s self-interest.  This provides room for a different kind 
of evidence to justify trust than is recognized by the rational choice approach.  A’s possession of 
evidence that B will be motivated by a sense of duty to do C can justify A’s trust in B to do C.   
                                                 
39 Even Hardin, a rational choice theorist, recognizes that B’s love for A provides motivation for B to be trustworthy, 
and thus evidence of B’s love for A can be evidence that justifies A’s trust in B: “When I fall in love with you, I 
partially take your interests as mine.  I actually want you to be happy—and not only because I will benefit from your 
happiness….  My love of you grounds your trust because it makes me a trustworthy agent for your welfare and 
happiness” (Hardin, p.142 my emphasis). 
40 Steven Shapin (1994) provides a fascinating account of the role that a sense of honor played in motivating 
trustworthiness in seventeenth-century gentlemen.   
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What might count as such evidence for a motivating sense of duty?41  The following are a 
few types of evidence that A might have for believing that B will do C: evidence that B has a 
general disposition to find obligations motivating, evidence that B has a localized disposition to 
be motivated by the type of obligation at issue in this situation, evidence that B recognizes that A 
and B have a relationship, evidence that B recognizes that the relationship generates an 
obligation to do C, and evidence that B is not subject to conflicting obligations to abstain from 
doing C.  That people trust on the basis of such evidence is familiar from everyday experience.  
In order to know whether trusting someone is justified, we often try to learn something about her 
character.  In particular, we want to know whether that person tends to live up to her obligations.  
We ask for character references both formally, by checking up on someone’s job references, and 
informally, by asking friends and colleagues.  The rational choice approach has a difficult time in 
accounting for the value of these types of inquiries.  Why would the fact that B is thought by 
others to have a virtuous moral character provide evidence that it will be in B’s self-interest to do 
C now?  Similarly, in evaluating the trustworthiness of others, we look for evidence that the 
trusted shares our values and recognizes the same norms as we do.  For example, one might 
choose not to become close friends with an acquaintance because one learns that the 
acquaintance has a very different view of what friendship means (say, the acquaintance does not 
believe that one should keep one’s friends’ secrets).  A professional may be reassured to learn 
that her colleague is a member of the same professional society that she belongs to because she 
takes this as evidence that her colleague has committed herself to the same code of ethics.  The 
value of this type of evidence is that it provides reason to believe that the trusted will recognize 
                                                 
41 The question of how one can live up to the epistemic responsibilities of justified trust is discussed further in 
chapter four. 
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an obligation to do the thing one trusts her to do.42  A full account of the types of evidence that 
justify the kind of trust outlined in (T) is outside the scope of this project.  However, it should be 
clear that (T) provides theoretical machinery for analyzing types of evidence for trust and 
motivations for trustworthiness that are omitted from the rational choice account of trust. 
Another limitation of the rational choice approach is that it does not account for non-
evidential reasons for trust.  (T) does not share this limitation.  Recall that A’s cognitive attitude 
towards the proposition that B will do C can be one of either belief or acceptance.  If A accepts 
that B will do C in part because A believes that their relationship obliges B to do C, then A trusts 
B to do C.  A’s reasons for accepting that B will do C must include this belief, but they may also 
include non-evidential reasons for accepting this proposition.  Take Holton’s example of the 
shopkeeper who trusts an ex-thief employee with the till.  The shopkeeper’s reasoning could be 
as follows: “This young convict is my employee, so she shouldn’t steal from me.  I’m not sure 
that she won’t.  But I am her boss, and maybe if I assume she won’t steal from me, it will show 
her that people still think she is a responsible person despite her past.  That might awaken her 
conscience and draw her back into the moral community.”  (T) recognizes the shopkeeper’s 
attitude as one of trust.  The shopkeeper has a non-evidential reason for accepting that the thief 
will not steal—the shopkeeper thinks that accepting this proposition will help bring the thief 
back into the moral community.  The shopkeeper’s belief that she has an employer/employee 
relationship that obliges the thief not to steal is part of the reason for this acceptance, since the 
shopkeeper is hoping that by holding up her end of the relationship (by trusting the thief), the 
pragmatic goal will be attained.  Similarly, Lauri, the trusting graduate student, may trust her 
                                                 
42 The rational choice approach can account for the value of this evidence only indirectly: we want to know that the 
other shares our norms because that gives us reason to believe that the trusted will fear punishment for breaking 
those norms.   
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advisor in the absence of evidence that the advisor will be trustworthy.  Lauri may recognize that 
the advisor/advisee relationship obliges her advisor to treat her well and because she wants to 
make her interactions with her advisor go smoothly, she decides to base her planning on the 
assumption that the advisor will be trustworthy.  In general, when one has a relationship that 
generates relational obligations, one often values that relationship.  Thus, one can find oneself in 
situations when there are pragmatic reasons (often to do with facilitating or growing that 
relationship) for assuming that the partner in your relationship will live up to her obligations.  
These non-evidential reasons for trusting can be accommodated by (T). 
In chapter one, I argued that the rational choice approach’s limitations prevent it from 
accounting for trust in unequal relationships.  It is a puzzle, if one follows the rational choice 
account, why people in positions of powerlessness trust people in positions of power.  Two types 
of powerlessness present particular problems for the rational choice approach: inability to detect 
untrustworthy behavior and inability to sanction untrustworthy behavior.  Trust under these 
conditions of powerlessness is not puzzling on my account of trust.  There are two ways that (T) 
can account for such trust.  First, powerless individuals may reasonably choose to trust for non-
evidential, pragmatic reasons.  This is the case with Lauri, who despite having no (or very little) 
way of sanctioning her advisor for untrustworthy behavior, nonetheless chooses to trust her 
advisor for pragmatic reasons.  Second, and I think more commonly, powerless individuals trust 
on the basis of evidence that the trusted is motivated to live up to her obligations.  Scientists who 
collaborate with colleagues from different fields may be powerless to check up on the work of 
their partners in research, but even so, they may trust their colleagues on the basis of evidence 
that their partners are motivated by a sense of professional duty.  Graduate students may 
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recognize that they have little power to sanction the behavior of their advisors, but they still trust 
because they see that their advisors are morally upstanding mentors.   
Such considerations can generate trust on the part of people in the most powerless of 
positions.  Refugees living in camps around the world are caught in positions of extreme 
powerlessness.  Routinely prevented from leaving the camps to work, they are almost completely 
dependent on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for food and basic necessities.  Refugees 
routinely have almost no voice in the way that the camps are run and have very limited 
communication with the outside world.  For these reasons, refugees are often epistemically 
powerless and powerless to sanction the individuals who work for NGOs.  Despite this stark 
power imbalance, refugees do sometimes trust NGO workers.  This can happen when a refugee 
builds a personal relationship with the worker and comes to believe that the worker is motivated 
to do this work for moral reasons.43  It seems to me that a refugee who sees that a particular 
worker is motivated by a sense of moral obligation and thereby comes to trust that worker is 
doing so with good reason.  This kind of trust cannot be easily explained by the rational choice 
approach. 
In this chapter, I have presented an account of trust that provides an alternative to the 
dominant rational choice approach to trust.  While my account lacks some of the theoretical 
simplicity of the rational choice approach, it provides tools for analyzing features of trust and 
trustworthiness that are left out of the rational choice picture.  Humans are not motivated by self-
interest alone.  People act trustworthily even when it is not in their self-interest to do so.  People 
find moral obligations motivating, and we recognize this fact about each other.  That is why we 
frequently look for evidence of a sense of duty in those we trust.  Such evidence is particularly 
                                                 
43 I saw this firsthand while working with refugees in Africa.   
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valuable to people in positions of powerlessness, who are not in a position to use the types of 
strategies outlined by the rational choice theorists.  Powerless individuals also trust for pragmatic 
reasons.  This illustrates another feature of trust left out of the rational choice picture.  Trust is 
not simply an involuntary belief that someone will do something.  Trust can be chosen in order to 
achieve particular goals.  My account of trust provides room for all these features of trust.  In the 
next chapter, I use this account to analyze trust between scientists.  In doing so, I expose features 
of the social epistemology of science that have been left out of the dominant accounts, which 
have been driven by the same kinds of assumptions behind the rational choice approach to trust. 
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3.0  THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TRUST IN SCIENCE 
As discussed in the introduction, the past few decades of socio-historical study of science 
have challenged the traditional view of the field.  The notion that science owes its privileged 
status as the paradigm of objective inquiry to scientists’ disinterested dedication to the pursuit of 
truth has been perceived to be undermined by sociological and historical research showing that 
scientists are influenced by biasing factors.  One response to this challenge has been to move 
towards a social epistemology of science according to which the objectivity of science appears at 
the community level.  One common form of this move to social epistemology investigates how 
self-interested scientists can interact in ways that are communally objective (e.g. Goldman 1992, 
Hull 1988, Kitcher 1993, and Railton 1994).  These social epistemologies of self-interest are 
interesting and useful analyses of the social aspect of the epistemology of science, especially 
since, as a matter of fact, scientists can be motivated by considerations of self-interest.  However, 
self-interest is not the only biasing factor that can influence scientists.  Scientists can also be 
swayed by their concern for others.  Thus there is conceptual space for a social epistemology that 
examines how communities of other-interested scientists can be well-organized to act in rational 
ways that produce objective knowledge.   
I provide such an epistemology in this chapter.  I address the epistemological 
consequences of personal relationships between scientists by focusing on trusting relationships.  
I argue that scientific communities can garner several significant epistemic benefits from groups 
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of other-interested scientists engaged in trusting relationships.  Science as a whole benefits when 
scientists are trustworthy and when they trust each other to act trustworthily (‘trust’ and 
‘trustworthy’ are used in the sense defined in chapter two).  This analysis is analogous to the 
approach of the social epistemology of self-interest, for it shows how what were traditionally 
considered biasing factors can actually generate positive epistemic effects at the community 
level.   
Like other social epistemologies, this approach does not pretend that the apparently 
biasing factor always plays a positive role in science.  The goal of social epistemologies of self-
interest is not to show that self-interest never has negative epistemic consequences for a 
scientific community.  Similarly, a social epistemology of other-interest will not maintain that 
other-interest never leads to problematic particularism or secrecy.  The goal of this chapter is 
simply to show that other-interested scientists who trust each other can create epistemic benefits 
for the community, just as Kitcher, Railton, and others have argued that self-interested scientists 
can create epistemic benefits for the community.  After having read this chapter, one might be 
convinced of this point, but nonetheless remain concerned that trust may also have negative 
epistemic consequences.  Chapter four addresses these concerns. 
3.1 EPISTEMIC APPRAISAL AND SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
Any social epistemology needs to present clear standards for epistemic appraisal.  Of 
course, any epistemology needs to do so, but social epistemologists should be particularly careful 
about this task in order to avoid blurring the line between sociology and social epistemology.  
Sociology of science is not philosophy of science.  Sociology of science is primarily a 
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descriptive enterprise.  It attempts to describe accurately the social practices of scientists.  
Philosophy of science in general, and epistemology of science in particular, are not and should 
not be primarily descriptive enterprises.  While it is the job of the sociologist to describe what a 
particular practice or structure in science is like, it is the task of the epistemologist to specify 
epistemic standards and evaluate whether that practice or structure conforms to those standards.  
As Alvin Goldman puts it:  “What interests the epistemologist are the epistemic consequences of 
such structures” (Goldman 1992, p.183).  As a normative enterprise, social epistemology needs 
standards to evaluate the epistemic consequences of social practices.  For social epistemology of 
science, these standards must be grounded in an account of what the epistemic aims of a 
scientific community ought to be.   
Goldman argues that veritism is a fitting approach for social epistemology.  Veritism 
“rates true belief as the ultimate epistemic aim” (Goldman 1992, p.190).  A ‘verific’ social 
epistemology assesses the effects that social practices and structures have on various measures of 
true belief in a community.  Goldman’s version of veritism lays out five standards for evaluating 
social practices or structures in science.  Thagard summarizes them as follows: 
1. The reliability of a practice is measured by the ratio of truths to total number of 
beliefs fostered by the practice; 
2. The power of a practice is measured by its ability to help cognizers find true 
answers to the questions that interest them; 
3. The fecundity of a practice is its ability to lead to large numbers of true beliefs 
for many practitioners; 
4. The speed of a practice is how quickly it leads to true answers; 
5. The efficiency of a practice is how well it limits the cost of getting true answers. 
(Thagard 1997, p.247) 
 
Put otherwise, a practice that prevents scientists from believing errors is a reliable practice; but a 
practice that enables scientists to believe truths is a powerful practice.  As I understand it, 
Goldman’s standard of fecundity is actually a species of the genus power since it is one measure 
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of how well a practice enables larger groups of cognizers to believe interesting truths.  To see 
that there are other possible ways that a practice could be powerful other than being fecund, 
consider the difference between a practice that enables a small elite to believe a large number of 
truths (a powerful practice that is not fecund) and a practice that enables a large number of 
scientists to believe a few truths (a powerful and fecund practice).  The standard of speed 
measures how quickly practices and structures generate true beliefs, which is important for 
cognizers whose time for investigation is finite.  Finally, the efficiency standard measures the 
costliness of a practice.   
This chapter evaluates the epistemic significance of trust in science using a modified 
version of Goldman’s standards.  However, I shall not measure the reliability, power, fecundity, 
speed and efficiency of a practice in terms of how that practice contributes to the true beliefs of a 
community.  There are two reasons why evaluating social practices in terms of their ability to 
produce true beliefs will not serve present purposes.  First, how are we to know which beliefs are 
true in order to evaluate how reliable, powerful, fecund, fast and efficient our social practices 
are?  While the truth of some of our beliefs about observations can be checked more or less 
directly (if anything can be), many others, those traditionally called ‘theoretical,’ cannot be.  Our 
beliefs about whether a theory’s predictions are borne out, or whether an attempted intervention 
was successful, can be checked.  However, our beliefs about whether the higher reaches of that 
theory are true cannot be.  This means that a social epistemologist who wants to measure the 
contribution that a social practice makes to reliability could not determine whether the practice 
increases reliability, because we do not know which of the beliefs are true.  This kind of 
evaluation is necessary if Goldman’s standards are to be applicable to the evaluation of science, 
but taking truth to be the ultimate epistemic aim makes such evaluation impossible.  Second, 
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since it is the goal of this project to show the benefits of an analysis of the epistemic significance 
of trust, I hope to provide an account that can be used by epistemologists of many stripes.  This 
includes those who disagree about the nature of the epistemic aims of science.  Axiological anti-
realists, such as van Fraassen (1980), do not take truth to be the ultimate epistemic aim of 
science.  Goldman’s verific social epistemology makes his standards, measured in terms of a 
practice’s contributions to true beliefs, unacceptable for such anti-realists.  There is no need to 
create standards for social epistemology that take a position on the realism debate.  Both realists 
and anti-realists can agree that increasing the empirical adequacy of the claims believed in a 
community is a good thing.  Therefore, the standards used in this analysis do not follow 
Goldman’s veritism. 
Instead, my standards measure the epistemic benefits of a social practice in terms of their 
contribution to predictive power and utility for intervention.  Epistemologists of any stripe ought 
to find these qualities valuable since practices that lead to better prediction and intervention are 
practices that produce more knowledge; prediction being a form of knowledge-that and 
intervention being a type of knowledge-how.  Taking predictive power and utility for 
intervention as epistemically valuable is something upon which realists and anti-realists can 
agree.  Anti-realists consider predictive power and utility for intervention to be the ultimate 
epistemic aim of science.  Realists value empirical adequacy (in part) because they take it to be 
an indicator of truth.  Therefore, I will measure the epistemic benefits of social practices by their 
ability to produce accurate predictions and successful interventions.44   
                                                 
44 This is not to suggest that one could not add more epistemic values like explanatory power and simplicity to the 
list.  Realists take explanatory power to be another mark of truth, so a realist may also want to evaluate social 
practices in terms of their explanatory power.  However, following (van Fraassen 1980), many anti-realists take 
explanatory power to be merely a pragmatic value rather than an epistemic value.  Thus, in order to avoid taking a 
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The social epistemology of science presented here takes accurate predictions and 
successful interventions (PI) as epistemically valuable and evaluates social practices in terms of 
how they contribute to various measures of PI.  The measures used for evaluating how well 
social practices contribute to PI are adapted from Goldman’s five standards for social 
epistemology (Goldman 1992, pp.195-6).  Thus, the following standards will be used to measure 
the epistemic significance of trust: 
1. The reliability of a practice is measured by the ratio of accurate predictions and effective 
interventions to the total number of checkable predictions and interventions enabled in a 
community by the practice. 
2. The power of a practice is measured by its ability to help a community of scientists make 
accurate predictions regarding the questions that interest them and to intervene 
effectively on the aspects of the world that interest them. 
3. The speed of a practice is how quickly it leads to accurate predictions and effective 
interventions. 
4. The efficiency of a practice is how well it limits the cost of making accurate predictions 
and effective interventions. 
5. The fertility of a practice is how well it enables a community of scientists to pursue 
accurate predictions and effective interventions for questions that they were previously 
unable to ask or investigate. 
 
I have replaced Goldman’s standard of fecundity, which is not particularly useful for present 
purposes, with an additional standard: fertility.  As a species of power, fertility measures the 
ability of a practice to enable scientists to predict and intervene in areas that were previously 
inaccessible.  This standard is based loosely on the value Kuhn called “fruitfulness”, which he 
describes as the ability to “disclose new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships among 
those already known” (Kuhn 1977, p.322).  Just as fruitful scientific theories can allow scientists 
to see new phenomena or recognize relationships that were previously hidden, fertile social 
practices and structures can permit scientists to pursue avenues of research that were previously 
inaccessible.  Scientists value practices which enable them to pursue PI about a previously 
                                                                                                                                                             
position in the realism debate, I do not consider explanatory power in this chapter.  This does not prevent a realist 
reader from doing so herself. 
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inaccessible part of the world.  Epistemologists should recognize the epistemic praiseworthiness 
of communities that are able to tackle a wide variety of research questions.   
Having now outlined the standards by which the epistemic consequences of social 
practices may be measured, I now turn to the analysis of the epistemic benefits of trust in 
science.   
3.2 EPISTEMIC BENEFITS OF TRUST BETWEEN SCIENTISTS 
Cooperation has a variety of epistemic advantages (Hardwig 1985 and 1991, Thagard 
1997).  In this section, I argue that trusting relationships confer epistemic benefits on a 
community in virtue of their role in fostering cooperation in the form of sharing.  Trust motivates 
and sustains cooperation.  Scientists are more likely to cooperate with people they trust.  Thus, 
trust can encourage cooperation.  However, as instances of scientific fraud show, trust by itself 
does not guarantee success.  As Bernard Barber says about one case of fraud, “There was too 
much trust but not enough trustworthiness” (Barber 1987, p.130).  Thus, successful collaboration 
requires not just trust, but also trustworthiness.45  Fortunately, people may be more likely to be 
trustworthy towards people who they know trust them (Baier 1994, p.197).  Of course, this is not 
always the case, so one cannot simply advertise one’s trust in someone and rest assured that she 
will act trustworthily.  Cooperation in science can also succeed when trusted scientists are 
                                                 
45 Cooperation is most stable when trusted individuals are trustworthy and trusters trust on the basis of good 
evidence for the trusted’s trustworthiness.  However, in order for cooperation to get off the ground, it is not 
necessary that trusters have such good evidence.  Trusters who trust for pragmatic reasons and who are fortunate 
enough to trust trustworthy individuals can also find success in cooperative activities. 
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motivated by a sense of duty to live up to their relational obligations to those who trust them.  
Thus, trust and trustworthiness can foster cooperation between scientists.   
The cooperative practice analyzed in this chapter is sharing.  Scientists engage in two 
main types of sharing: 1) sharing materials and technology, and 2) sharing information, ideas and 
critical scrutiny though the practices of shop talk and technical gossip.  I analyze each type of 
sharing along the following lines.  First, I show that scientists share in this particular way.  Then 
I demonstrate that this type of sharing has epistemic benefits by evaluating its epistemic 
consequences according to the standards outlined in section 3.1.  Third, I argue that this type of 
sharing is often grounded in trust and trustworthiness.  Finally, I respond to the objection that 
these types of sharing, and the epistemic benefits they confer on communities, can be explained 
in terms of mere reliance instead of trust.  In responding to this objection, I expand my argument 
to show that key features of these sharing practices cannot be explained without recognizing that 
trust is necessary for the formation and maintenance of sharing networks. 
While numerous examples of sharing practices will be provided, one case study will be 
used to illustrate, in detail, the role of sharing in a scientific community.  This case study focuses 
on the community of Drosophilists whose primary research tool were fruit flies of the 
Drosophila genus.  The community of Drosophilists that emerged out of Thomas Hunt Morgan’s 
lab at Columbia University at the beginning of the 20th Century acquired epistemic benefits from 
a cooperative style that was fostered by personal trusting relationships.  This community has its 
origins in Morgan’s decision, around 1906, to turn Drosophila into a laboratory animal.  
Morgan’s lab and his students became the center of a growing community of Drosophilists as 
biologists realized what a powerful tool the fly could be.  Numerous accounts of the community 
of Drosophilists reveal a highly cooperative group of scientists who shared ideas, materials, time 
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and even credit (e.g. Allen 1978, Kohler 1994, and Sturtevant 1965).  There are many possible 
explanations for the development and evolution of this cooperation.  Personal relations of trust 
and trustworthiness, motivated by a shared code of morality, feature prominently in historical 
accounts as well as the scientists’ own descriptions of their behavior.  That trusting relationships 
were so prominent in the history of the so-called ‘fly people’ is particularly interesting given the 
productive and groundbreaking nature of their work.  Thus, the work of the fly people will be 
used to illustrate both the forms that scientific sharing can take as well as the epistemic benefits 
that sharing can confer on a scientific community. 
3.2.1 Sharing materials and technology 
3.2.1.1 Scientists share materials and technology 
Sharing materials and technology is one of the most concrete ways in which scientists 
cooperate with each other.  For instance, biologists working on a model organism share varieties 
of stocks, and high energy physicists share technology when they collaborate on an experiment 
(Knorr Cetina 1999).  In the case of biologists’ stocks, scientists are sharing both concrete, 
material objects and pieces of technology.  Stocks of flies bred by Drosophilists to possess 
certain combinations of useful mutants are technological innovations (Kohler 1994).  Shared 
technologies can also be less concrete, such as computer programs for creating simulation 
models or for analyzing data.  Materials or technology take different forms within a particular 
scientific field, but I suspect that almost all fields exhibit some degree of sharing of materials and 
technology.  Even scientists whom we think of as relying mostly on simple observation, such as 
researchers into the behavior of meerkats in the wild, use materials and technology that can be 
shared across the field, such as special cameras for observing the meerkats underground.   
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Sharing materials and technology became a central feature of the Drosophilists’ research 
practice.  Their work depended on having access to a variety of mutant populations of 
Drosophila.  Any new mutants that were discovered needed to be kept alive and populations of 
them maintained so that the mutant could be used as a research tool.  Their stock-keeping work 
involved not only maintaining populations of new mutants but also populations of flies that the 
fly people had constructed through cross-breeding to possess multiple useful mutations.  Keeping 
one’s flies alive and in useable condition was no small task as any number of disasters could 
befall them: the flies could succumb to temperature shock, mite infestations, starve, escape, and 
be invaded by wild flies entering the lab or other mutants flying around the lab (Kohler 1994, 
p.82-3).  The cost in terms of money, space and time of having a particular variety of fly 
available as a research tool thus involved not simply generating the mutant but also keeping it 
alive and in good condition.  Since different mutants were useful for different experiments, 
Drosophilists were constantly asking each other to share their stocks.  In fact, the amount of 
stock swapping was immense, because the Drosophilists were constantly changing their 
evaluation of the research value of particular mutants.  As more was learned about each mutant, 
its relative usefulness often rose and fell (Kohler 1994, p.81).  All of these aspects of the fly 
people’s work meant that they simply could not make progress without devoting a significant 
amount of time to stock upkeep and preparing stocks for shipment to a colleague who had 
requested them.  Thus, the Drosophilist community shows that sharing materials can become a 
significant and time-consuming part of a community’s work. 
3.2.1.2 The epistemic benefits of sharing materials and technology 
A scientific community in which scientists share materials and technology can reap 
epistemic benefits that a stingy community of non-sharers forgoes.  First, sharing is a process 
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that increases reliability.  In his discussion of testimony, Jonathan Adler (1994) has noted the 
power of implicit replication to uncover fraud and error in scientific results.  A result will be 
implicitly replicated when it is incorporated into the investigations of others who attempt to build 
on the result.  Adler argues that implicit replication can be a powerful force for uncovering fraud 
and error: “Once it is allowed that fraud and error are rapidly identifiable in intense areas of 
research, it follows that, over time, the uncovering of fraud is highly likely so long as an 
informant’s results are, as is standard, an integrated part of a larger research project” (Adler 
1994, p.267).  Thus, implicit replication is a reliability-enhancing process, one that reduces the 
number of inaccurate predictions and failed interventions made by members of the community.  
This means that sharing is also reliable because a community in which sharing of materials and 
technology occurs is one with increased implicit replication.  For example, when one scientist 
shares her mutant strain of Drosophila with other Drosophilists, the recipients of the mutant 
stock can detect problems with the strain (or problems with claims about the strain) that the 
generous scientist may have overlooked.  For example, one of the problems with creating new 
mutants by cross-breeding is that one can create a mutant that possesses multiple mutations 
which have effects on each other (Kohler 1994).  Not knowing that these other mutations are 
present can skew one’s results.  If multiple researchers are working with a particular stock, there 
is more opportunity for someone to detect a complicating mutation that decreases the reliability 
of results.  Likewise, bugs in a computer program are more likely to be discovered when multiple 
researchers are using it in their work.  Therefore, the reliability of results can be increased when 
materials and technology are widely shared within a scientific community.46 
                                                 
46 One might object that sharing may decrease the reliability of results if researchers abandon a reliable material or 
technology in favor of a shared unreliable piece of material or technology.  All objections of this kind (that sharing 
has negative as well as positive epistemic consequences), are dealt with in chapter four. 
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Second, sharing can increase the power of a community because more hypotheses are 
tested, i.e. more research questions can be tackled if materials and technology are not hoarded.  
Sharing is not valuable simply because it can help a community weed out errors; it can also help 
scientists attain accurate predictions and effective interventions.  For example, the sharing of a 
technology for growing a model organism under extreme temperatures can increase the power of 
a community, since more scientists will be able to address different aspects of the model 
organism under this range of conditions.  Additionally, since there are limits to the time and 
other resources individuals have, they are usually not capable of exploiting all the possibilities 
for research inherent in a material or piece of technology.  Finally, sharing can be fertility-
enhancing.  Even if one individual were not limited by time or other resources, she is unlikely to 
be able to think of all the possible research questions that could be answered with her material or 
piece of technology.  There is significant cognitive variation between individual scientists.  As 
several philosophers of science have noted, different facts, or aspects of data, will be salient to 
different individuals (Kitcher 1993, Kuhn 1962/1996 and Solomon 1992).  Thus stingy, 
unsharing behavior can deprive a scientific community of PI it may have discovered were more 
scientists able to use the resource to pursue the different questions that are salient to them. 
Third, the practice of sharing can increase the speed of scientific research.  Sometimes 
having just the right materials or technology can quicken the process of one’s experiments.  
Also, when more scientists are working in a field, they can build on each other’s work and use 
others’ results instead of having to do everything themselves.47  Finally, sharing materials and 
technology can increase the efficiency of research.  The costs of producing materials are greatly 
decreased when scientists can borrow materials from others rather than having to produce them 
                                                 
47 This is not to say that replication and checking of others’ results is not needed and valuable. 
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by themselves.  For example, the overall costs of developing particular Drosophila mutants are 
decreased when development only needs to be done once and then shared throughout the 
community.  In summary, the practice of sharing materials can have the epistemic benefits of 
reliability, power, fertility, speed and efficiency.   
3.2.1.3 The practice of sharing materials and technology is grounded in trust 
Sharing of materials and technology is often grounded in trust and trustworthiness.  
Scientists tend to share their materials and technology with people they trust.  In order to 
establish that any particular instance of sharing is grounded in trust, I need to show that both 
parts of (T) are met. In other words, I need to show that (i) the truster takes the cognitive risk 
described in part (1) of (T), and (ii) that the truster takes this risk, in part, because she believes 
that her relationship with the trusted obliges the trusted to act as expected.  I address each in turn. 
Recall that trust, like reliance, involves risk.  In chapter two, I argued that when A trusts 
B to do C, A takes the proposition that B will do C as part of her adjusted cognitive background.  
A makes plans on the basis of her adjusted cognitive background.  Thus, trust involves the risk 
that one’s practical reasoning will be undermined.  When it comes to sharing, scientists trust 
each not to use shared materials and technology to scoop, steal or otherwise undermine the 
donor’s research.  Some of the risks involved in giving materials or technology to another 
include: that the receiver will plagiarize and take credit for the materials or technology, that the 
receiver will use the materials to complete one’s own research project faster thereby rendering 
one’s own work useless, that the receiver will use the materials to complete other research 
projects faster and thereby gain a better reputation than oneself, and that one will waste time 
preparing the materials for sharing instead of making progress on one’s own research project.  
These are significant risks for the donor.   
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We can see these risks in the situation faced by the Drosophilists.  Giving another 
Drosophilist one’s stock opened up the possibility that the other could try to scoop one’s 
research.  Drosophilists often put years of work into a particular experiment that involved 
constructing just the right stocks for the task.  By allowing another scientist to use stocks that one 
had taken years to perfect, one risked the possibility that the other could use those stocks to 
finish the experiment faster and publish the results first.  When the Drosophilists shared with 
each other, they made plans on the assumption that the recipient scientist would not undermine 
their work in this way.  Kohler outlines several particular things that the donors of stocks 
expected of the recipients.  First, donors routinely worked on the assumption that the recipients 
would reciprocate by sharing their own stocks with the donor (Kohler 1994, p.143).  Second, it 
was assumed that the recipient would fully disclose what they planned to do with the stock and 
keep the donor informed of the results of any experiments (Kohler 1994, p.144).  Third, donors 
assumed that the recipients would not use the stocks to try to scoop the donors by completing 
their experiments faster (Kohler 1994, p.145).  Thus, when the Drosophilists shared stocks, they 
risked having their plans undermined. 
An unfortunate historical incident involving betrayed trust illustrates the importance of 
these plans.  Milislav Demerec, a Drosophilist, was working with Franz Schrader, a cytologist, 
on the particularly promising project of producing a systematic genetic and cytological map of 
D. virilis.  Demerec had spent years working on constructing a genetic map of D. virilis, so he 
had useful stocks of the organism.  Demerec shared stocks with a Japanese group at the 
University of Kyoto under the understanding that they were only using them for a study of some 
translocations and inversions.  But in 1936 Demerec and Schrader were “taken aback” when the 
Japanese team announced that they had completed cytological maps of virilis—the very goal that 
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Demerec and Schrader were working towards (Kohler 1994, p.155).  Kohler reports that what 
upset Demerec was that the Japanese had not kept them informed about their progress (Kohler 
1994, p.156).  Thus, in this instance, Demerec was let down because he assumed that the 
Japanese would keep him updated about what they were doing with his stock.  He was making 
plans for his own research based on the assumption that the Japanese team was not already 
working on the same problem at a faster pace.  The secrecy on the part of the other team caused 
Demerec and Schrader a great deal of wasted effort.  This is just one example that shows 
scientists sharing on the basis of their assumption that the recipient will do something.  In cases 
like this one, scientists’ cognitive attitude meets condition (1) of (T). 
So far, what I have said is consistent with an understanding of sharing networks 
completely in terms of mere reliance.  As argued in chapter two, both trust and mere reliance 
involve vulnerability to having one’s practical reasoning undermined.  To show that sharing 
materials and resources is often grounded in trust, rather than always mere reliance, I need to 
show that donor scientists make the assumptions described above because they believe that their 
relationship with the recipient scientists obligates the recipients to act as expected.  Focusing on 
the Drosophilists, I need to show that (a) they believed that the recipients were obligated to 
reciprocate, disclose, and not scoop, and (b) this belief was part of the reason why they assumed 
that the recipients would, in fact, live up to these expectations.   
The Drosophilists believed that they were obligated to reciprocate and keep the donor 
updated on how the stocks were being used.  The Drosophilists developed a moral code, which 
Kohler calls the rules of their moral economy, that supported public ownership and free sharing 
of stocks.  Kohler explains the concept of a moral economy of the laboratory as follows: 
“…unstated moral rules define the mutual expectations and obligations of the various 
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participants in the production process. …  Moral conventions regulate access to tools of the trade 
and the distribution of credit and rewards for achievement” (Kohler 1994, p.12).  One of the 
main theses of his account of the fly people’s work is that they operated with a set of moral rules 
that guided appropriate interactions between them all.  Reciprocity, disclosure and not scooping 
were three of these rules: “Reciprocity was one [rule]: the privilege of receiving stocks entailed 
the obligations to reciprocate” (Kohler 1994, p.143).  Second, receiving stocks entailed the 
obligation to keep the producer of the stock updated on one’s plans for using the stocks and what 
results one found from them; “[f]ailures to disclose were taken as serious reasons to worry about 
the borrowers’ intentions” (Kohler 1994, p.144).  Finally, Drosophilists embraced the rule that 
one ought not to use someone else’s stocks to try to scoop them by completing their experiment 
faster (Kohler 1994, p.145).  This is the obligation that the Japanese group failed to live up to 
when they scooped Demerec and Schrader.  Thus, the Drosophilists recognized relational 
obligations; they believed that recipients had obligations to the donors of stocks. 
As noted in chapter two, in most cases of trust, one trusts because one has evidence that 
the trusted is trustworthy.  Since scientists tend to share materials and technology with people 
they trust, this means that scientists are watching out for signs of trustworthiness when deciding 
whether to share with someone.  Recall that being trustworthy, in my sense, is different from 
being merely reliable in that we do not consider someone trustworthy if she is acting solely out 
of self-interest.  Therefore, when scientists are determining whether to share materials or 
technology with someone, they often look for evidence of other-interest in the potential receiver.  
One thing scientists look for as evidence of trustworthiness is a sense of duty to follow the 
professional codes of conduct (or ‘rules of the moral economy’, in Kohler’s terminology).  
Scientists will attempt to find out whether a potential receiver is trustworthy by making informal 
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investigations into the character of the receiver by, for instance, contacting people who have 
worked with or shared materials with the receiver in the past.   
The Drosophilists illustrate this practice of assuming that someone will act in a particular 
way on the basis of one’s belief that she is motivated to live up to her obligation to perform that 
action.  It was widely known that anyone who passed through Morgan’s lab was taught the 
importance of playing by the rules of the moral economy.  Allen and Kohler cite pieces of 
Morgan’s correspondence in which he would write to ex-members of the lab reminding them of 
these moral rules (Allen 1978, p.252-4; Kohler 1994, p.152).  Drosophilists tended to assume 
that anyone who had spent time in the lab, or who had been properly acculturated to the rules of 
the Drosophila economy, was someone who could be trusted to act as expected.  When, on 
occasion, doubts surfaced about whether it was justified to assume that someone would 
reciprocate, disclose, or not scoop, Drosophilists looked for evidence that the recipient had a 
sense of duty before they shared their stock with them.  An interaction between Curt Stern and 
Gert Bonnier illustrates this point.  At an earlier point in time, Bonnier flouted the rule of 
disclosure.  Otto Mohr had given Bonnier one of Calvin Bridges’ stocks.  Bonnier failed to tell 
either Mohr or Bridges what he was doing with the stock.  As Kohler reports, “This lapse made 
[Bonnier’s] intentions suspect.  Stern hesitated when Bonnier later asked him for stocks, and 
wrote Mohr first to ask if Bonnier could be trusted” (Kohler 1994, p. 145).  Mohr responded that 
Bonnier’s failure to disclose previously was “due to lack of acquaintance with the scientific 
practice (coûtume) and not to bad will” (Mohr qtd. in Kohler 1994, p.146).  Mohr told Stern that 
now that Bonnier had spent time in the Morgan lab, Mohr was confident that Bonnier had been 
educated to recognize a duty to disclose.  He therefore told Stern that as long as he made it clear 
 109 
who the donor of the stocks was, that Stern could justifiably assume that Bonnier would live up 
to his obligation to disclose: 
Just denote the special stocks with the name of their owner…I cannot doubt that 
Bonnier, who has been at Columbia, now must be fully aware of the “étiquette 
scientifique.”  At the time he was just a beginner in scientific work. (Mohr qtd. in 
Kohler 1994, p.146) 
 
Mohr does not reassure Stern by explaining why it would be in Bonnier’s self-interest to disclose 
in the future.  Instead, Mohr reassures Stern by pointing to the moral education that scientists 
received in Morgan’s lab.  Mohr provides Stern with reason to believe that Bonnier is motivated 
by a sense of obligation to disclose.  Thus, were Stern to follow Mohr’s advice in working it into 
his plans that Bonnier would disclose, he would be trusting rather than relying on Bonnier.  
Thus, trust that the recipient will not misuse the stocks is sometimes the foundation of sharing 
materials and technology. 
3.2.1.4 The rational choice objection 
 In response to this evidence that scientists’ sharing of materials and technology can be 
grounded in trust, a rational choice theorist might object that networks of sharing can be 
explained in terms of mere reliance on the self-interest of scientists.  One might argue that 
sharing is grounded in the kind of reciprocity that motivates cooperation in iterated prisoners’ 
dilemmas.  One scientist might share with another in the hopes that the receiver will later return 
the favor with some of her materials or technology.  On this account, scientists are reliable 
stewards of materials and technology that a colleague has shared with them because it is in their 
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interest to maintain a sharing relationship with the donor for future sharing.48  Similarly, donors 
can rely upon the self-interested motives of their colleagues if the donor is in a position to make 
a credible threat of punitive measures, such as refusing to share in the future or shunning by the 
community at large.  Thus, one might wonder whether the epistemic benefits of sharing should 
be attributed to trust in science or instead to mere reliance. 
 To respond to this objection, I must first point out that my account does not pretend to 
show that trust is the only source of the epistemic benefits of sharing networks.  There is no 
doubt that individuals operate from both self-interested and other-interested motives, and 
scientists recognize this fact.  Scientists both trust and rely on each other.  So considerations of 
self-interest do play a role in sharing of materials and technology.  As will be discussed further in 
chapter four, a well-designed scientific community will have mechanisms for increasing sharing 
by increasing both reliance and trust between scientists.  However, this rational choice objection 
is wrong to claim that all sharing behavior can be accounted for in terms of mere reliance.  As I 
will now argue, there are key features of sharing networks that cannot be explained by mere 
reliance alone. 
 Not only do scientists trust their colleagues to use shared materials and technology 
properly, but scientists act trustworthily out of other-interest.  I have shown that scientists share 
because they believe their colleagues to be other-interested.  They look for evidence that their 
colleagues are motivated by a sense of duty to live up to the obligations inherent in the donor-
recipient relationship.  Showing that scientists look for such evidence, and make decisions on the 
basis of it, is not quite to show that scientists actually are other-interested.  However, the most 
                                                 
48 This is the explanation Rescher provides for sharing of information in science (Rescher 1989).  Michel Blais’ 
(1987) account of cooperation in science as a kind of epistemic tit for tat is another example of this rational choice 
explanation. 
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convincing evidence of the role of other-interest in supporting networks of sharing materials and 
technology is an example of a scientist living up to an obligation out of a sense of duty even 
when it is not in her interest to do so.  The Drosophilist community provides such examples of 
other-interested altruism. 
 In addition to recognizing duties that recipients of stocks had to donors, the Drosophilists 
recognized duties on the part of potential donors.  The Drosophilists were expected to share 
stocks upon request: “It was customary to get permission from the inventors of these valuable 
and versatile tools before using them, but it was taken for granted that permission would not be 
refused” (Kohler 1994, p.145).  The Drosophilists believed that they were obligated to share their 
materials and technology.  Morgan articulates such a sense of obligation in the following passage 
from a letter: 
We make a point of supplying any individual or group of individuals with any 
material in stock, not only material that has been studied by ourselves but also 
material as yet unpublished if it can be utilized.  The method of locking up your 
stuff until you have published about it, or of keeping secret your ideas and 
progress has never appealed to me personally, and I think as a simple matter of 
policy that such a procedure is as injurious to the student as it is to the progress of 
science, which we profess to have most at heart. (qtd. in Kohler 1994, p.134) 
 
This sense of obligation is the reason why stocks were even shared with individuals from whom 
one could expect little in terms of reciprocation.  The elite members of the fly people at research 
institutions like Columbia and the University of Texas regularly put significant amounts of time 
and resources into providing stocks for teachers at small institutions to use for their students.  For 
example, the Universities of Chattanooga, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Pittsburgh, as 
well as colleges in Texas, Allegheny and Procopious were given teaching stocks (Kohler 1994, 
p.143). It is interesting that the elite Drosophilists did this work even though it required quite a 
sacrifice in terms of time and effort: 
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Supplying stocks for teaching was no small burden.  Sometimes [Charles] Zeleny 
[who was one of Morgan’s graduate students] was asked to supply directions for 
culturing, breeding, and handling socks, and colleges had to be continually 
resupplied, since there were no researchers there to maintain stocks, and cultures 
died out every summer and had to be “ordered” again each fall. (Kohler 1994, 
p.143)  
 
These institutions could not be counted on to produce their own new stocks that the elite groups 
could hope to get in return.  Since the teachers were not top-level researchers, the Drosophilists 
could also not hope to get much in terms of news of promising new research in return for their 
stocks.  Thus, it is hard to explain the donation of stocks to these universities in terms of a desire 
on the part of the fly people to build profitable reciprocating relationships with other 
Drosophilists.  Thus, trustworthiness, in the sense of living up to one’s obligations out of other-
interest, was a feature of the Drosophilist sharing network. 
This example of other-interested altruism reveals the key feature of sharing networks that 
cannot be accounted for in terms of mere reliance and self-interested reliability.  Recall from 
chapter one that the rational choice approach has trouble accounting for trust on the part of the 
powerless.  This is because there is little incentive for the trusted to act trustworthily towards the 
powerless.  To apply this to the case of the Drosophilists, the elite Drosophilists shared stocks 
with small institutions at significant cost despite receiving little to no benefit from it.  This point 
will apply generally in many different cases of powerlessness on the part of scientists.  For 
example, if a scientist is marginalized in the community or if she is unlikely to have anything 
that the receiver will want in the future, she could not rely on self-interest alone to motivate her 
receiver to use the materials and technology responsibly.  Thus, mere reliance and reliability 
cannot explain sharing in scientific communities in which members differ in their value to each 
other.   
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Another key feature of sharing networks that is difficult to explain in terms of mere 
reliance is how new sharing networks get off the ground.  Recall that the rational choice 
theorist’s objection to my account of the role of trust in sharing is that scientists need not trust 
each other in order for sharing to occur; sharing networks can function if scientists rely on threats 
of punishment for uncooperative behavior.  These punishments can take place at the level of 
individuals, as when one party refuses to share with another who previously failed to act in the 
cooperative manner expected.  Punishment can also happen at the community level, as when a 
whole community shuns or expels a member who failed to live up to the norms governing 
sharing.  As Niklas Luhmann puts it, these threats of sanctions make the interests of each party 
interdependent (Luhmann 1979, p.36).  I, the truster (in the rational choice sense) have an 
interest in you acting as expected, and you, the trusted have an interest in acting as expected so 
that you can avoid the punishment.  In situations in which these interdependencies exist, the 
rational choice theorist can provide a nice account of the rationality of sharing.  However, the 
situation is very different when the threat of punishment is not yet present.  Before a sharing 
network exists, there is no threat of being excluded from such a network if one acts 
uncooperatively.  So it seems that the rational choice theorist will encounter difficulties 
explaining why someone would take that first step to share.   
Before there is a network of sharing, there can be no network-level norms that individuals 
are punished for not obeying.  Thus, the first individual to share cannot count on the threat of 
shunning by or expulsion from the network to motivate cooperative behavior by people with 
whom she shares.  In response, rational choice theorists like Blais and Rescher point to iterated 
Prisoners’ Dilemmas to explain the development of cooperation, but even here there are 
problems.  The kind of punishment on the rational choice view is the cutting off of the sharing 
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relationship.  The idea is that the person contemplating whether to share can rehearse to herself 
the following argument: “If I share with this person, then she will probably act cooperatively 
with me, because she will calculate that it is in her self-interest to cooperate, for she knows I will 
cut her off from future sharing if she doesn’t.”  The problem is that, as Luhmann puts it, “The 
argument does not directly rest upon this calculation [of the potential trusted person], but upon 
the truster’s ability to anticipate it” (Luhmann 1979, p.36).  The first sharer anticipates that this 
will be the calculation that the recipient will make, but what grounds does she have for 
anticipating this?  How is the recipient to know that the sharer will punish her by cutting her off?  
In the first round of interaction, the recipient has no guide to predict how the sharer will respond 
to certain behaviors.  While many donors would not continue to share with recipients who do not 
reciprocate, not everyone will retaliate to uncooperative behavior.  Some donors may continue to 
share with uncooperative recipients because these donors feel that sharing is the morally right 
thing to do.  Human nature is sufficiently diverse on this matter of retaliation that the recipient 
cannot automatically assume that if she fails to cooperate, the donor will cut off the relationship 
with her.  So the sharer cannot assume that the recipient will calculate that it is in her best 
interest to cooperate with the sharer. 
One way to solve this problem would be for the first sharer to make the threat of 
punishment explicit.  But Luhmann points out that this will not work:  
The structure of the trust relationship requires that such calculation should remain 
latent, evolving in its generalizing fashion covertly, purely as a reassuring 
consideration.  In his overt behaviour the truster must show himself ‘utterly 
trusting’, lest he himself sow the seed from which later reciprocal distrust may 
grow, thereby producing exactly the results which he is trying to avoid. (Luhmann 
1979, p.36) 
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Explicitly threatening someone shows a lack of trust that risks “poisoning the relationship” with 
the person whom one threatens (Luhmann 1979, p.36).  People do not react well to being treated 
with suspicion.  Someone treated with distrust tends to respond in the following ways: 
In so far as he continues the relationship at all, he will respond at first perhaps 
with explanations, with forbearance, then with caution and finally with distrust 
himself.  He feels himself relieved of moral obligation by the distrust which is 
brought against him and given the freedom to act in his own interests, or indeed 
actually feels the need to revenge himself for this unearned treatment.  And thus 
he gives distrust additional justification and further nourishment. (Luhmann 1979, 
p.74) 
 
Thus explicitly threatening the potential recipient with punishment for failing to act in a 
cooperative manner is unlikely to encourage that recipient to act cooperatively.  It is more likely 
to poison any sharing relationship before it starts.  Thus, the first sharer’s behavior cannot be 
explained in rational choice terms.  Either she is not warranted in anticipating that the recipient 
will act cooperatively because the recipient may not recognize the threat of punishment, or she 
explicitly threatens the recipient, which dooms the sharing relationship to mutual distrust and 
retaliation from the start.49   
In response, a rational choice theorist may respond that the first step in a sharing 
relationship is justified because it is part of a long-term successful strategy.  Both Rescher’s 
economic model of trust and Blais’ account of trust as a form of epistemic Tit-for-Tat, present 
the initial cooperative move as justified because it is part of a cooperative but punitive strategy 
that yields benefits over the long-term (Blais 1987, Rescher 1989).50  The idea is that a long-term 
strategy of cooperating with cooperators and punishing uncooperative defectors is successful 
(Axelrod 1984, Rescher 1989, p.37).  In order for one to get the benefits of this long-term 
                                                 
49 Luhmann puts this point as follows: “Because contrived interchanges of this [punitive] nature are not expected, to 
bring them about requires open communication about them between the people concerned; and this, as we have 
suggested, may introduce an atmosphere unfavourable to trust into the relationship (Luhmann 1979, p.36). 
50 For more on these types of explanations of cooperation, see Axelrod (1984) and Woods (1989). 
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strategy, one must take an initial step of “blind trust” (Rescher 1989, p.38).  In other words, these 
rational choice theorists bite the bullet to some extent and respond to my objection that the first 
step in a reliance-based cooperative practice is not justified at the moment it happens.  It only 
becomes justified later as it is shown to have been part of a successful strategy for stimulating a 
profitable cooperative relationship (Rescher 1989, p.40).  Rescher compares this process to the 
process by which we justify our reliance on cognitive instruments like telescopes or 
microscopes:  
In inquiring, we cannot investigate everything; we have to start somewhere and 
invest credence in something.  But of course our trust need not be blind.  Initially 
bestowed on a basis of mere hunch or inclination, it can eventually be tested, and 
can come to be justified with the wisdom of hindsight. (Rescher 1989, p.40) 
 
Therefore, a rational choice theorist might argue that I have been asking for the wrong type of 
justification for the first step in a sharing network.  I have been arguing that the rational choice 
theorist cannot provide a justification at the moment of the first act of sharing, but the rational 
choice theorist responds that justification by hindsight, is instead all that is required—or 
possible. 
The problem with this response is that it only makes sense for someone to take this initial 
act of blind trust if the costs for being let down are low.  If I stand to gain large benefits in the 
long-run by taking a small initial risk, it makes sense to take that risk.  However, if the potential 
costs of being wrong on that first risk are high enough, they may not be outweighed by the long-
term benefits.  Rescher says, “When others tend to respond in kind to one’s present 
cooperativeness or uncooperativeness, then no matter how small one deems the chances of their 
cooperation in the present case, one is nevertheless well advised to act cooperatively” (Rescher 
1989, p.37 my emphasis).  But this is too strong.  It is not rational to take the first sharing step, if 
the costs in the present case are high enough.  By the rational choice theorists’ own lights, if the 
 117 
costs of your uncooperativeness are high enough, then I ought not to cooperate with you if the 
chances of your cooperation are low enough.   
This is why this rational choice account provides a poor explanation of the origin of 
sharing networks in science.  Recall how significant the costs are for the scientist who has her 
research program scooped.  These costs are high enough that it would not be rational for the 
initial sharer to trust without first making a determination of how likely it is that the first 
recipient will act cooperatively.  This means that some justification of that first decision to share 
is required.  The costs of having one’s whole research program undermined require a scientist 
like Morgan to have some justification for sharing.  Thus, the rational choice theorist finds 
herself back in the position of the dilemma presented by Luhmann: either the first sharer makes 
the threat of punishment explicit, or the first sharer takes an unjustified risk.   
In contrast, my account of trust can explain how sharing networks get off the ground.  
The first sharer may reasonably decide to share if she has evidence that the recipient is a morally 
upstanding person.  For example, if I know that you are motivated by such moral principles as 
the Golden Rule, I may have reason to assume that you will not act uncooperatively when I share 
with you.  Another possible explanation within my account for how sharing gets off the ground 
is that the first sharer decides to share for pragmatic reasons.  Just as the shopkeeper from 
chapter two decided to trust the ex-thief with the till in order to bring the thief into the moral 
community, I might decide to share with you in order to inspire you to share with others 
(including myself).  This seems to provide a plausible interpretation of Morgan’s role in getting 
the Drosophila sharing network off the ground.  Morgan clearly believed that biologists ought to 
share their materials and technology with each other.  When he first brought Drosophila 
melanogaster into the laboratory and found it to be a useful research tool, there was no 
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Drosophila community with whom to share his stocks.  It was quite a significant risk that he took 
in sharing his stocks with others.  It was entirely possible that he could have shared his stock 
with someone in another laboratory who would have been able to make more progress with the 
organism than he did.  One way to explain why he took this risk by sharing his stocks with other 
researchers who were interested in starting work on this organism is that he wanted to inspire 
those who wanted to work on the organism to create a sharing community.  These are reasons for 
sharing that, unlike the threat of sanctions, can be explicitly communicated to recipients without 
undermining the sharing relationship.   
In conclusion, my account of the epistemic benefits of sharing materials and technology 
as grounded in trust explains two key features of sharing that cannot be explained in terms of 
mere reliance.  Not only does the rational choice approach have trouble accounting for sharing 
between parties of unequal power, but it also faces difficulties explaining how sharing networks 
initially get off the ground.  Having defended my account from the rational choice objection, I 
now turn to another form of sharing which is also epistemically valuable and grounded in trust. 
3.2.2 Sharing shop talk and technical gossip 
3.2.2.1 Scientists share shop talk and technical gossip 
Science flourishes when there is free sharing of ideas, information and critical scrutiny.  
Scientists share these things both formally, in publications and presentations, and informally, in 
conversations and correspondence.  Much of the philosophical work on trust in science has 
emphasized scientists’ dependence on testimony (e.g. Hardwig 1985 and 1991, Kitcher 1993, 
and Shapin 1994).  As students, scientists learn by absorbing facts from textbooks.  As they 
progress to mature scientists, they shift from learning from textbooks to learning about their field 
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from journal articles and presentations at conferences.  As philosophers point out, most of what 
scientists believe about the history of their field (e.g. their beliefs about how the structure of 
DNA was discovered) and what they believe about the current state of their field (e.g. their 
beliefs about what we currently know about the genetic basis of behavior) is grounded in 
testimony rather than direct experience or evidence.  Thus, much of what scientists believe is 
grounded in these modes of formal communication—textbooks, journals and presentations.  
However, there is also another significant mode of communication for scientists: informal 
communication (Crane 1972).  In this section, I argue that two forms of informal 
communication—shop talk and technical gossip—rest on a foundation of trust and 
trustworthiness. 
Anyone who has spent much time with a group of scientists will have noticed them 
engaging in what Knorr Cetina calls ‘technical gossip’ (Knorr Cetina 1999).  Technical gossip 
takes place at the laboratory bench, during lunch breaks and even during social occasions when 
scientists are not at work.  Examples of technical gossip include discussion about how so-and-
so’s experiment is progressing, how so-and-so’s working relationship with her partner is 
deteriorating, how so-and-so’s work habits are changing.  A paradigmatic example of technical 
gossip is: “I just talked to someone in Greg’s lab and he can’t get his flies to grow on the new 
medium he’s trying out.”  Technical gossip is gossip insofar as it is informal conversation about 
a third party or parties; it is technical because it refers to the third party’s scientific work rather 
than purely personal affairs.  It is important to recognize that while in ordinary English ‘gossip’ 
has negative connotations, ‘technical gossip’ does not necessarily have negative valence.  
Technical gossip includes two parties innocently discussing the well-known successes of a third 
party’s research.  But sometimes technical gossip can have negative valence, such as when one 
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person tells another something about a third party that the third party would not want discussed.  
Knorr Cetina, following Bergmann’s (1993) analysis of gossip in general, characterizes gossip as 
a form of communication with the following features:   
…certain relational characteristics (it features A gossiping to B about C) and a 
sequential structure (there may be an opening sequence, then the gossip, then a 
closing sequence).  It is situationally embedded (there is gossip within purely 
sociable interactions and within work), and the subject of gossip is established 
and managed in specific ways (for example, the persons who become the subject 
of gossip are initially named).  There exist a number of policies of information 
presentation (for example, the information is presented as worthy of 
communication, as believable, and passively acquired), and the gossipers often 
appear to indulge in the joy of speculating and are interested in generalization. 
(Bergmann 1993: 71ff) (Knorr Cetina 1999, p.205) 
 
Technical gossip, Knorr Cetina says, always includes a reference to a knowledge object (e.g. 
fruit flies, subdetectors, PCR technique).  Thus, by engaging in technical gossip, scientists use an 
everyday practice to communicate about the objects of study, theories, methodologies, 
technologies, results and collaborations that compose their field.  To summarize, technical gossip 
is informal conversation about a third party or parties that refers to the third party’s scientific 
work.   
Shop talk is another type of informal communication that has epistemic benefits and is 
fostered by trusting relationships.  I define ‘shop talk’ as informal communication about one’s 
own work.  Thus, it is distinguished from technical gossip in that it is not about a third party.  
Scientific shop talk includes discussion about the progress of one’s experiments, one’s ideas for 
research, one’s methodology, results, partnerships and other features of one’s research.  
Scientists frequently share the details of their research and ideas with each other in informal 
conversations.  They do so in order to let others know what they are doing and also to get their 
help in dealing with problems they are having.  Shop talk, therefore, includes critical scrutiny.  
For example, one scientist might ask for her laboratory benchmate’s advice about some new 
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puzzling data.  Much scientific communication happens through informal shop talk rather than 
formal publications or presentations. 
One of the widely discussed features of the Drosophila community, and Morgan’s lab in 
particular, has been its collaborative style of inquiry.  Allen describes the collaborative 
environment as follows: 
A unique feature of the Morgan group was the atmosphere in which the major 
ideas were developed and worked out.  There was a constant give and take and 
sense of equality among the four central members, but this sprit rubbed off to 
varying degrees on all those who spend any time in the fly room. (Allen 1978, 
p.188) 
 
Kohler describes life in the early years of Morgan’s lab as communal: 
It is crowded, crammed with eight desks and the paraphernalia of Drosophila 
production:  odd-looking homemade incubators, shelves loaded with milk bottles, 
tables for preparing fly food….  There were no personal, private spaces in the fly 
room, except for Morgan’s small adjoining office, the door of which was always 
open.  Space was arranged so that everyone knew what everyone else was up to. 
(Kohler 1994, p.98) 
 
The inhabitants of the lab took advantage of their close quarters to work closely together: “The 
fly room was a noisy place, too, with the clinking of bottles and an unceasing flow of banter, 
gossip, and shoptalk.  Every new result or technical problem, or letter from another lab was 
openly and vigorously discussed by everyone present” (Kohler 1994, p.98).  Alfred Sturtevant 
and Calvin Bridges, the two main centers of activity in the lab, were known for stimulating this 
shop talk.  Dobzhansky remembered Sturtevant as “talking much of the time” (qtd. in Kohler 
1994, p.99), and Muller recalled Bridges as follows: 
We’d keep up a more-or-less running, often desultory, conversation as things 
came up.  We’d speak freely to one another. ‘Oh,’ Bridges would say, ‘Here is a 
strange case I just got the results from.’  We’d all discuss it, and I might make a 
suggestion about what to do next… and so, we simply went along in an informal 
way, talking things over with one another as they came along; very seldom on 
what you might call a philosophical plane. (qtd. in Allen 1978, pp. 190-1) 
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This sharing of ideas and collective problem solving may have started in the cramped Columbia 
lab, but it spread throughout the national, and international, Drosophilist community alongside 
the work and tools of the fly group.  Drosophilists shared news, ideas and craft lore through 
extensive letterwriting.  Letters between a scientist in one lab and another somewhere else were 
semi-public communications, since they were read aloud in the lab and shared with colleagues 
(Kohler 1994, p.99 and p.165).  Technical gossip and shop talk were conspicuous features of the 
Drosophilist community. 
3.2.2.2 The epistemic benefits of sharing shop talk and technical gossip 
Communities of scientists who, like the Drosophilists, engage in much collaborative shop 
talk and technical gossip can garner many epistemic benefits.  Technical gossip can have a 
positive impact on the power of a scientific community.  As philosophers working on the 
epistemology of testimony have noted, much of science today is done in collaborations (Blais 
1987; Hardwig 1985 and 1991, Shapin 1994).  Collaboration can have significant epistemic 
benefits for a community.  A recent study of 19.9 million papers over five decades has shown 
that teams produce more “high-impact” research in the sciences than do individuals (Wuchty et 
al. 2007).  In order for teams to be able to produce this high-impact work, it is important that 
scientists be able to find good collaborators with whom to work.  Informal communication like 
technical gossip can provide scientists with useful information that helps them locate technically 
competent and morally upstanding colleagues with whom to work.  Reports from scientists who 
have worked with a potential collaborator in the past can prove invaluable.  Public information 
about a scientist’s past work, such as a publication record or CV, which many academics now 
publish on their websites, provides very limited information about what that scientist is like to 
work with.  Without technical gossip, one might be able to learn that a potential colleague has 
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been a part of several successful teams that published high-impact work in the past, but one 
would not be able to determine to what extent that individual contributed to that team’s work.  In 
addition, information about the moral character of scientists is spread through technical gossip.  
Learning that a scientist has an upstanding character can reassure a potential collaborator who 
may have doubts about whether a partnership is a good idea.  This would seem to be of particular 
value for scientists considering an interdisciplinary collaboration.  As was discussed in chapter 
one, scientists involved in peer-different collaborations experience a kind of epistemic 
powerlessness since they do not have the expertise to check the work of their partners.  Thus, a 
scientist considering an interdisciplinary collaboration would value technical gossip that shows a 
potential collaborator to be morally upstanding.  Since interdisciplinary work often has the 
potential to open up whole new avenues of research that were previously inaccessible, practices 
like technical gossip that encourage interdisciplinary work increase the fertility of a research 
community.  Having those doubts assuaged through technical gossip can clear the path to a 
fruitful collaboration that increases the power and fertility of the research in that scientific 
community.   
Shop talk can also have a positive impact on the power of scientific research.  When 
scientists discuss their work with each other, they can help each other come up with solutions to 
problems.  This is amply illustrated in the case of the Drosophilists.  This quotation from Muller 
already presented above is a classic description of the communal problem solving style of this 
community: 
We’d keep up a more-or-less running, often desultory, conversation as things 
came up.  We’d speak freely to one another. ‘Oh,’ Bridges would say, ‘Here is a 
strange case I just got the results from.’  We’d all discuss it, and I might make a 
suggestion about what to do next…and so, we simply went along in an informal 
way, talking things over with one another as they came along. (qtd. in Allen 1978, 
p.190) 
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Thus shop talk can have significant effects on the power of scientific research within a 
community. 
Technical gossip can have a positive effect on the reliability and efficiency of results.  
While collaboration can have significant epistemic benefits, it also involves risks of scientific 
misconduct.  As scientists depend on each other more and more, there is increasing room for 
dishonest or careless scientists to do harm to the community if their misdeeds go unnoticed by 
their collaborators.  When a community uncovers a case of scientific fraud, there is much anger 
over the errors the fraud perpetuated and the time wasted by other researchers who tried to 
replicate or build on the fraudulent work (Barber 1987).  This anger is commonly directed not 
only at the wrongdoer, but also at the wrongdoer’s colleagues who, it is thought, should have 
caught the errors and stopped the rest of the community from adopting the fraudulent work.  
Communities in which scientists either are able to avoid working with dishonest or careless 
partners, or are able to detect their misconduct, are in a better epistemic position in regards to the 
reliability and efficiency of their work than are communities in which scientists are unable to do 
so.  Thus, practices and structures which enable scientists to learn about and keep an eye on their 
potential or actual collaborators increase reliability and efficiency.   
Technical gossip can be one such practice.  Suppose I am a biologist looking for a 
chemist to be part of my interdisciplinary experiment. If I hear some technical gossip about how 
chemist A has performed suspicious experiments on another interdisciplinary project or has 
showed a lack of circumspection when assessing her own abilities in my subfield of biology, 
then I have some prima facie reason to avoid working with A.  When it functions as an informal 
source of information about potential collaborators, technical gossip can be a community-level 
mechanism for isolating those scientists who are prone to contribute negatively to the reliability 
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and efficiency of the community’s work.  By providing individuals with information that is 
likely to disincline them to working with the problematic members of the community, technical 
gossip can confer a benefit not just on the individuals who avoid bad partners, but on the 
community as a whole.   
Shop talk also increases reliability because it facilitates implicit replication as scientists 
learn from each other and incorporate the work of others’ into their own research.  In addition, 
shop talk provides a medium for scientists to submit each other’s work to critical evaluation.  
When one scientist shares her work with others, the chance that problems with her work will be 
discovered is greater.  Thus, critical scrutiny by others increases reliability by increasing the 
likelihood that errors will be detected.  Not all results make it to publication.  In particular, null 
results are harder to publish in a peer-reviewed journal than are positive results.  Thus, if such 
results are to receive critical scrutiny, it will often need to be through the informal 
communication method of shop talk.  Therefore, a community in which shop talk is prevalent 
can have greater reliability of results since more results will be subjected to critical scrutiny. 
Technical gossip and shop talk also increase the speed of research because it facilitates 
the spread of information.  Informal means of communication are often faster than formal 
communication in publications that sometimes publish an article that is a year or more old.51  A 
community of scientists that has access to the latest information through technical gossip and 
shop talk produces results at a faster pace than one which relies on purely formal means, because 
scientists have access to the latest results and techniques.  In addition, when scientists engage in 
the collaborative problem solving discussed above, they not only increase the likelihood that they 
                                                 
51 However, the rise of internet journals and internet-first publishing in recent years has decreased this lag time in 
some fields.  
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will attain PI, but they also arrive at PI faster.  Sturtevant describes this as one of the benefits of 
the Drosophilists’ collaborative problem solving approach: 
There was a give-and-take atmosphere in the fly room.  As each new result and 
each new idea came along, it was discussed freely by the group.  The published 
accounts do not always indicate the sources of ideas.  It was often not only 
impossible to say, but was felt to be unimportant who first had an idea….I think 
we came out somewhere near even in this give-and-take, and it certainly 
accelerated the work. (Sturtevant 1965, pp.49-50; my emphasis) 
 
Thus, the speed of research can be increased by informal means of communication. 
3.2.2.3 The practice of sharing technical gossip is grounded in trust 
Trust has indirect epistemic benefits because it helps create the atmosphere that makes 
technical gossip and shop talk possible.  To prove this I need to show that in sharing technical 
gossip and shop talk, one takes a cognitive risk and that one does so, in part, because one 
believes that there are relevant relational obligations.  In addition, I need to respond to the 
obvious objection that this form of sharing can be accounted for in terms of mere reliance 
instead.  I address these points regarding technical gossip first and shop talk later.   
There are risks involved in participating in technical gossip, just as there are for engaging 
in everyday gossip.  Since it is part of the nature of gossip that one is discussing the affairs of 
another person, there is the potential that one will say something that the person being gossiped 
about would not appreciate.  One is not, therefore, usually able to be sure that one is not 
engaging in the kind of gossip that has negative valence.  This being the case, we depend on the 
person with whom we are gossiping to exercise enough tact and discretion not to spread the 
gossip further in a way that will reflect poorly upon us.  It would be indiscreet for the recipient of 
my gossip to go to the third party and tell her that I am gossiping about her, unless the recipient 
is confident that the third party will not mind me discussing her affairs.  Thus we often want to 
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be able to trust our partners in gossip to be able to keep the gossip confidential.  Even if one is 
not concerned that what one is saying would upset the person one is gossiping about, one may 
still have other reasons for wanting the gossip to be confidential.  For example, one may be 
sharing some information that one does not want one’s competitors to find out.  Scientists who 
trust each other to respect the often unclear, but nonetheless important, boundaries of 
confidentiality are more likely to engage in technical gossip with each other.  When we gossip, 
we normally do so, in part, because we assume that the recipient of the gossip will exercise 
discretion and tact.  It is this assumption of discretion that one takes as part of one’s adjusted 
cognitive background when deciding whether or not to gossip with someone.  Thus, gossip 
involves the kind of cognitive risk that fulfills part (1) of (T). 
We make this assumption, in part, because we believe that the recipient has a relational 
obligation to exercise discretion and tact.  The key to recognizing this is that gossip is something 
that typically takes place between friends.  Recall from chapter two that relational obligations 
arise in a couple of ways.  First, sometimes we explicitly agree to take on relational obligations 
as a sign that we are indeed in a particular kind of relationship.  A common opening to an 
exchange of gossip is for the sharer of the gossip to say something along the lines of “Promise 
you won’t spread this around….”  The recipient of the gossip may reply by agreeing to exercise 
discretion because she wants to reassure the sharer that they are friends.  Second, relational 
obligations can also derive from the trusted’s implicit agreement to behave in a particular way 
given their participation in a certain kind of relationship with the truster.  Thus, if I am friends 
with someone, I implicitly agree to exercise discretion with any information she shares with me.  
In both of these ways, people can incur obligations to exercise discretion and tact.  We depend 
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on our friends to live up to these relational obligations, and we feel betrayed when they fail to do 
so. 
3.2.2.4 The rational choice objection about technical gossip 
At this point, a rational choice theorist may object that moral concepts like friendship and 
relational obligation are not necessary to explain the existence of technical gossip—the 
motivation to engage in technical gossip can be explained in purely self-interested terms. 
According to this account, I exchange gossip with someone with the hopes that she will 
reciprocate and provide me with useful gossip in the future.  The recipient exercises tact and 
discretion with the gossip I give her because she wants me to share gossip with her in the future.  
In other words, she can be counted upon to be discreet because it is in her interest not to be 
punished by having future gossip withheld from her. 
In response, I do not deny that self-interested motives can account for some features of 
technical gossip.  In particular, the reciprocity of many instances of gossip may be well 
accounted for in self-interested terms.  However, I find it implausible that it can account for 
discretion on the part of the recipient of gossip.  The problem with gossip, one that we are all 
familiar with, is that once one has told someone something one has almost no way of knowing 
how the information one shared is being presented to others.  Thus, the truster is in a position of 
the kind of epistemic powerlessness discussed in chapter one.  Perhaps in a small community, 
one could, with only casual inquiry, find out whether and how one’s gossip is being spread 
around.  But in larger communities, this is impractical.  Every person knows many people with 
whom she could share gossip.  If I tell Susan something, there are many people with whom 
Susan could indiscreetly share my gossip.  I may not normally interact with these people.  Thus, 
the gossip may spread through the community in a way that reflects poorly on me, and I would 
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not know.  This makes it extremely hard to determine whether one’s partner in gossip has let one 
down.  One could, I suppose, constantly check in with all the members of the community to see 
whether they have heard what you said about so-and-so, but the costs of such vigilance are 
bound to outweigh the benefits, and those people are not bound to tell you the truth.  In any case, 
one is in a position of relative epistemic powerlessness.  When one has difficulty determining 
whether the relied upon has let one down, one is unable to retaliate effectively against her.  Thus, 
the reciprocity rational choice explanation provides a poor explanation of the practice of gossip 
in general.  I see no reason why it should provide a better explanation in the particular case of 
technical gossip between scientists. 
3.2.2.5 The practice of sharing shop talk rests on trust and is difficult to explain in terms of 
mere reliance 
The sharing of information about one’s own work through the practice of shop talk rests 
on trust in much the same way that sharing of one’s own materials and technology does.  The 
same risks of scooping are present for the scientist who shares information about her work.  The 
scientist who shares information about her work assumes that the recipient will not use the 
information to scoop the donor.  In making plans on the basis of this assumption, the scientist 
becomes vulnerable to having her practical reasoning undermined.  Thus, by sharing, scientists 
adopt the cognitive attitude described in part (1) of (T).  The same arguments given above for 
why sharing materials and technology rests upon trust rather than mere reliance also apply to 
shop talk.  First, mere reliance accounts cannot explain why powerless individuals share 
information about their work.  Second, rational choice accounts cannot explain how networks of 
sharing information about one’s work, which carries significant risks, get off the ground.  
 130 
Therefore, shop talk, like sharing materials and technology is best explained in terms of a 
background of trust. 
There is one additional feature of the background of trust that supports shop talk in 
communities that engage in extensive collaborative problem solving.  Assigning individual credit 
for work in such a community is problematic.  When everyone jointly engages in the process of 
criticizing and refining the research, it is difficult to give each person who contributed to the 
final product the appropriate credit for the work she did.  Communities which work highly 
collaboratively sometimes resolve this problem by abandoning the private ownership of ideas.  
This was a widely recognized feature of Morgan’s lab: 
A unique feature of the Morgan group was the atmosphere in which the major 
ideas were developed and worked out.  There was a constant give and take and 
sense of equality among the four central members, but this sprit rubbed off to 
varying degrees on all those who spend any time in the fly room.  Especially in 
the earlier years (between 1910 and 1915) there was little concern about priority 
or ownership of ideas. (Allen 1978, p.188) 
 
This group worked as a unit.  Each carried on his own experiments, but each 
knew exactly what the others were doing, and each new result was freely 
discussed.  There was little attention paid to priority or to the source of new ideas 
or new interpretations.  (Sturtevant 1965, p.295).52 
 
Knorr Cetina also found this to be a feature of the high energy physics communities she studied 
during the late 1980’s (Knorr Cetina 1999).  The experiments conducted in this field require 
large numbers of scientists to work together.  In these communities  
[i]ndividuating authorship conventions have disappeared; papers reporting 
experimental results will have all members of the collaboration listed on the first 
page(s) of the paper….  The names are in alphabetical order; no clues as to who 
originated the research or performed large chunks of it can be derived from the 
list. (Knorr Cetina 1999, p.167) 
 
                                                 
52 Although this may have been the norm, both Kohler and Allen note that there were individual members of the 
Drosophila community, like Hermann Muller, who retained a strong desire for individual credit in publications 
(Allen 1978, p.205; Kohler 1994, p.105). 
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By not trying to figure out which individual should get credit for each part of the research, 
collaborative communities save themselves a lot of hassle and potential quarrels.   
That said, this system will only work if junior members of the community can depend on 
senior members to provide them with alternative means for advancing their careers.  In a 
community in which a graduate student, postdoc or junior scientist cannot count on having a 
publicized record of her specific contributions to the field, she depends more on letters of 
references and other opportunities to prove her worth.  In the high energy physics community, 
junior members of the community received ‘exposure’ by being selected to give the 
presentations on behalf of the experiment at conferences (Knorr Cetina 1999, p.169).  In 
Morgan’s fly group, the junior members were highly dependent on either positions provided by 
Morgan or references from him.  Thus, the willingness of junior members of a community to 
participate in the collaborative problem solving process of shop talk rests on their assumption 
that they will be fairly provided for by their superiors.  Given the relative powerlessness of junior 
members, it is hard to explain this assumption in terms of mere reliance.  Instead, junior 
members in collaborative communities trust senior members to live up to their relational 
obligations as mentors and supervisors to provide for them.   
In conclusion, communities which share materials and technology, technical gossip and 
shop talk can garner significant epistemic benefits.  The reliability, power, speed, efficiency and 
fertility of research can be enhanced in sharing communities.  Key features of these sharing 
practices rest on a foundation of trust.  Therefore, trust helps provide epistemic benefits to 
scientific communities.  At this point, one might be persuaded that trust can provide such 
benefits, but one might remain worried that trust can also undermine the reliability, power, 
speed, efficiency and fertility of research.  I address this concern in the next chapter. 
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4.0  BALANCING TRUST 
While the previous chapter argued that trust has positive epistemic consequences for 
scientific communities, this chapter considers the potential negative epistemic effects of trusting 
relationships.  In response to the arguments of chapter three, one might object that on the whole, 
trust does more harm than good to the epistemic projects of science.  In order to respond to this 
concern, this chapter presents and responds to three worries one might have about the role of 
trust in producing good science.  First, one might worry that too much sharing will lead to 
harmful conformism within science.  Second, concerns could be raised that trust makes science 
inappropriately value-laden.  Third, one might be concerned that trust between scientists leads to 
epistemic laziness.  Part of my response to these worries is that the epistemic success of science 
results, in part, from science’s ability to balance competition and cooperation, trust and distrust, 
self-interest and other-interest.  This lays the groundwork for a brief outline of some positive 
proposals for how to design scientific communities that maximize the epistemic benefits of trust 
while minimizing its drawbacks.   
4.1 OBJECTION 1: SHARING HAS NEGATIVE EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENCES 
While I have argued that sharing increases the fertility of research in a community, one 
might object that sharing could have the opposite effect, on the grounds that sharing can lead to 
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conformism.  If everyone in a research community uses the same materials and technology, then 
the range of research questions pursued may be smaller than it would if a wider range of 
materials and technology were being used.53  To use the example of stocks of model organisms, 
if everyone in the developmental genetics field is working with fruit flies, then the community 
suffers from lower fertility due to the absence of use of (e.g.) mice to study mammalian 
development.  The critic may accept the arguments made in chapter three showing that sharing 
can have a positive effect on fertility, but nonetheless she may argue that that these benefits may 
be overshadowed by the negative consequences of conformist sharing.  Thus, one might object 
that to the extent that trust fosters sharing, it can have a negative effect on the fertility of 
research.  In addition, this kind of conformism could hurt decrease reliability if a community 
settles on sharing a flawed type of material or technology. 
This objection is correct in pointing out that sharing could decrease fertility and 
reliability.  However, the kind of incentives described by social epistemologies of self-interest 
will tend to work against trends towards strong conformism.  As Kitcher (1993) argues, self-
interested scientists are motivated by a desire to attain the prize of being the first to make a 
discovery.  Kitcher begins with the simplifying assumption that the credit for a discovery is 
shared equally between the scientists who make it.  If many of the community members are all 
using the same method for investigating a problem, then the credit that any individual could hope 
to receive would be so diluted that it is prudent for an individual to switch methods in the hopes 
of gaining more of the credit for herself.  This incentive to switch methods can be present even if 
the probability of success of the new method is lower (Kitcher 1993, p.350).  Thus, self-interest 
can prevent scientists from being too conformist.  In this way, there can still be a variety of 
                                                 
53 This argument can also be made in terms of sharing of technical gossip and shop talk. 
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materials and technology used within a community even if sharing occurs because scientists have 
an incentive to not use the same materials as everyone else.  Thus, in an actual scientific 
community in which scientists are motivated by both self-interest and other-interest, sharing 
need not lead to conformism and a decrease in fertility and reliability.  I return to this theme of a 
balance between self-interest and other-interest at the end of this chapter. 
4.2 OBJECTION 2: TRUST MAKES SCIENCE INAPPROPRIATELY VALUE-
LADEN 
A second objection to the claim that trust has epistemic benefits for scientific 
communities rests on the observation that we tend to trust people who are like us.  It is an 
unfortunate aspect of the human condition that we tend to be suspicious of people different from 
us and feel more trusting towards people who share our background.  In some ways this makes 
sense.  Recall from chapter two that in evaluating the trustworthiness of others, we often look for 
evidence that the trusted shares our values and recognizes the same norms as we do.  This makes 
sense because one wants to know whether one can count on the trusted to live up to the relational 
obligations that one thinks are part of our relationship.  However, we often take this sensible 
approach too far when we rely on stereotypes and prejudice as guides for whether someone 
shares our values.  Thus, whether or not one takes a trusting attitude towards someone can be 
affected, consciously and/or unconsciously, by such factors as the person’s race, ethnicity, 
gender and socioeconomic background, among others.  Because of this tendency, the critic, who 
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sees no reason to think that scientists are any different from everyone else in this regard,54 argues 
that to the extent that it is based on trust, science will be subjective and value-laden. 
This objection is pressing only if it can be shown that the role of trust in science brings 
what Longino labels ‘contextual values’ into the context of justification.  Those who defend the 
claim that science is, and ought to be, value-free are not concerned by the presence of what 
Longino calls ‘constitutive values’.  These are values like accuracy, simplicity, truth, 
repeatability, unification, which “are the source of the rules determining what constitutes 
acceptable scientific practice or scientific method” (Longino 1990, p.4).  The role of constitutive 
values in science is uncontroversial.  What motivates the values-in-science debate is a concern 
that ‘contextual values’ play a role in determining which hypotheses, theories, explanations etc. 
are accepted as having met the appropriate epistemic standards.  Contextual values are “[t]he 
personal, social, and cultural values, those group or individual preferences about what ought to 
be” which “belong to the social and cultural environment in which science is done” (Longino 
1990, p.4).  These are the values which have traditionally been thought antithetical to objective 
science.  Even those who resist the claim that science is value-laden agree that contextual values 
can play a role in the context of discovery in which hypotheses are generated.  The controversial 
claim is that contextual values play a role in the context of justification—that contextual values 
help determine which hypotheses are accepted as having met the standards of justification.  
Recall Merton’s principle of universalism, according to which “[t]he acceptance or rejection of 
claims entering the lists of science is not to depend on the personal or social attributes of their 
protagonists; their race, nationality, religion, class, and personal qualities are as such irrelevant.  
                                                 
54 Allen argues that some of the distrust between T.H. Morgan and H.J. Muller had some basis in their very different 
backgrounds.  Morgan came from a wealthy Southern family, while Muller came from a working class, immigrant 
background (Allen 1978, p.207). 
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Objectivity precludes particularism” (Merton 1942/1996, p.269).  Therefore, if this second 
objection is to have teeth, it needs to show that trust opens the door for contextual values in the 
context of justification. 
Longino’s analysis of the need for transformative criticism provides the basis for such a 
pressing objection.  Longino draws on underdetermination arguments to show that there is a gap 
between hypotheses and the data taken to support them (and also between our experience and the 
data that we extract from it).  She describes the gap between data and hypotheses as follows: 
Data—even as represented in descriptions of observations and experimental 
results—do not on their own, however, indicate that for which they can serve as 
evidence.  Hypotheses, on the other hand, are or consist of statements whose 
content always exceeds that of the statements describing the observational data.  
There is, thus, a logical gap between data and hypotheses…. [I]n the interesting 
cases of scientific reasoning, for example, that concerning the characterization of 
and relations among subatomic particles, hypotheses contain (as essential 
components) expressions not occurring in the description of the observations and 
experimental results serving as evidence for them. (Longino 1990, pp.58-9)55 
 
Background assumptions are, for Longino, what fill this justificatory gap.  Background 
assumptions “determine what states of affairs count as evidence for a hypothesis” (Longino 
1990, pp.56-57).  They can include assumptions about how the expressions occurring in the 
hypotheses are connected to the expressions occurring in the descriptions of the data, as well as 
general methodological principles like the correctness of enumerative induction.  Longino argues 
that background assumptions are justified by having survived a process of critical scrutiny from a 
variety of perspectives.  This variety of perspectives needs to include input from a variety of 
scientists from different racial, ethnic, gender, socioeconomic backgrounds because, as research 
into sexism and racism in science has shown, background assumptions can be based on 
contextual values (e.g. Fausto-Sterling 1985; Gould 1981; Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 1984; 
                                                 
55 For her discussion of the gap between experience and data see (Longino 2002, pp.99-103). 
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Lloyd 1993 and 2005; Longino 1990).  Thus, in order to ensure that background assumptions, 
which provide the framework for justification in science, do not simply reflect the views and 
interests of one segment of society, it is necessary that a true diversity of scientists be included in 
the process of critical scrutiny. 
The pressing version of this objection can now be presented.  In chapter three I argued 
that trust has epistemic benefits because it encourages sharing of materials and technology, 
technical gossip and shop talk.  I argued that such sharing increases the reliability of research 
because it enables more scientists to be part of the process of critically evaluating the materials 
and technology used and the ideas circulated.  This includes critical scrutiny of background 
assumptions.  Given Longino’s arguments for the need to subject background assumptions to 
critical scrutiny, it would seem that she would appreciate the role of trust in fostering more 
critical scrutiny.  However, sheer quantity of critical scrutiny is not enough.  In order for critical 
scrutiny to uncover questionable background assumptions based on contextual values, those 
involved in the critical process need to come from a variety of backgrounds.  But if scientists 
share, collaborate, and discuss their work only or primarily with members of their social circle, 
the kind of diverse criticism that Longino promotes may not take place.  Therefore, to the extent 
that people trust others who are like them, the sharing encouraged by trust will be ineffective at 
uncovering assumptions based on contextual values.  In this way, one might object, trust 
undermines the objectivity of science. 
In responding to this objection, I will not deny that trust has the potential to undermine 
objectivity.  Scientific communities that are ‘old boys’ clubs’ that exclude women and minorities 
are likely to share in ways that do not subject contextually based background assumptions to 
scrutiny.  In societies in which members of particular groups are treated with suspicion, they are 
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more likely to be excluded from sharing networks, and thus some assumptions may go 
unquestioned.  Therefore, this objection is right to point out that trust may undermine the 
questioning of problematic contextual values.  
However, it would be wrong to conclude that trust must have this negative epistemic 
consequence.  While we do have a tendency to trust people like us, it is by no means the case that 
we are incapable of trusting people who are very different from us.  This suggests that the correct 
response to this objection is not to reject the arguments presented in chapter three for a positive 
epistemic role for trust in science.  The correct response is to argue that an epistemically well 
designed scientific community needs more than just trust; it needs to encourage diversity and 
personal relationships between individuals of different backgrounds.  In order for sharing to 
increase reliability by facilitating the kind of transformative criticism Longino describes, 
scientists need to create diverse sharing networks.  This is one way that an epistemology of 
other-interest can be supplemented by Longino’s ‘contextual empiricist’ social epistemology. 
4.3 OBJECTION 3:  TRUST ENCOURAGES EPISTEMIC LAZINESS 
A third objection to the claim that trusting relationships have significant epistemic value 
rests on the worry that trust encourages epistemic laziness.  The concern is that trust could be 
used as an excuse by negligent scientists who give unwarranted credence to what their colleagues 
tell them.  This could be one means by which trust has a negative epistemic impact on the 
community.  For instance, a concern one might have about the role of technical gossip and shop 
talk in science is that if scientists are too gullible in believing what their colleagues tell them, 
misinformation can spread throughout the community.  This might happen through the 
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unintentional dispersal of inaccurate information or through the malicious spreading of 
misinformation.  Someone who objects to the arguments of chapter three might point out that 
information about results spread through the informal communication of technical gossip and 
shop talk does not go through the rigorous peer-review process, which makes it more likely to 
contain inaccuracies.  In addition, one might worry that trust in one’s colleagues prevents 
scientists from recognizing misconduct.  Thus, epistemically lazy scientists who trust their 
colleagues allow fraud to go on under their noses.   
The critic points to instances of trust being used as an excuse for ignorance and 
inattentiveness to one’s responsibilities.  For example, CEOs of large corporations have tried to 
evade charges of malfeasance by claiming that they should not be expected to have done more to 
prevent wrongdoing because they trusted their subordinates (Pasha 2006).  The CEOs maintain 
that they were ignorant of any wrongdoing on the part of their subordinates and simply trusted 
them to follow the law.  In a more commonplace context, the critic points to the mother who says 
she trusts her partner and is so absent from her family that she fails to see evidence that her 
children are being abused.  In both of these cases, trust is used as an excuse for epistemically 
blameworthy behavior.  Thus, one might be concerned that endorsing trust between scientists 
could lead to similar epistemically damaging behaviors.   
To appreciate why this objection is pressing, one must recognize that justified trust in 
someone does involve letting one’s guard down to some extent (Baier 1994, p.139).  Part of the 
reason why trust makes us vulnerable is that when one trusts, one lets down one’s guard a little 
and does not engage in constant monitoring of the trusted to make sure she is acting as expected.  
For example, suppose that I know that my colleague is particularly conscientious and considers it 
her duty to her colleagues to double-check her work, and I know of no reason why she would be 
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prevented from doing so or motivated not to do so in this particular instance.  In this case, it 
seems that I am justified in trusting her to provide accurate results, and I am not obliged to check 
and double-check her work myself.  My justified trust in my colleague absolves me of the 
responsibility to engage in burdensome monitoring.  Thus, objection three can be interpreted as 
asking the following questions:  If trust absolves one of some of the responsibility to monitor, 
how is trust not just epistemically lazy?  Why is justified trust not just an excuse to be lazy? 
My response to this objection is that while justified trust does absolve one of burdensome 
monitoring, it still requires an adequate amount of monitoring, and so it is not epistemically lazy.  
In order for A’s trust in B to do C to be justified, A must have some reason to assume that B will 
do C.  In cases of ongoing trust, when A trusts B to do C over a period of time (e.g. I trust my 
colleague to work conscientiously throughout our project), A has an epistemic responsibility to 
check periodically whether her reasons for trusting B to do C still hold.56  Thus, the carelessness 
of the CEO and the mother are blameworthy even if they did trust the wrongdoers.  They ought 
to be faulted for misplacing their trust and also for being neglectful in their responsibilities.  The 
CEO has a responsibility to remain well-informed about the dealings of her corporation and to 
ensure that it pursues no illegal or unethical actions.  The mother has a responsibility to 
determine whether her children are safe.  Neither the CEO nor the mother can abdicate this 
responsibility to someone else, even if they trust that person.57  Trust does not justify epistemic 
negligence.   
                                                 
56 Recall from chapter two that A’s reasons for trusting B to do C can be evidential or pragmatic.  In cases when A 
believes that B will do C, A’s belief is justified by evidence that B will do C.  When A accepts that B will do C for 
pragmatic reasons, A’s acceptance is justified by evidence that trusting B to do C will, in fact, accomplish the 
pragmatic goals at issue.  Thus, in both types of trust, the truster has an epistemic responsibility to discharge. 
57 This is not to say that there cannot be extraordinary circumstances in which we do not hold people to their 
responsibilities.  For example, suppose the mother is drugged by her partner and cannot exercise due care to make 
sure her children are safe.  However, in situations like these, even the critic of trust will agree that the mother was 
not lazy. 
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This is also the case in science where trust in a colleague does not absolve one of the 
responsibility to exercise due diligence to make sure that one’s trust is justified.  When one 
engages in technical gossip or shop talk, one has a responsibility to recognize that, as informal 
communication, it has not passed through the peer review and replication process.  Thus, one has 
an epistemic responsibility to make sure that one has good reason to trust what a fellow scientist 
says.  Similarly when one trusts one’s colleague to provide solid research, one has a 
responsibility to remain reasonably well-informed about her activities.  One’s trust absolves one 
of the need to obtain independent verification of everything one is told and of the need to check 
up constantly on one’s partners in research, but that does not mean that one’s trust justifies 
laziness.   
The threat of scientists giving undue credence to their colleagues’ work and the need for 
scientists to exercise due diligence is illustrated in the controversy surrounding the South Korean 
stem cell researcher Hwang Woo Suk.  Hwang gained international fame for his 2004 paper in 
Science, in which he claimed to have succeeded in cloning human embryos and extracting stem 
cells from cloned embryos.  In 2005 he again published a breakthrough paper in Science; this 
time he reported that his team at Seoul National University had developed embryonic stem cell 
lines tailored to specific patients.  With the publication of these results, Hwang staked his claim 
for priority in some of the most sought after breakthroughs in stem cell research.   
Unfortunately, reports began to surface in 2005 that undermined Hwang’s credibility.  
First, it was discovered that Hwang had used ethically suspect means to collect the eggs needed 
for his research.  Eggs were donated by two of his junior researchers as well as some South 
Korean women who were paid $1,400 each (“Korea’s cloning crisis” 2005).  To solicit eggs 
from these sources is considered morally dubious, since it is questionable whether subordinates 
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freely choose to donate their eggs, and the potential for exploitation of the poor exists when 
women are paid large sums of money for eggs.  Concerns about Hwang’s ethics increased when 
it was discovered that he had lied to cover up the source of the eggs.   
It was hoped that Hwang’s misdeeds were only related to the issue of egg sources.  For 
example, on December 4th 2005 the New York Times published the following editorial 
comments:  
South Korea's high-flying stem cell researchers—reputedly the best in the world 
at cloning—have stumbled badly in handling the ethical issues of their 
controversial craft. Worse yet, the research team’s leader, a national hero in his 
homeland, lied in an effort to hide his ethical lapses. We can only hope that he has 
not also lied about the astonishing scientific achievements of his research team….  
The key unresolved issue is whether lying about egg donations suggests 
that the Korean team may have lied about its scientific results. So far there is no 
evidence of that. Indeed, American collaborators and observers remain confident 
that the team’s achievements were real. (“Korea’s cloning crisis” 2005) 
 
But only a few weeks later, these hopes were dashed as a university panel found that Hwang had 
forged much of the data in the 2004 and 2005 papers (Chong 2005).  Even though the results of 
another one of Hwang’s papers—this one reporting the first cloning of a dog—were 
authenticated, Hwang’s reputation was ruined, and he resigned from his position at Seoul 
National University.   
The scientific community’s response to Hwang’s deception illustrates Baier’s claim that 
we recognize the pervasiveness of trusting relationships when the atmosphere of trust has been 
polluted (Baier 1994, p.98).  When the fraud was uncovered, scientists were reported in the press 
as acknowledging their vulnerability to being deceived by their colleagues.  For example, stem 
cell researcher Peter Andrews acknowledged the limits of the process of replication. “In the end, 
the progress of science depends on results being repeated in independent labs, but along the way 
we have to work by trusting our colleagues,” he said.  “It comes as a shock when occasionally 
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we find that someone has betrayed that trust” (qtd. in Chong 2005).  Another distinguished stem 
cell researcher, Irving Weissman, responded to speculation that Hwang’s work was sabotaged by 
other members of his lab by noting how vulnerable senior scientists are to fraud on the part of 
people working for them:   
I’ve told people in my lab many times -- there is no doubt that you can fool me. 
It’s a matter of trust between us that you are not doing that…You can be taken in 
by a very clever and overeager person whether they are a professor or an assistant 
professor or a trainee. (qtd. in Fox 2006) 
 
Thus, the case of the South Korean stem cell controversy illustrates the extent to which scientists 
are vulnerable to having put their trust in the wrong colleagues. 
This case also illustrates the ways that such ill-placed trust can cause personal harm for 
those involved and negative epistemic consequences for the community as a whole.  Hwang’s 
fraud caused considerable harm to many people and their scientific work.  His laboratory was 
disrupted and doubt cast on the accuracy of the work of all the scientists involved.  Junior 
scientists and other scientists who worked under him found their credibility undermined.  Some 
of their loss of credibility may be deserved since it has been suggested that some of them aided 
Hwang in his deceit, or even, as some suggest, sabotaged his work.  However, the authentication 
of their work on cloning the dog suggests that his lab was doing some legitimate scientific work, 
which has now been disrupted.  A cloud of suspicion has also been cast over the South Korean 
scientific community who had held Hwang up as a national hero.  Hwang’s international 
collaborators have also suffered.  The role that Gerald Schatten of the University of Pittsburgh 
played in getting Hwang’s work published has received much scrutiny.  While it does not appear 
that Schatten knowingly participated in Hwang’s fabrication of results, he did help get the work 
published and appears as a senior author on one of the papers.  Schatten’s reputation has been 
tarnished by his association with Hwang, and also by his and Hwang’s failure to disclose fully 
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the conflict of interest involved in their application for patents on the technology reported in the 
publications (“Cloning Scam” 2006).  The reputation of the field of stem cell research and, to a 
lesser degree, science as a whole has also suffered as a result of Hwang’s untrustworthiness as 
public trust in the reliability of scientific results has been shaken.  
Hwang’s fraud also had negative epistemic consequences for the scientific community.  
Most obviously, Hwang’s untrustworthiness negatively affects the reliability of the community’s 
results since it introduces falsehoods into the scientific record.  The harm to reliability can 
mushroom as other scientists make inaccurate predictions and ineffective interventions based on 
fabricated research.  The acceptance of falsehoods into the scientific record has other significant 
indirect harms.  As social epistemologists of self-interest note, there are incentives for scientists 
to try to be the first to make a breakthrough.  Once it is reported that the breakthrough has been 
made by someone else, that particular incentive is gone for other scientists to keep trying.  Thus, 
promising lines of research may be dropped, which negatively affects both the speed and 
efficiency of the community.  Fabrication by untrustworthy scientists can slow the progress of 
science as the lines of research that would actually have led to the breakthrough are abandoned.  
The cost of actually making the breakthrough are also increased, harming efficiency, since it is 
costly both to change one’s line of research once the fabricated discovery is published and also to 
change it again once the fabrication has been uncovered (Poling 1992, p.145).  Fraud of this kind 
also negatively affects the efficiency of science because costly investigations must be undertaken 
to uncover the extent to which those associated with the dishonest scientists are themselves 
dishonest and thus deserving of diminished reputation.  Similarly, the speed of scientific progress 
is slowed as these researchers must divert their time away from their work in order to defend 
their reputation.  Thus fraud can make science less reliable, less efficient and slower. 
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Gerald Schatten’s role in the South Korean stem cell controversy illustrates the role that 
trust can play in causing these negative epistemic consequences.  Once the fraud was discovered, 
Schatten was criticized for helping the fraudulent papers get published and for putting his name 
on one of them as a senior author without being involved enough in the actual work to be 
confident that the results were genuine: 
Stem cell pioneer John Gearhart said Schatten’s decision to accept the 
responsibility as senior author of the Korean paper and promote the research 
without overseeing the lab work was the Pitt scientist’s biggest mistake.  “If you 
are a senior author, you have to do more than just accept the integrity of the 
scientific process that you believe is going on,” said Gearhart, a professor of 
medicine at The John Hopkins University’s McKusick-Nathans Institute of 
Genetic Medicine in Baltimore. “You have to be part and parcel to it.” (“Cloning 
scam” 2006) 
 
In statements, Schatten has indicated that he trusted Hwang,58 but he has not attempted to use 
this trust as an excuse.  However, were he to attempt to do so, the quote from Gearhart cites the 
reason why such an excuse would carry little weight.  While Schatten’s trust in Hwang does 
absolve him of a responsibility to engage in constant, burdensome monitoring of Hwang, trust 
does not entitle a scientist to negligence.  Thus, Schatten had an epistemic responsibility to make 
some effort to “do more than just accept the integrity of the scientific process.”   
The primary way trusters can discharge this epistemic responsibility and avoid epistemic 
laziness is by engaging in what I call ‘participatory trust’.  Participatory trust has three main 
components: 1) getting to know the trusted well, 2) participating with the trusted in the activities 
one is trusting her to perform, and 3) taking steps to address some of the structural features of 
one’s relationship with the trusted that can undermine one’s epistemic position.  As I will show, 
judicious performance of these activities is epistemically praiseworthy.   
                                                 
58  “In a written statement Friday, Schatten said he was quitting his 20-month relationship with the South Korea 
group after ‘a breach of trust about possible egg-donor recruitment irregularities’” (Hall 2005). 
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Some of the problems with the negligent trusters like the mother and CEO can be solved 
by their getting to know the trusted better.  The first component of participatory trust is getting to 
know the trusted better so that one can learn things like whether she recognizes relational 
obligations and finds them motivating, or whether there are any other aspects of her character or 
circumstances that might prevent her from acting trustworthily.  Mothers who get to know their 
partners well before they expose their children to them are more likely to uncover character traits 
(e.g. violent temper) that would put the children at risk.  Of course, mothers can be the victims of 
manipulative individuals who hide their true characters from them.  So getting to know the 
trusted well is often not enough to justify continued trust. 
The second part of participatory trust can help mothers and other trusters with this 
problem—by participating in the activities that the partner pursues with her children, she has a 
chance to see just how he interacts with them.  By taking an active role in the family and the 
partner’s role in it, the mother will gain information relevant to protecting her children.59  By 
actively participating in family life, she gives herself the opportunity to discover evidence that 
falsifies her assumption that the partner can be trusted.  For example, by dressing the children, 
she may notice bruises.  Similarly, CEOs who get to know their immediate subordinates well and 
who are active participants in the affairs of their business are more likely both to know who can 
be trusted and also detect wrongdoings.  Such CEOs can still be deceived, but they will have 
lived up to their epistemic responsibilities.  Notice that participatory trust is less a matter of 
making spot checks and surprise visits to check up on the trusted than it is a matter of being 
involved on a regular, normal basis.  Spot checks and surprise visits can be very useful in 
                                                 
59 Certainly, there will still be unfortunate cases where the partner is so deceptive and manipulative that even an 
active mother is prevented from ever getting evidence of abuse, but in these cases we are not likely to see the 
mother’s actions as blameworthy—she did all she could be reasonably expected to do to make sure her trust was 
well placed. 
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uncovering evidence of trustworthiness, but they have a tendency to make the visitor look 
suspicious.  Thus, ideally, the responsible truster makes an effort to be regularly involved. 
A third aspect of participatory trust involves taking steps to address some of the structural 
features of one’s relationship with the trusted that can undermine one’s epistemic position.  One 
lesson of standpoint epistemology is that one’s position in power structures and institutions can 
affect the evidence available to one.60  Information does not flow equally among all levels in a 
hierarchy.  Individuals in positions of power need to take steps, like having an ‘open door’ policy 
and encouraging organizational dissent, to make sure that subordinates do not hide problems 
from them (Harris et al. 2005, p.42, p.207).  Being approachable is epistemically valuable to 
mothers and CEOs alike because they can learn useful information about people they trust if 
their children and employees feel comfortable coming to them.  People in positions of relative 
powerlessness need to make an effort to find out what kind of information is typically hidden 
from them and, when necessary, to try to gain access to that information to which they are not 
ordinarily privy.  This is not to say that trusters are required to escape the limitations of their 
epistemic location.  That would be requiring too much.  All that is required is that trusters take 
steps to recognize the limitations and do what is possible and reasonable to overcome them.   
Participatory trust should also be expected of scientists.  One natural interpretation of 
Gearhart’s comment that “you have to do more than just accept the integrity of the scientific 
process that you believe is going on….  You have to be part and parcel to it” is that he is 
criticizing Schatten for not participating enough in the research.  Scientists who are part of a 
collaboration can live up to their epistemic responsibilities by getting to know their partners well 
                                                 
60 For a useful summary of feminist standpoint epistemology, see Harding (1991).  Many standpoint epistemologists 
want to draw stronger conclusions about the privileged epistemic location of oppressed groups (e.g. Harding 1991, 
p.119).  By recognizing one of the insights of standpoint epistemology, I do not endorse these stronger claims, 
which are not directly relevant to the point I make here. 
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and by participating in the work as much as is reasonable.  Getting to know one’s collaborator 
well involves knowing things like how committed she is to professional standards of ethical 
conduct, how conscientious she has been in the past, how desperate she is to find results that will 
improve her reputation, and how often she tends to cut corners in ways that threaten the integrity 
of the research.  These are things that one can find out in part by talking to one’s partner and the 
partner’s past colleagues, but they are also things one can learn best by seeing one’s collaborator 
in action, and this requires active participation in the work.  This can include being in the lab 
when experiments are performed, being party to conversations where the results are analyzed and 
witnessing what changes are made to experimental design or analytical methodology.   
Of course, there will be practical constraints that will limit scientists’ ability to participate 
in the work of their colleagues.  For example, international collaborations will face the 
challenges of distance and expense of travel.  Such limitations do not make responsible trust 
impossible.  In these circumstances, scientists can still actively participate in the work of their 
colleagues by using teleconferencing and other communication technologies to join the 
conversations in which experiments are designed, problems are addressed and data is analyzed.  
They can also, to the extent possible, make the effort to visit their partner’s labs occasionally.  
All that participatory trust requires is that scientists make a reasonable effort to be part of the 
process of their partners’ research.  Finally, issues of power and epistemic location are important 
for scientists to take into account.  Open door policies, encouraging dissent and understanding 
what information is being kept from one by more powerful members of the community are all 
policies that scientists would be well advised to follow. 
Knorr Cetina’s account of the role of the lead scientists in high energy physics provides a 
useful illustration of active participation on the part of senior scientists.  As was discussed in 
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chapter three, high energy physics is a field characterized by very large collaborations.  Knorr 
Cetina describes the lead scientists’ place within the collaboration as follows: “Graphically 
speaking, leaders were not the “top” of an experiment, not its “spearhead” pointing forward, but 
were centrally placed within it.  Above all, they were centrally located in the conversation 
conducted within the collaboration” (Knorr Cetina 1999, p.180).  The leader is the 
‘spokesperson’ for, ‘secretary general’ of, and ‘true participant’ in the experiment (Knorr Cetina 
1999, p.180).  As spokesperson, the leader interacts with the community outside the experiment 
by attending conferences and interacting with institutional management.  As secretary general, 
the lead scientist “is someone who gathers information and relays it—someone who functions as 
an intellectual administrator, who ‘handles’, knows, passes on matters, and can be contacted 
about them” (Knorr Cetina 1999, p.180).  Finally as true participants, the leaders  
…took care, with co-workers, of parts of the equipment and their functioning; 
they were present not only at meetings that concerned them as leaders but also at 
relevant technical meetings; and they worked closely with some postdocs and 
younger collaborators. (Knorr Cetina 1999, p.180) 
 
These lead scientists, who occupy this central position within the experiment, are active 
participants in the experiment.  They may trust the postdocs and younger collaborators who are 
part of the experiment, but this trust is hardly passive or lazy.  It is in this way that trusting 
scientists can live up to the epistemic obligations that are part of working in collaboration.61 
A responsible truster will engage in some or all of these activities to a reasonable extent.  
Of course, too much or heavy handed practice of these activities will be taken by the trusted as a 
sign of distrust.  Thus, epistemically responsible trust is a matter of balancing the need for 
                                                 
61 One might think that participatory trust is simply common sense and must be already widely practiced in science, 
but this is not necessarily the case.  Poling (1992) reports his experiences working with a collaborator who was later 
found to have fabricated his results.  Poling reports that in the case of one paper, he visited the study site but did not 
observe experimental sessions, and in another paper he did not visit either of the two study sites while his colleague 
was supposedly collecting data (Poling 1992, p.143). 
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verifying that one’s trust is well placed with the need to truly trust by refraining from excessive 
monitoring.  There is no magical formula for determining how much of each kind of 
participatory activity one needs to perform in each instance of trust.  Common sense, trial and 
error and learning from other participatory trusters are all useful guides in striking the right 
balance. 
It is important to remember that the kind of trust discussed here as participatory trust is 
not the kind of trust described by the rational choice approach.  The purpose of getting to know 
the trusted is not to learn what the trusted values so that one can provide incentives for 
trustworthy behavior.  The reason for active participation is not to use one’s regular presence as a 
deterrent that makes it in the trusted’s self-interest to act as expected, although this may be a 
side-benefit.  Nor is the purpose to be present to detect untrustworthy behavior so that it can be 
punished, although this may be another bonus.  The purpose of these activities is to determine 
whether one’s trust is justified.  Were one to engage in the activities that support participatory 
trust simply in order to obtain these side-benefits, one would be merely relying on the individual.  
That one can acquire these side-benefits from these activities shows that they are also helpful to 
epistemically responsible mere reliers.  Thus, there may also be participatory reliance, but it is 
important not to confuse it with participatory trust. 
Interestingly, although participatory reliance is a possibility, it is not frequently 
encountered.  Engaging in participatory activities tends to lead us to adopt an attitude of trust 
rather than reliance.  This is because trust is morally inflected in the way outlined by Strawson.  
Recall from chapter two that reactive emotions are those emotions to which humans are naturally 
subject as a result of their inevitable involvement, or participation, in interpersonal relationships 
(Wallace 1994, pp 31-2).  When we participate in relationships we tend to become susceptible to 
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the reactive emotions.  Thus, someone who actively participates in a relationship, when she is 
working on the assumption that the partner will do something, will tend to trust, rather than rely 
on, the other.  This is why despite it being possible for mere reliers to discharge their epistemic 
responsibilities by engaging in participatory reliance, they tend instead to adopt another method 
of verifying that their reliance is justified.  I call this other method the ‘audit’ method of 
verification. 
Audit verification is importantly different from participatory verification.  Whereas 
people who follow the participatory method meet their epistemic burdens by being part of the 
action and observing how the trusted/relied upon person acts, followers of the audit method stand 
outside the action and meet their epistemic burdens by requiring the trusted/relied upon to submit 
evidence that her actions meet specific standards.  Take an example from the world of education.  
A principal of a school has an obligation to ensure that her students are being taught well.  Even 
though her trust (or reliance) may absolve her of a duty to monitor every move of the teachers, 
she still has an epistemic burden to find out how well her teachers are performing.  If she follows 
the audit method, then she may try to live up to her epistemic responsibility by instituting a series 
of student tests to measure how the students of various teachers are progressing.  The teachers 
are informed that their performance will be measured by how well their students’ test results 
meet the standards appropriate for their age.  The students take the tests at several points in the 
year, and the principal looks to see if the results improve acceptably, thereby discharging her 
epistemic responsibility to know how the students are progressing.  Through this method, the 
principal can meet her responsibility without ever setting foot inside the classroom.   
Consider another option available to the principal: the participatory method.  If she wants 
to know how the students are doing, she can get out of her office and into the classroom.  She 
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can co-teach a class with each teacher to learn how that teacher works and observe how the 
students respond.  She can work with the teachers as they prepare their classes, grade some 
assignments and meet with parents.  If the principal is diligent about participating in the teaching 
of her schools’ students, she can hardly be said to be epistemically lazy.  So in following the 
participatory method, she shirks no epistemic responsibilities. 
Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages.  One might argue that the audit 
method has the advantage of being less costly.  It is true that there are significant costs to the 
principal’s time for taking the participatory approach.  Participating in all the various aspects of 
teaching could be very time-consuming.  However, it is not obvious that the principal would save 
time by creating and administering the student tests herself.  Of course, she could simply read the 
reports provided by a group that has been hired from outside to create and administer the student 
tests.  However, outsourcing the testing process would be financially costly, so it is not clear that 
the participatory method would be more costly overall than auditing.  There is more merit to the 
argument that the participatory method is, in some way, less objective62 than the audit method.  
When the principal enters the classroom, she has only her own observational and analytical 
powers to rely on in assessing the teachers’ performance.  This means that she can bring her own 
biases and blinders into her assessment.  In contrast, if she were to outsource the testing to a 
group of people, the assessment process would be subject to a process of criticism that could 
weed out individual biases.  There is no way to outsource participation.  Therefore, the 
participatory method does not have the benefit of using objective measurements and standards.  
However, the audit method has other problems, which the participatory method avoids.  These 
                                                 
62 ‘Objective’ is here being used in Longino’s sense of being subjected to intersubjective critical scrutiny (Longino 
1990). 
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problems are particularly pressing when the audit method is used, as it frequently is, in 
conjunction with mere reliance.   
Audit reliance can undermine the goals of an enterprise by distracting people from their 
true goals and by providing perverse incentives.  Onora O’Neill discuses these problems in her 
criticism of what she calls the ‘culture of accountability’ (O’Neill 2002).  In the United Kingdom 
during the 1990s, reports of a crisis of public trust in public institutions like the educational and 
health systems led to calls for increased accountability.  New legislation and regulations were put 
in place to make precise measurements of performance in these sectors and sanction schools and 
hospitals that fall short of the performance indicators.  Essentially, legislators and regulators 
responded to the perceived crisis of trust by trying to improve the effectiveness of their reliance 
on the self-interest of teachers and health care professionals.  They hoped that if the punishment 
for poor performance were stiff enough and auditing mechanisms for detecting poor performance 
were effective, performance would improve.  This would cause public confidence in the system 
to return.  O’Neill argues that this culture of accountability distorts the “proper aims of 
professional practice” (O’Neill 2002, p.50).  This happens because the auditing process distracts 
professionals from the work they are really supposed to be doing:   
Much professional practice used to centre on interaction with those whom 
professionals serve: patients and pupils, students and families in need.  Now there 
is less time to do this because everyone has to record the details of what they do 
and compile the evidence to protect themselves against the possibility not only of 
plausible, but of far-fetched complaints. (O’Neill 2002, p.50) 
 
Under a culture of accountability, teachers spend more time administering standardized tests and 
less time actually teaching, and doctors spend more time filling out paperwork with less time 
remaining to address the needs of their patients.  The concern is that this system of audit reliance 
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may in fact decrease the quality of work because it decreases the amount of time that people 
have to do the work.   
The problem of perverse incentives is a slightly different way that audit reliance can be 
self-defeating.  Even the best performance indicators, the standards by which good performance 
is measured and verified, are chosen because they are “at the very best” surrogates for the real 
objectives of the activity measured (O’Neill 2002, p.55).  Good test performance is not the real 
objective of education, but if the test is designed well, then it is a good substitute for the ultimate 
objectives.  One of the reasons why it is a good substitute is that it is easily operationalized and 
measured (O’Neill 2002, p.54).  Thus, by taking the audit reliance approach, we end up holding 
people accountable to surrogates for the real objectives of their work.  Unfortunately, sometimes 
the easiest way to meet a surrogate goal turns out to undermine the real goals.  This is 
problematic if, as good mere reliers, we are counting on people to act out of self-interested 
motivations.  Since people will be rewarded or punished based on their ability to meet the 
performance indicators, a system of audit reliance creates incentives for people to act in ways 
that undermine the real goals of their work; in other words, audit reliance can create perverse 
incentives.  O’Neill describes this phenomenon as follows: 
…the performance indicators have a deep effect on professional and institutional 
behaviour.  If a certain [testing] board offers easier examinations in a subject, 
schools have reason to choose that syllabus even if it is educationally inferior.  If 
waiting lists can be reduced faster by concentrating on certain medical 
procedures, hospitals have reason so to do, even if medical priorities differ.  
Perverse incentives are real incentives. (O’Neill 2002, p.55) 
 
By holding people accountable to measurable standards, audit reliance may have the perverse 
effect of encouraging people to act in ways that undermine the goals one is trying to ensure are 
met.  Even though verification by such standards has the epistemic benefit of being somewhat 
 155 
more objective than participatory trust, it can also be self-defeating by distracting individuals 
from the real purpose of their work and even providing perverse incentives.  
Distraction and perverse incentives are not just problems for audit reliance in education 
and health care; they are problems facing an audit reliance approach to science.  First, attempts to 
use a system of audit reliance to increase confidence in the validity of the predictions and 
interventions published in scientific journals threatens to distract scientists from their real work.  
The response to the crisis of trust in the public sector was a call for increased accountability.  
Similarly, revelations of scientific fraud are usually followed by calls for increased scrutiny of 
articles before they are published in journals.  The South Korean stem cell controversy was no 
exception.  That Hwang’s fabricated results were published in such a reputable journal shocked 
many within and outside the scientific community.  There were calls for independent testing of 
results before publication: “Journals are likely to ask for more supporting data on papers which 
purport to be major breakthroughs; and in some cases, scientists may even open up their work to 
independent experimental analysis before they submit a paper for publication” (Morelle 2006).  
Such calls are not new: Daniel Freedman (1992) discusses proposals for editors to 
“[scrutinize] the bank accounts and laboratory notebooks of contributors” and for journals to 
“‘randomly audit’ laboratory practices (as does the FDA)” (Freedman 1992, p.185).  Such 
independent experimental analysis and auditing might help journals uncover fraud before it is 
published, but it would also require scientists to take time away from their research to work with 
the independent testers.  At the time of the revelation of Hwang’s fraud, Donald Kennedy, Editor 
in Chief of Science, dismissed calls for independent replication of data by a third party, saying it 
was an unreasonable requirement for publication: “I think that to install a procedure by which 
replication by a third party was required for acceptance of a manuscript would impose simply an 
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enormous load on our readership and the scientific community” (Rincon & Amos 2006).  
Auditing of results could thus potentially distract scientists.  This would be self-defeating insofar 
as such distraction could negatively affect the speed, efficiency, power and fertility of the 
community.  Distracted scientists would find their work on their research projects slower and 
more costly if they are required to submit to independent testing.  The demands on their time and 
resources could also create practical barriers to their taking on new research projects, thus 
harming both power and fertility.   
One might object that while extra auditing measures might harm the speed, efficiency, 
power and fertility of scientific research, audit reliance increases the reliability of research.  If 
scientists are held to higher standards of evidence, then inaccurate predictions and ineffective 
interventions are more likely to be weeded out, which is a good thing.  However, there is also a 
way that a culture of accountability in science can undermine reliability.  Unsurprisingly, in the 
wake of scandals, such as the stem cell controversy, government regulators and scientific policy 
makers feel pressure to do something about the dramatic cases of falsification, fabrication and 
plagiarism (FFP) (De Vries et al. 2006).  Thus, the audit reliance approach to science tends to 
focus on setting up procedures to detect FFP, standards to measure FFP and punishments for 
engaging in FFP.  While these efforts may be effective in decreasing the prevalence of FFP, they 
might distract the scientific community from more significant causes of misconduct.  In their 
2006 empirical study of research misconduct, De Vries, Anderson and Martinson found a gap 
between the kinds of misconduct that receive a lot of attention from policy makers and the kinds 
of problematic behavior that scientists themselves view as most damaging to the integrity of 
science: 
It is particularly important to notice that when scientists talk about behaviors that 
compromise the integrity of their work, they do not focus on FFP; rather they 
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mention more mundane (and more common) transgressions, and they link these 
problems to the ambiguities and everyday demands of scientific research. When 
policymakers limit their concern to the prevention of infrequently occurring cases 
of FFP, they overlook the many ways scientists compromise their work in an 
effort to accommodate to the way science is funded and scientists are trained. (De 
Vries et al. 2006, p.47) 
 
In their survey and focus groups, De Vries et al. found that scientists are more concerned about 
the everyday decisions about how to deal with the gray areas of research.  They worry about the 
tough decisions about when ‘cleaning’ one’s data becomes ‘cooking’ the data (De Vries et al. 
2006, p.47).  They worry about sloppy record keeping and how to respond to results one cannot 
replicate.  As one participant in their focus groups observes, spending time to make sure one 
does not engage in FFP can distract scientists from dealing with these other issues of scientific 
integrity: 
It’s a question of over-commitment. These famous people are so busy, I think 
they are mostly ethical, they don’t … violate FFP, but they don’t sit for an hour 
and talk to their students about keeping a lab notebook. In fact they probably, you 
know, don’t even look at the raw data, they just see the final figures and paper. 
(qtd. in De Vries et al. 2006, p.45) 
 
If the scientists interviewed and surveyed by De Vries et al. are right, then it is the commonplace 
practices of cutting the corners and making questionable decisions in gray areas that affect the 
integrity of science more than the rare cases of FFP.  This raises a real worry that an audit 
reliance approach could undermine the reliability of science.  Holding scientists accountable to 
standards aimed at preventing FFP could distract them from dealing with the real problems that 
undermine reliability. 
In addition, independent testing and auditing could provide perverse incentives to 
scientists.  Social epistemologies of self-interest consider desire to publish as one of the primary 
motivations of self-interested scientists.  If results must pass independent tests before 
publication, scientists have an incentive to pursue lines of research that can be easily tested 
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independently.  Thus, fertility could be harmed as research projects that are either difficult to test 
independently or slow and costly to test would be ignored in favor of projects whose results 
could be easily tested.  Hence, audit reliance can have some negative epistemic consequences for 
science. 
To summarize, one objection to the account I have provided of the positive epistemic 
benefits of trust in science is that trust may make scientists epistemically lazy.  The proponent of 
this objection is concerned that trust may be used as an excuse by negligent scientists who give 
unwarranted credence to what their colleagues tell them.  In response, I have argued that 
scientists have a responsibility not to uncritically accept everything their colleagues tell them, 
which includes information gained through technical gossip, shop talk and collaboration.  By 
engaging in participatory trust, scientists can gain the kind of information they need to assess the 
validity of their colleague’s work.  They can do this by getting to know their colleagues well, 
participating in the research as it progresses, and being attentive to the weaknesses of their 
epistemic location.  While participatory trust may leave some room for individual bias in 
evaluations of validity, it avoids the self-defeating problems of distraction and perverse 
incentives that plague systems of audit reliance.  While this does not show that participatory trust 
is always a better approach than audit reliance, it does show that participatory trust is a viable 
alternative and that scientists who trust their colleagues need not be epistemically lazy.  The 
analysis of the relative advantages and disadvantages of participatory trust and audit reliance 
suggests that the proper antidote to epistemic laziness is a combination of the two approaches.   
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4.4 EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES: A BALANCING ACT 
My responses to the previous objections refer to several epistemic benefits and costs of 
both trusting relationships between scientists and competitive relationships based on 
considerations of self-interest.  This naturally again raises the question—should epistemologists 
adopt a social epistemology of self-interest or a social epistemology of trust?  Should 
philosophers of science encourage scientists to rely on the self-interested motivations of their 
colleagues, or should they promote trust in the concern for others that motivates trustworthy 
collaborators? 
This question presents a false dichotomy.  We should not think of these two approaches 
to social epistemology as competitors.  Rather they are complementary analyses.  Both identify 
social practices (reliance and trust) that, when engaged in properly, confer epistemic benefits on 
the community.  Each social practice also has the potential to weaken the epistemic position of 
the scientific community.  These two approaches to social epistemology mirror each other.  
Some of the problems caused by too much reliance and too much self-interested behavior can be 
moderated by greater trust and concern for others.  Similarly, some of the problems associated 
with too much trust can be mitigated by greater reliance on self-interest.  Hence, the two 
approaches complement each other.  A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach will show how social epistemologies of trust and self-interest can balance one another.    
As was argued in chapter three, trust confers several epistemic benefits on a scientific 
community.  Trust facilitates sharing between scientists.  Scientists who trust each other are more 
likely to share a number of key resources including materials and technology.  Communities in 
which materials and technology are shared produce work that is more reliable and powerful 
through a faster, more fertile and more efficient process.  Scientists who trust each other also 
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share information, ideas and critical scrutiny though the practices of shop talk and technical 
gossip.  These modes of communication also positively impact the reliability, power, speed, 
efficiency and fertility of the scientific community in which they operate. 
Unfortunately, as the critics who present the objections discussed above argue, there are 
potential negative epistemic consequences to trusting relationships between scientists.  First, the 
method of verification appropriate to trusters may be somewhat less objective than the method of 
verification favored by mere reliers.  A scientist who fulfills her epistemic responsibility to check 
the validity of her partner’s work by engaging in participatory trust may overlook crucial pieces 
of information.  When the scientist enters the lab, she has only her own observational and 
analytical powers to rely on in assessing the trustworthiness of her partner.  This means that she 
can bring her own biases and blinders into her assessment.  In contrast, if she were to outsource 
the evaluation to an institutional audit reliance process, the assessment process would be subject 
to a process of criticism that could weed out individual biases.  Thus, a more suspicious scientist, 
who merely relied upon an objective system of audit reliance, might do better at picking up on 
the problems with her partner.  Second, a community composed only of other-interested 
scientists who trust each other may have a tendency towards conformism.  By sharing their 
materials and technology and ideas through technical gossip and shop talk, they may come to 
think alike and research the same questions. 
Fortunately, a community of trusting scientists can overcome these drawbacks by also 
having a certain level of competitive incentives in place to appeal to the self-interested 
motivations of scientists.  If scientists who engage in participatory trust also avail themselves of 
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a reasonable63 level of objective audit reliance, then they can both reap the epistemic benefits of 
working with people whose work they know well and also check their judgments of the validity 
of the work against the objective tests.  Similarly, if, following Kitcher’s advice, a community of 
trusters institutes incentives for being the first to make a discovery, then there is an incentive for 
scientists to branch out and use uncommon methods and pursue new research agendas.  In these 
ways, some of the potential harms of trust can be overcome by sensible levels of mere reliance.   
To turn to the other approach, social epistemologists of self-interest are right to say that 
self-interested behavior within a competitive environment has several epistemic benefits.  First, 
once a practice of sharing has become part of a scientific community, self-interest can, as 
Rescher (1989) argues, provide incentives for individuals to reciprocate and keep the sharing 
going.  Second, when scientists are merely relying on each other instead of trusting each other, 
they tend to use objective methods of verification to determine whether their colleagues are 
behaving properly.  Third, as Kitcher and Railton argue, a community of self-interested 
individuals competing for priority will be a cognitively diverse one in which scientists are 
pursuing different research projects (Kitcher 1993, Railton 1994).   
That said, self-interest and our reliance upon it also have negative epistemic 
consequences for a scientific community.  First, self-interested competition tends to breed 
suspicion and undermine trust.  Thus, the more that scientists view their colleagues as motivated 
by competitive instincts to garner reputation and funding, the less they trust each other.  Thus, in 
trying to garner the epistemic benefits outlined by the social epistemologies of self-interest, we 
can miss out on the benefits of depending on the other-interest of scientists.  Second, the role of 
                                                 
63Striking the right balance between reasonable levels of audit reliance and too much audit reliance is not an easy 
task since individuals have differing levels of sensitivity to audit reliance.  Some individuals may feel distrusted by 
even a small amount of audit reliance, and one risks poisoning the relationship if one tries to implement an audit 
reliance process. 
 162 
self-interest in motivating scientific fraud has numerous negative epistemic consequences.  
While the harms of fraud were discussed in section 4.3, it was not noted then that competition 
between self-interested individuals can be a significant cause of fraud (Judson 2004, p.146).  The 
pressure to publish is often cited as one of the main causes of fraud (Judson 2004, p.146, Thelen 
& DiLorenzo 1992, pp.166-172).  Thus, a system of competitive incentives for self-interested 
individuals can provide perverse incentives to fabricate results in order to increase one’s 
reputation.  One might think that the solution to the problems of fraud is increased auditing to 
detect fraud and increased punishments to deter fraud.  However, as was shown in 4.3, such audit 
reliance can distract scientists from their aims and provide further perverse incentives—in this 
case incentives to pursue only the research projects that can be easily verified.  In these ways the 
reliability of a competitive community can be harmed by incentives to engage in fraud and less 
egregious forms of scientific misconduct.  A competitive community can also be slower, less 
efficient and less fertile if it tries to avoid fraud by merely relying on scientists to be motivated 
by self-interest to pass the tests put in place to verify the validity of their work.  
Fortunately, trust and trustworthiness can counteract these negative effects of 
competition.  In a competitive environment that provides perverse incentives to commit fraud, 
scientists are well-advised to work with trustworthy colleagues who are not motivated solely by 
self-interest.  Trustworthiness thus decreases the incidence of fraud.  Of course, it will not 
eliminate it entirely.  Thus, scientists will still need to live up to their epistemic responsibilities to 
ensure that their partners are not engaging in fraud.  The problems of verification can be 
addressed if scientists meet their epistemic burdens through a combination of participatory trust 
and moderate levels of audit reliance.  When a scientist engages in participatory trust, she gains 
substantial amounts of information about the work of her partner.  She, therefore, needs to rely 
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less on methods of audit reliance.  She may nonetheless still want to use some minimal level of 
audit reliance to check her judgments about the validity of her partner’s work.  But since the 
audit reliance will be minimal, it will not seriously impact the speed or efficiency of the work.  
Nor will it create overpowering perverse incentives that will decrease fertility.  Therefore, the 
negative epistemic consequences of relying on self-interest can be mitigated by trust in concern 
for others.  This means that social epistemologies of trust and self-interest complement each 
other. 
Finally, as my response to objection two reveals, social epistemologists need to be 
attentive to issues of power and inclusion.  A community which has stuck the right balance 
between competition and cooperation, reliance and trust, self-interest and other interest, will 
garner many epistemic gains in terms of reliability, power, speed, efficiency and fertility.  
However, if it is a homogenous community in which the critical abilities of oppressed and 
minority groups are not included and valued, background assumptions will go unquestioned and 
the science produced will reflect the values of the dominant group(s).  To maintain the 
objectivity of science as a whole, scientists need to balance their natural tendency to trust people 
who share their values with openness to building trusting relationships across differences.  
Therefore, the social epistemology that emerges from my analysis describes a well-designed 
epistemic community as one in which inclusive, diverse practices and institutions balance 
fostering reliance on the self-interest of scientists with cultivating trust in their other-interest.  
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4.5 SOME PRACTICAL PROPOSALS 
The social epistemologists’ notion of a ‘well-designed’ scientific community is a useful 
fiction.  It is fictional because there is no designer or group of designers who determine how 
scientific communities are organized and which practices will be observed by its members.  But 
it is a useful fiction because it rightly identifies that one of the roles of social epistemology is to 
provide recommendations for how to improve the institutions and practices of science.  While we 
cannot start from scratch and create the ideal epistemic community, we can make improvements 
so that our scientific communities better live up to the norms outlined by social epistemologies.  
In this final section, I outline two practical proposals that are a natural consequence of the social 
epistemology presented here. 
First, epistemically beneficial trust can be fostered by encouraging socializing between 
scientists that is fully inclusive.  Social interaction is not only important for initiating trusting 
relationships between scientists, it is also critical for ensuring that these relationships are based 
on justified, participatory trust.  Therefore, scientific communities that provide opportunities for 
scientists to interact with each other both inside and outside the workplace foster trust and garner 
epistemic benefits.  Scientific leaders (e.g. the leaders of labs, collaborative projects and research 
institutions) ought to create venues for the scientists they supervise to get to know each other.  
For example, T.H. Morgan is remembered for organizing group trips to Woods Hole that helped 
build personal relationships between the Drosophilists (Allen 1978, p.198).  In addition, funding 
bodies can produce better science not only by providing resources for the work itself to be 
carried out, but also by funding conferences, workshops, seminars and other opportunities for 
scientists to get to know their colleagues in the field better.  Funders who have a particular 
interest in reducing scientific fraud ought to not only require that their grantees have in place 
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audit reliance mechanisms to deter misconduct, they ought also to provide travel funds for 
collaborators to visit each other.  Of course, in order for interaction between scientists to foster 
transformative criticism, the avenues for socializing need to be fully inclusive of a diversity of 
scientists.  This means that attention needs to be paid to the extent to which avenues of 
interaction exclude particular types of people.  For example, exclusion of female scientists from 
socializing in male-dominated environments is often cited as one of the factors undermining the 
position of women in science.  Therefore, recognizing that trust between scientists has epistemic 
consequences ought to prompt us to pay more attention to the context and dynamics of the 
environments in which scientists socialize. 
Second, scientific communities ought to invest in the moral education of their members.  
Communities whose members are socialized to recognize moral obligations to their colleagues 
foster other-interested trustworthiness.  Avenues for moral education include both formal ethics 
training and informal mentoring.  Formal ethics training is frequently called for as an antidote to 
fraud (Freedman 1992, Vasgird 2007).  While there is mixed data on the effectiveness of existing 
ethics training, there is some evidence to suggest that it can be effective when it is ongoing and 
integrated into the scientist’s educational program (Anderson et al. 2007).  Ethics training that 
includes discussion of relational obligations might help produce scientists who can be trusted.  
Similarly, informal training through mentoring can be helpful in reducing scientific 
misconduct.64  Mentoring could also have epistemic benefits if mentors teach their students the 
importance of living up to one’s relational obligations to colleagues.  As has been shown, the 
                                                 
64 Interestingly, Anderson et al. (2007) found that the kind of mentoring given makes a difference.  They found that 
mentoring in ethics was correlated with a decrease in misconduct; however, mentoring in financial matters (e.g. how 
to obtain funding) and survival skills (e.g. how to build relationships) was correlated with an increase in certain 
kinds of misconduct (Anderson et al. 2007, p.856).  This suggests that some research into the kind of mentoring that 
tends to increase other-interest in scientists would be useful. 
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community of Drosophilists garnered significant epistemic benefits from the role Morgan and 
other senior Drosophilists played in training their students in the rules of their community’s 
moral economy.  Finally, there may be some value in instructing scientists in the insights of 
social epistemology (including the social epistemology of trust), since it is scientists, rather than 
philosophers, who are primarily responsible for inculcating and maintaining the moral standards 
of the scientific community.  Therefore, a social epistemology of trust brings attention to the 
epistemic value of moral education in science. 
In conclusion, not only does paying attention to the role of trust in science reveal that 
trust and trustworthiness have epistemic benefits for scientific communities, but recognizing the 
negative consequences of trust in science reveals the value of a balanced approach to social 
epistemology.  When social epistemologists recognize the role that both self-interest and other-
interest play in science, a host of issues are raised which might otherwise be overlooked.  Not 
only are epistemologists pressed to investigate the epistemic merits of practices like sharing, 
mentoring, and socializing; but we are also compelled to examine the epistemic significance of 
power relations and diversity.   
In the introduction, I began by asking what ethics can contribute to the epistemology of 
science.  I have shown that the ethical concept of trust provides the tools for a new avenue of 
research in social epistemology: the social epistemology of trust, in the moral sense.  This new 
line of research differs significantly from past approaches to social epistemology and dominant 
accounts of trust, which both rely on a narrow and rather stark conception of human nature as 
primarily motivated by self-interest.  Rational choice theorists and social epistemologists of self-
interest and both frequently identify their work as merely providing a first step in the analyses of 
trust and the social character of science.  Almost everyone recognizes that humans are motivated 
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by more than mere self-interest.  However, it appears that one reason why these investigations 
have not progressed beyond this first step is that we lacked an account of trust that could 
accommodate non-self-interested motivations.  It is my hope that the account provided here will 
spur further research by ethicists into a thoroughly moral conception of trust, one which 
recognizes that our ability, and need, to trust is deeply connected to our sense of moral duty.  In 
addition, I hope that this account of moral trust and my initial steps in a social epistemology of 
trust will prove to be useful tools for philosophers of science who want to expand our 
understanding of the epistemic consequences of the social character of science.  The success of 
science is grounded on more than the self-interested drive of scientists; nobler motivations like 
concern for others and a sense of moral duty are psychologically real, ethically significant, and 
epistemically important.  
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